

# **PLANNING COMMITTEE**

**23<sup>rd</sup> March 2022**

THE FOLLOWING ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS HAVE BEEN  
RECEIVED SINCE THE PLANNING OFFICER'S REPORT WAS  
PRESENTED TO MEMBERS

## **Amendment Sheet.**

### **P/02411/022 – Thames Central, Hatfield Road, Slough, SL1 1QE**

1.0 Correction in paragraph 2.1 – as set out in paragraph 13.4, there are to be 12 affordable housing units (six 2-bed and six 3-bed)

2.0 Further comments from the Secured by Design/Police Architectural Liaison Officer on the revised current proposals:

I have reviewed the plans you provided separately to the draft condition you suggested, I think the following makes it clear that the condition in the majority of instances addresses my concerns, thank you. In addition, however we would ask that the applicant incorporates formal surveillance within the security strategy to address those areas which lack natural surveillance, in particular the entrances including post boxes, parking and cycle storage levels. I have also requested standards which will address both security and durability for the applicant to adequately address the potential crime risk and surveillance issues in the design. Naturally all access controls are required to drop out for emergency egress, therefore to prevent this being exploited, it is important that the system is able to recover instantaneously following an alarm activation (this is a requirement under SBD but may be worth including within the condition to prevent break glass units being incorporated).

You mentioned the applicant's use of key pad systems for access controls, electronic fob access would be required to allow the system to be easily maintained and amended in a timely manner. I do not know what system they are proposing but any key code operated system would not be appropriate as they easily show 'wear and tear', exposing codes and do not prevent key codes being passed to visitors.

I hope the following comments are of assistance but please let me know if you need anything further from me at this stage.

#### Ground floor

From the plans and images provided this northern entry still lacks a suitable level of surveillance. It relies on existing activity within the glazed stair core to safeguard the entrance and active rooms from dwellings are only present from higher floors. The presence of balconies may assist with surveillance in the summer months however at other times these will obscure sightlines down to the entrance.

The physical security of this entrance must be robust and should meet the minimum standards of LPS 1175 SR2 or equivalent ensuring the durability of the door set is also able to meet the high level of usage required as well as the physical security recommended.

The point of entry into the lobby from the public realm is directly next to the vehicle shuttered entrance creating safety concerns for pedestrians entering and leaving from this door set. It also makes this vehicle shutter particularly vulnerable to unauthorised pedestrian access, allowing them to avoid any access controls present on the communal entrance in favour of entering the development from tailgating a legitimate vehicle. Where appropriate design

changes are not possible this could be mitigated to some level with the use of formal surveillance and robust access controls that should be present from the vehicle and cycle storage areas back into the residential stair cores.

Postal boxes are now present within the lobby of the northern entrance however formal surveillance should also address this area.

Vehicle shutters should be robust with timely activations and operational without the need to exit the vehicle. Again for the purpose of physical security and durability these should meet the minimum standards of LPS 1175 SR2.

### First Floor (Level 2)

This appears to include the cycle storage for all occupants. Formal surveillance should be present in this location.


This floor introduces access to two other cores. Merged cores should generally be avoided as they benefit those intent on crime and anti-social behaviour providing circular free movement within a development and several routes to and from an offence. Therefore, this floor represents a significant risk in terms of crime and anti-social behaviour, again this could be mitigated with robust access controls and formal surveillance.

Secured by Design highlights the importance of compartmentation in large developments and provides some guidance. The applicant must not make the mistake of considering all offenders being external to a development. Neighbourhood disputes impact heavily police resources. Occupants should only have access to areas within the development that they have a legitimate need to access, e.g. a resident located on the 9<sup>th</sup> floor should have access through the communal doors, to mail services, to the parking and cycle storage areas, to the appropriate stair and lift core to access their floor and the floor plate of the level 9. They should not have access to other stair cores or floor plates and should be treated like a visitor should they wish to gain entry at these points.

The applicant therefore needs to address compartmentation of the development through their access controls, how visitor entry will be facilitated and where these entry systems will be located.

### 2<sup>nd</sup> Floor

Compartmentation must be provided through the access controls to ensure only residents are able to exit onto this floor plate.



### 9<sup>th</sup> Floor

This introduces a merged core layout again, it is assumed that this design is required to merge the two buildings in terms of the permitted development scheme and the new development and their shared amenity space, cycle stores etc. Again access controls to compartmentalise the building to prevent access from stair cores onto all floor plates need to be present.

### 14<sup>th</sup> Floor

It is good to see that access to the amenity space is now provided directly off the stair core and not the private residential corridor for any occupants. Once again this will be wholly dependent on adequate access controls being provided. This will include the need for access controls to be present from the amenity space back into the residential corridors.

2.1 The applicant's architect has responded, as follows:

Whilst most of the issues raised in the comments from the SBD Officer can be dealt with by way of a condition I would like to clarify a couple of points.

1. It is proposed to use a programmable key fob access control system throughout the building.
2. Secure key fob access will be provided at first floor level to the circulation cores.
3. Access at each floor level (2<sup>nd</sup> floor upwards) will be limited to the residents of each floor by way of a secure access lobby.



4. A management suite has now been located at first floor level allowing visual monitoring of the both the vehicular access and the pedestrian access. Whilst there is no view to the west this could if necessary be provided by way of an additional window as noted on the attached mark-up.
5. All access points to the building will be provided with CCTV coverage which will be monitored on site by the building manager.
6. All entrance doors will meet the minimum standards of LPS 1175 SR2.
7. All access controls will be linked to fire detection systems to ensure release of any locks in the event of a fire alarm activation.
8. Pedestrians will be afforded priority at the entrance. The footpath level at the vehicular entrance will be raised to provide level access whilst creating a traffic calming ramp for vehicles.
9. The vehicle shutter will be controlled by way of a remote fob which will be provided to residents. Audible and visual warnings will accompany the opening of the shutter.

Can we also suggest a condition like this being included?

I trust this addresses all the points raised by the SBD officer.

#### 4.0 Officer's response:

The SBD lead officer has stated "it clear that the condition in the majority of instances addresses my concerns". So, it recommended that the draft condition be broadened to ensure that the remaining details set out in their comments are covered. Therefore, the draft condition should be replaced by the following agreed by the applicant's architect:

*"A scheme for compliance with Secured by Design and a timetable for accreditation following first occupation will be submitted to and approved in writing by the local planning authority. Development shall be carried out in accordance with the approved details."*

Informative no. 12 would remain.