



London Borough of Camden Pension Fund

PROXY VOTING REVIEW

PERIOD 1st July 2024 to 30th September 2024


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1 Resolution Analysis

- Number of resolutions voted: 3021 (note that it MAY include non-voting items).
- Number of resolutions supported by client: 1938
- Number of resolutions opposed by client: 1041
- Number of resolutions abstained by client: 1
- Number of resolutions Non-voting: 25
- Number of resolutions Withheld by client: 11
- Number of resolutions Not Supported by client: 3


Resolutions Voted



1.1 Number of meetings voted by geographical location

| Location | Number of Meetings Voted |
|-----------------------|--------------------------|
| UK & BRITISH OVERSEAS | 168 |
| EUROPE & GLOBAL EU | 25 |
| USA & CANADA | 27 |
| SOUTH AMERICA | 1 |
| TOTAL | 221 |


Meetings voted by geographic location



1.2 Number of Resolutions by Vote Categories


| Vote Categories | Number of Resolutions |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|
| For | 1938 |
| Abstain | 1 |
| Oppose | 1041 |
| Non-Voting | 25 |
| Not Supported | 3 |
| Withhold | 11 |
| US Frequency Vote on Pay | 1 |
| Withdrawn | 1 |
| TOTAL | 3021 |

Resolutions by Vote Category




1.3 List of meetings not voted and reasons why

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Comment |
|----------------------|--------------|-------|-----------------------|
| VOESTALPINE AG | 03-07-2024 | AGM | Zero shares available |
| SAMPO OYJ | 09-07-2024 | EGM | Zero shares available |
| CAPITA PLC | 29-07-2024 | EGM | Miscellaneous |
| ASCENTIAL PLC | 04-09-2024 | COURT | Zero shares available |
| ASCENTIAL PLC | 04-09-2024 | EGM | Zero shares available |
| EPSILON NET | 10-09-2024 | AGM | Zero shares available |
| RYANAIR HOLDINGS PLC | 12-09-2024 | AGM | Miscellaneous |
| ITHACA ENERGY PLC | 11-09-2024 | EGM | No ballot received |
| COCA-COLA HBC AG | 16-09-2024 | EGM | No ballot received |



1.4 Number of Votes by Region

| | For | Abstain | Oppose | Non-Voting | Not Supported | Withhold | Withdrawn | US Frequency Vote on Pay | Total |
|-----------------------|-------------|----------|-------------|------------|---------------|-----------|-----------|--------------------------|-------------|
| UK & BRITISH OVERSEAS | 1577 | 0 | 783 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 2361 |
| EUROPE & GLOBAL EU | 176 | 0 | 97 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 297 |
| USA & CANADA | 182 | 1 | 161 | 1 | 3 | 11 | 0 | 1 | 360 |
| SOUTH AMERICA | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 |
| TOTAL | 1938 | 1 | 1041 | 25 | 3 | 11 | 1 | 1 | 3021 |




1.5 Votes Made in the Portfolio Per Resolution Category

Portfolio

| | For | Abstain | Oppose | Non-Voting | Not Supported | Withheld | Withdrawn |
|-----------------------------|-----|---------|--------|------------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| All Employee Schemes | 14 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Annual Reports | 160 | 0 | 193 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Articles of Association | 39 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Auditors | 183 | 1 | 121 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Actions | 24 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Donations | 31 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Debt & Loans | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Directors | 965 | 0 | 326 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 |
| Dividend | 133 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Executive Pay Schemes | 1 | 0 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Miscellaneous | 107 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NED Fees | 21 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Voting | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Say on Pay | 0 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Capital Restructuring | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Issue/Re-purchase | 225 | 0 | 294 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Shareholder Resolution | 26 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


Votes Made in Portfolio by Resolution Category



1.6 Votes Made in the UK Per Resolution Category

| | UK | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|------------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| | For | Abstain | Oppose | Non-Voting | Not Supported | Withheld | Withdrawn |
| Annual Reports | 67 | 0 | 67 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Remuneration Reports | 52 | 0 | 74 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Remuneration Policy | 13 | 0 | 26 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Dividend | 115 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Directors | 748 | 0 | 187 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Approve Auditors | 46 | 0 | 92 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Issues | 201 | 0 | 71 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Repurchases | 4 | 0 | 134 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Executive Pay Schemes | 0 | 0 | 20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| All-Employee Schemes | 14 | 0 | 11 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Political Donations | 31 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Articles of Association | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Mergers/Corporate Actions | 19 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Meeting Notification related | 92 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| All Other Resolutions | 157 | 0 | 82 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Shareholder Resolution | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Votes Made in UK by Resolution Category




1.7 Votes Made in the US/Global US & Canada Per Resolution Category

US/Global US & Canada

| | For | Abstain | Oppose | Non-Voting | Not Supported | Withheld | Withdrawn |
|-----------------------------|-----|---------|--------|------------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| All Employee Schemes | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Annual Reports | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Articles of Association | 2 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Auditors | 3 | 1 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Actions | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Donations | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Debt & Loans | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Directors | 147 | 0 | 93 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 |
| Dividend | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Executive Pay Schemes | 1 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Miscellaneous | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NED Fees | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Voting | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Say on Pay | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Capital Restructuring | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Issue/Re-purchase | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Votes Made in US/Global US & Canada by Resolution Category



1.8 Shareholder Votes Made in the US Per Resolution Category


US/Global US and Canada

| | For | Abstain | Oppose | Non-Voting | Not Supported | Withheld | Withdrawn |
|---------------------------------|-----|---------|--------|------------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| Social Policy | | | | | | | |
| Human Rights | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Employment Rights | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Environmental | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Animal Rights | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Lobbying | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Executive Compensation | | | | | | | |
| Performance Metrics Requirement | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Governance | | | | | | | |
| Declassify the Board | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Special Meetings | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Chairman Independence | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Other | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

1.9 Votes Made in the EU & Global EU Per Resolution Category

| | EU & Global EU | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|---------|--------|------------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| | For | Abstain | Oppose | Non-Voting | Not Supported | Withheld | Withdrawn |
| All Employee Schemes | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Annual Reports | 28 | 0 | 22 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Articles of Association | 19 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Auditors | 15 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Actions | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Donations | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Debt & Loans | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Directors | 67 | 0 | 45 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Dividend | 14 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Executive Pay Schemes | 0 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Miscellaneous | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NED Fees | 10 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Voting | 0 | 0 | 0 | 24 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Say on Pay | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Capital Restructuring | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Issue/Re-purchase | 16 | 0 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Shareholder Resolution | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |


Votes Made in EU & Global EU by Resolution Category



1.10 Votes Made in the Global Markets Per Resolution Category

| | Global Markets | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|----------------|---------|--------|------------|---------------|----------|-----------|
| | For | Abstain | Oppose | Non-Voting | Not Supported | Withheld | Withdrawn |
| All Employee Schemes | 14 | 0 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Annual Reports | 160 | 0 | 193 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Articles of Association | 39 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Auditors | 183 | 1 | 121 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Actions | 24 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Corporate Donations | 31 | 0 | 15 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Debt & Loans | 1 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Directors | 965 | 0 | 326 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 0 |
| Dividend | 133 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Executive Pay Schemes | 1 | 0 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Miscellaneous | 105 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| NED Fees | 21 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Non-Voting | 0 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Say on Pay | 0 | 0 | 27 | 0 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Capital Restructuring | 7 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Share Issue/Re-purchase | 225 | 0 | 294 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Shareholder Resolution | 26 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

Votes Made in Global Markets by Resolution Category



1.11 Geographic Breakdown of Meetings All Supported

SZ

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

AS

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

UK

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 168 | 27 | 0 | 27 |

EU

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 25 | 4 | 0 | 4 |

SA

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 1 | 1 | 0 | 1 |

GL

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

JP


| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

US

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 27 | 0 | 0 | 0 |

TOTAL

| Meetings | All For | AGM | EGM |
|----------|---------|-----|-----|
| 221 | 32 | 0 | 32 |



1.12 List of all meetings voted

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|---|--------------|-------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC | 02-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 15 | 0 | 5 |
| CAPITAL GEARING TRUST PLC | 02-07-2024 | AGM | 13 | 10 | 0 | 3 |
| PHOENIX SPREE DEUTSCHLAND | 02-07-2024 | AGM | 11 | 8 | 0 | 3 |
| SNOWFLAKE INC | 02-07-2024 | AGM | 6 | 4 | 0 | 2 |
| JPMORGAN EUROPEAN GROWTH & INCOME PLC | 03-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 11 | 0 | 3 |
| AIRTEL AFRICA PLC | 03-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 11 | 0 | 10 |
| ABRDN DIVERSIFIED INCOME AND GROWTH PLC | 03-07-2024 | EGM | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| J SAINSBURY PLC | 04-07-2024 | AGM | 22 | 16 | 0 | 6 |
| BANCO BILBAO VIZCAYA ARGENTARIA SA (BBVA) | 04-07-2024 | EGM | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| ASSURA PLC | 04-07-2024 | AGM | 18 | 11 | 0 | 7 |
| PIRAEUS PORT AUTHORITY | 04-07-2024 | AGM | 10 | 6 | 0 | 3 |
| 3I INFRASTRUCTURE PLC | 04-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 11 | 0 | 3 |
| HENDERSON EUROTRUST PLC | 04-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| JD SPORTS FASHION PLC | 04-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 16 | 0 | 5 |
| GREAT PORTLAND ESTATES PLC | 04-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 11 | 0 | 9 |
| SCOTTISH MORTGAGE I.T. PLC | 04-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| HARBOUR ENERGY PLC | 05-07-2024 | EGM | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| HIPGNOSIS SONGS FUND | 08-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| HIPGNOSIS SONGS FUND | 08-07-2024 | COURT | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| INDITEX (INDUSTRIA DE DISEÑO TEXTIL) SA | 09-07-2024 | AGM | 17 | 12 | 0 | 5 |
| PERSONAL ASSETS TRUST PLC | 09-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| BRITISH LAND COMPANY PLC | 09-07-2024 | AGM | 24 | 14 | 0 | 10 |
| PERSONAL ASSETS TRUST PLC | 09-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| PALACE CAPITAL PLC | 09-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| PACIFIC ASSETS TRUST PLC | 09-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 13 | 0 | 1 |
| NATIONAL GRID PLC | 10-07-2024 | AGM | 23 | 14 | 0 | 9 |

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|---|--------------|-------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| INTRAKAT SA of TECHICAL & ENERGY PROJECTS | 10-07-2024 | AGM | 8 | 3 | 0 | 2 |
| WORLDWIDE HEALTHCARE TRUST PLC | 10-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| KONINKLIJKE AHOLD DELHAIZE N.V. | 10-07-2024 | EGM | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| SEVERN TRENT PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 15 | 0 | 6 |
| BYTES TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 13 | 0 | 7 |
| BT GROUP PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 11 | 0 | 10 |
| RS GROUP PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 11 | 0 | 9 |
| RENEWI PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 18 | 12 | 0 | 6 |
| DR. MARTENS PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 12 | 0 | 8 |
| DCC PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 19 | 12 | 0 | 7 |
| TEMPLETON EMERGING MARKETS I.T. PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| FIELMANN AG | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 10 | 3 | 0 | 6 |
| VALUE AND INDEXED PROPERTY INCOME TRUST PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 10 | 0 | 4 |
| EYDAP-ATHENS WATER & SEWERAGE | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 13 | 7 | 0 | 3 |
| LAND SECURITIES GROUP PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 11 | 0 | 10 |
| PETS AT HOME GROUP PLC | 11-07-2024 | AGM | 18 | 16 | 0 | 2 |
| TYMAN PLC | 12-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| TYMAN PLC | 12-07-2024 | COURT | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| FORESIGHT SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY | 16-07-2024 | COURT | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| FORESIGHT SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY | 16-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL GROUP | 16-07-2024 | AGM | 19 | 11 | 0 | 8 |
| BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC | 16-07-2024 | AGM | 15 | 9 | 0 | 6 |
| BURBERRY GROUP PLC | 16-07-2024 | AGM | 22 | 16 | 0 | 6 |
| AUTODESK INC. | 16-07-2024 | AGM | 15 | 8 | 0 | 7 |
| MOTOR OIL CORINTH REFINERIES | 17-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| CALEDONIA INVESTMENTS PLC | 17-07-2024 | AGM | 22 | 16 | 0 | 6 |
| EXPERIAN PLC | 17-07-2024 | AGM | 19 | 11 | 0 | 8 |
| EDINBURGH INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 17-07-2024 | AGM | 15 | 13 | 0 | 2 |

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC. | 17-07-2024 | AGM | 18 | 12 | 0 | 6 |
| HELICAL PLC | 17-07-2024 | AGM | 19 | 13 | 0 | 6 |
| HARBOURVEST GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY LTD | 17-07-2024 | AGM | 11 | 9 | 0 | 2 |
| HICL INFRASTRUCTURE PLC | 17-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| SSE PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 24 | 14 | 0 | 10 |
| REGIONAL REIT LIMITED | 18-07-2024 | EGM | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| TR PROPERTY INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 13 | 11 | 0 | 2 |
| FD TECHNOLOGIES PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 9 | 0 | 5 |
| BIG YELLOW GROUP PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 11 | 0 | 9 |
| PREMIER FOODS PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 16 | 0 | 5 |
| QINETIQ GROUP PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 13 | 0 | 7 |
| JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 15 | 0 | 5 |
| THE BIOTECH GROWTH TRUST PLC | 18-07-2024 | AGM | 13 | 11 | 0 | 2 |
| THE BIOTECH GROWTH TRUST PLC | 18-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| UNITED UTILITIES GROUP PLC | 19-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 13 | 0 | 7 |
| LONDONMETRIC PROPERTY PLC | 22-07-2024 | AGM | 19 | 11 | 0 | 8 |
| ABRDN EUROPEAN LOGISTICS INCOME PLC | 23-07-2024 | EGM | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| FIDELITY CHINA SPECIAL SITUATIONS PLC | 23-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 11 | 0 | 3 |
| GB GROUP PLC | 23-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 10 | 0 | 6 |
| FULLER, SMITH & TURNER PLC | 23-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| MITIE GROUP PLC | 23-07-2024 | AGM | 20 | 15 | 0 | 5 |
| EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS SA | 23-07-2024 | AGM | 29 | 21 | 0 | 6 |
| B&M EUROPEAN VALUE RETAIL SA | 23-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 9 | 0 | 12 |
| B&M EUROPEAN VALUE RETAIL SA | 23-07-2024 | EGM | 10 | 8 | 0 | 2 |
| ICON PLC | 23-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 9 | 0 | 5 |
| JPMORGAN EUROPEAN DISCOVERY TRUST PLC | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 13 | 10 | 0 | 3 |
| ALPHA SERVICES AND HOLDINGS S.A | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 10 | 0 | 3 |
| PENNON GROUP PLC | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 23 | 14 | 0 | 9 |

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|--|--------------|------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| MOTORPOINT GROUP PLC | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 15 | 7 | 0 | 8 |
| NORCROS PLC | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 11 | 0 | 5 |
| MOLTEN VENTURES PLC | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 17 | 10 | 0 | 7 |
| URBAN LOGISTICS REIT PLC | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| PALACE CAPITAL PLC | 24-07-2024 | AGM | 9 | 5 | 0 | 4 |
| VICTORIA PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 9 | 2 | 0 | 7 |
| OXFORD INSTRUMENTS PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 18 | 13 | 0 | 5 |
| JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 12 | 3 | 0 | 5 |
| BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 12 | 5 | 0 | 7 |
| JPMORGAN JAPAN SMALL CAP GROWTH & INCOME PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 12 | 10 | 0 | 2 |
| NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 25 | 19 | 0 | 5 |
| NINETY ONE PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 29 | 17 | 0 | 12 |
| MONTANARO UK SMALLER COMPANIES I.T. PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 12 | 11 | 0 | 1 |
| WORKSPACE GROUP PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 18 | 16 | 0 | 2 |
| CMC MARKETS PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 13 | 0 | 8 |
| HALMA PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 22 | 15 | 0 | 7 |
| TATE & LYLE PLC | 25-07-2024 | AGM | 23 | 12 | 0 | 11 |
| CT UK HIGH INCOME TRUST PLC | 26-07-2024 | AGM | 13 | 11 | 0 | 2 |
| FIRSTGROUP PLC | 26-07-2024 | AGM | 21 | 13 | 0 | 8 |
| DISCOVERIE GROUP PLC | 26-07-2024 | AGM | 23 | 11 | 0 | 12 |
| CRANSWICK PLC | 29-07-2024 | AGM | 24 | 13 | 0 | 11 |
| CAPITA PLC | 29-07-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| PICTON PROPERTY INCOME LTD | 30-07-2024 | AGM | 15 | 10 | 0 | 5 |
| VODAFONE GROUP PLC | 30-07-2024 | AGM | 23 | 13 | 0 | 10 |
| SEVERFIELD PLC | 30-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 8 | 0 | 8 |
| LINDE PLC | 30-07-2024 | AGM | 14 | 8 | 0 | 6 |
| RECORD PLC | 30-07-2024 | AGM | 19 | 11 | 0 | 8 |
| MCKESSON CORPORATION | 31-07-2024 | AGM | 16 | 10 | 0 | 6 |

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|---|--------------|------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| VOLEX PLC | 01-08-2024 | AGM | 13 | 7 | 0 | 6 |
| STERIS PLC | 01-08-2024 | AGM | 17 | 7 | 0 | 10 |
| ELECTRONIC ARTS INC | 01-08-2024 | AGM | 11 | 4 | 0 | 7 |
| SEQUOIA ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE INCOME FUND | 01-08-2024 | AGM | 14 | 13 | 0 | 1 |
| REGIONAL REIT LIMITED | 05-08-2024 | AGM | 12 | 9 | 0 | 3 |
| INVESCO PERPETUAL UK SMALLER COMPANIES | 05-08-2024 | EGM | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| NEWRIVER REIT PLC | 05-08-2024 | AGM | 17 | 11 | 0 | 6 |
| SYNCONA LIMITED | 06-08-2024 | AGM | 14 | 11 | 0 | 3 |
| CUSTODIAN PROPERTY INCOME REIT PLC | 08-08-2024 | AGM | 15 | 10 | 0 | 5 |
| INVESTEC PLC | 08-08-2024 | AGM | 33 | 26 | 0 | 7 |
| ATLANTICA SUSTAINABLE INFRASTRUCTURE PLC | 08-08-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| SAPUTO INC | 09-08-2024 | AGM | 13 | 7 | 0 | 6 |
| JPMORGAN GLOBAL CORE REAL ASSETS LIMITED | 12-08-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| NEXTENERGY SOLAR FUND LIMITED | 12-08-2024 | AGM | 14 | 12 | 0 | 2 |
| ABRDN PROPERTY INCOME TRUST LIMITED | 13-08-2024 | AGM | 12 | 11 | 0 | 1 |
| THE GLOBAL SMALLER COMPANIES TRUST PLC | 13-08-2024 | AGM | 15 | 12 | 0 | 3 |
| TELECOM PLUS PLC | 13-08-2024 | AGM | 18 | 10 | 0 | 8 |
| QORVO INC | 13-08-2024 | AGM | 9 | 3 | 0 | 6 |
| THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY | 14-08-2024 | AGM | 12 | 8 | 0 | 4 |
| CAE INC | 14-08-2024 | AGM | 16 | 11 | 1 | 4 |
| C&C GROUP PLC | 15-08-2024 | AGM | 19 | 12 | 0 | 7 |
| YANDEX NV | 15-08-2024 | AGM | 17 | 9 | 0 | 8 |
| ASOS PLC | 20-08-2024 | EGM | 5 | 1 | 0 | 4 |
| MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED | 20-08-2024 | AGM | 11 | 5 | 0 | 6 |
| OCI N.V | 21-08-2024 | EGM | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| GLOBALDATA PLC | 21-08-2024 | EGM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| PROSUS N.V. | 21-08-2024 | AGM | 21 | 9 | 0 | 8 |
| ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED | 22-08-2024 | AGM | 10 | 3 | 0 | 7 |

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|--|--------------|-------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| ORYX INTERNATIONAL GROWTH FUND LTD | 22-08-2024 | AGM | 12 | 5 | 0 | 7 |
| FINSBURY GROWTH & INCOME TRUST PLC | 23-08-2024 | EGM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| BRITVIC PLC | 27-08-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| BRITVIC PLC | 27-08-2024 | COURT | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| MARATHON OIL CORPORATION | 29-08-2024 | EGM | 3 | 1 | 0 | 2 |
| KEYWORDS STUDIOS PLC | 30-08-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| KEYWORDS STUDIOS PLC | 30-08-2024 | COURT | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| JPMORGAN EUROPEAN DISCOVERY TRUST PLC | 02-09-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| JPMORGAN GLOBAL GROWTH & INCOME PLC | 02-09-2024 | EGM | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| WATCHES OF SWITZERLAND GROUP PLC | 03-09-2024 | AGM | 17 | 10 | 0 | 7 |
| DS SMITH PLC | 03-09-2024 | AGM | 19 | 12 | 0 | 7 |
| JPMORGAN GLOBAL CORE REAL ASSETS LIMITED | 03-09-2024 | AGM | 14 | 9 | 0 | 5 |
| TAYLOR MARITIME INVESTMENTS LTD | 04-09-2024 | AGM | 15 | 13 | 0 | 2 |
| AEW UK REIT PLC | 04-09-2024 | AGM | 14 | 11 | 0 | 3 |
| BAILLIE GIFFORD UK GROWTH TRUST PLC | 04-09-2024 | AGM | 13 | 10 | 0 | 3 |
| ODYSSEAN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 04-09-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| ASCENTIAL PLC | 04-09-2024 | COURT | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| ASCENTIAL PLC | 04-09-2024 | EGM | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| SDCL ENERGY EFFICIENCY INCOME TRUST PLC | 04-09-2024 | AGM | 13 | 11 | 0 | 2 |
| LINSELL TRAIN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 04-09-2024 | AGM | 15 | 13 | 0 | 2 |
| ASHTREAD GROUP PLC | 04-09-2024 | AGM | 21 | 9 | 0 | 12 |
| JET2 PLC | 05-09-2024 | AGM | 11 | 6 | 0 | 5 |
| CURRYS PLC | 05-09-2024 | AGM | 18 | 14 | 0 | 4 |
| XPS PENSIONS GROUP PLC | 05-09-2024 | AGM | 23 | 15 | 0 | 8 |
| ALIMENTATION COUCHE-TARD INC | 05-09-2024 | AGM | 23 | 14 | 0 | 9 |
| SPEEDY HIRE PLC | 05-09-2024 | AGM | 22 | 13 | 0 | 9 |
| BERKELEY GROUP HOLDINGS PLC | 06-09-2024 | AGM | 20 | 14 | 0 | 6 |
| HALFORDS GROUP PLC | 06-09-2024 | AGM | 17 | 11 | 0 | 6 |

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|--|--------------|------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| TRIFAST PLC | 10-09-2024 | AGM | 20 | 13 | 0 | 7 |
| MONKS INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 10-09-2024 | AGM | 15 | 11 | 0 | 4 |
| GEN DIGITAL INC | 10-09-2024 | AGM | 13 | 7 | 0 | 6 |
| NIKE INC. | 10-09-2024 | AGM | 11 | 6 | 0 | 4 |
| WAREHOUSE REIT PLC | 11-09-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| NETAPP INC | 11-09-2024 | AGM | 12 | 7 | 0 | 5 |
| POLAR CAPITAL TECHNOLOGY TRUST PLC | 11-09-2024 | AGM | 14 | 11 | 0 | 3 |
| INVESCO ASIA TRUST PLC | 12-09-2024 | AGM | 13 | 10 | 0 | 3 |
| OPEN TEXT CORPORATION | 12-09-2024 | AGM | 14 | 4 | 0 | 10 |
| TWENTYFOUR INCOME FUND LIMITED | 12-09-2024 | AGM | 15 | 11 | 0 | 4 |
| HAMMERSON PLC | 12-09-2024 | EGM | 6 | 5 | 0 | 1 |
| FORESIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED | 13-09-2024 | AGM | 16 | 13 | 0 | 3 |
| HOME REIT PLC | 16-09-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| SCHRODER REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST | 16-09-2024 | AGM | 12 | 9 | 0 | 3 |
| UTILICO EMERGING MARKETS TRUST PLC | 17-09-2024 | AGM | 13 | 10 | 0 | 3 |
| WISE PLC | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 19 | 12 | 0 | 7 |
| TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE INC. | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 12 | 5 | 0 | 7 |
| GORE STREET ENERGY STORAGE FUND PLC | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 16 | 12 | 0 | 4 |
| REAL ESTATE CREDIT INVESTMENTS LTD | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 12 | 8 | 0 | 4 |
| IG GROUP HOLDINGS PLC | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 20 | 13 | 0 | 7 |
| FRASERS GROUP PLC | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 22 | 17 | 0 | 5 |
| AO WORLD PLC | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 18 | 9 | 0 | 9 |
| MOONPIG GROUP PLC | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 17 | 10 | 0 | 7 |
| DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC. | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 16 | 7 | 0 | 9 |
| CONAGRA BRANDS INC. | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 14 | 7 | 0 | 7 |
| GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP PLC | 18-09-2024 | AGM | 14 | 8 | 0 | 6 |
| LIONTRUST ASSET MANAGEMENT | 19-09-2024 | AGM | 19 | 8 | 0 | 11 |
| BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP PLC | 19-09-2024 | AGM | 21 | 11 | 0 | 10 |

| Company | Meeting Date | Type | Resolutions | For | Abstain | Oppose |
|---|--------------|-------|-------------|-----|---------|--------|
| FERREXPO PLC | 19-09-2024 | EGM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| OCI N.V | 19-09-2024 | EGM | 3 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| AUTO TRADER GROUP PLC | 19-09-2024 | AGM | 24 | 12 | 0 | 12 |
| AUGMENTUM FINTECH PLC | 19-09-2024 | AGM | 12 | 10 | 0 | 2 |
| ABRDN NEW INDIA INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 20-09-2024 | AGM | 10 | 7 | 0 | 3 |
| PETROFAC LTD | 23-09-2024 | AGM | 20 | 9 | 0 | 11 |
| ALPHAWAVE IP GROUP PLC | 23-09-2024 | EGM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| FEDEX CORPORATION | 23-09-2024 | AGM | 21 | 8 | 0 | 13 |
| KAINOS GROUP PLC | 24-09-2024 | AGM | 15 | 9 | 0 | 6 |
| ZIGUP PLC | 24-09-2024 | AGM | 20 | 13 | 0 | 7 |
| GENERAL MILLS INC | 24-09-2024 | AGM | 16 | 12 | 0 | 4 |
| INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PLC | 25-09-2024 | AGM | 23 | 14 | 0 | 9 |
| WIZZ AIR HOLDINGS PLC | 25-09-2024 | AGM | 27 | 12 | 0 | 15 |
| RM INFRASTRUCTURE INCOME PLC | 25-09-2024 | EGM | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| DE LA RUE PLC | 25-09-2024 | AGM | 17 | 9 | 0 | 8 |
| DIAGEO PLC | 26-09-2024 | AGM | 20 | 13 | 0 | 7 |
| AVANGRID, INC. | 26-09-2024 | AGM | 18 | 7 | 0 | 11 |
| JUMBO SA | 26-09-2024 | EGM | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| ALFA SAB DE CV | 26-09-2024 | EGM | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 |
| LAMB WESTON HOLDINGS INC | 26-09-2024 | AGM | 13 | 8 | 0 | 5 |
| BAILLIE GIFFORD US GROWTH TRUST PLC | 27-09-2024 | AGM | 12 | 10 | 0 | 2 |
| BALTIC CLASSIFIEDS GROUP PLC | 27-09-2024 | AGM | 21 | 10 | 0 | 10 |
| TRIMBLE INC. | 30-09-2024 | AGM | 13 | 6 | 0 | 7 |
| MARLOWE PLC | 30-09-2024 | AGM | 8 | 4 | 0 | 4 |
| GREATLAND GOLD PLC | 30-09-2024 | EGM | 4 | 2 | 0 | 2 |
| WITAN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 30-09-2024 | EGM | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| WITAN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC | 30-09-2024 | CLASS | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 |

2 Notable Oppose Vote Results With Analysis

Note: Here a notable vote is one where the Oppose result is at least 10%.

BRITISH LAND COMPANY PLC AGM - 09-07-2024

19. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to one third of the Company's issued share capital. This cap can increase to two-thirds of the issued share capital if shares are issued in connection with an offer by way of a rights issue. All directors are standing for annual re-election. This resolution is in line with normal market practice and expires at the next AGM. However, it is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the proposed resolution received significant opposition of 14.2% of the votes. The Company did not disclose information's as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 85.9, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 13.9,

22. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.0, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 10.4,

24. *Meeting Notification-related Proposal*

It is proposed that a general meeting of the Company other than an annual general meeting may be called on not less than 14 clear days' notice.

It is considered that all companies should aim to provide at least 20 working days notice for general meetings in order to give shareholders sufficient time to consider what are often complex issues. However, as the proposed change is permissible by the Companies Act. However, it is noted that in the 2023 Annual general Meeting the proposed resolution received significant opposition of 13.29% of the votes. The Company did not disclosed information's as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 11.1,

WORLDWIDE HEALTHCARE TRUST PLC AGM - 10-07-2024

4. *Re-elect Mr. Doug McCutcheon - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of more than nine years in the Board. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her

oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 71.0, Abstain: 4.9, Oppose/Withhold: 24.1,

5. *Re-elect Mr. Sven Borho - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered to be independent, as this director is considered to be connected with the Portfolio Manager. Mr Borho is a founder and Managing Partner of OrbiMed Capital LLC, the Company's Portfolio Manager. However, there is sufficient independent representation on the Board. It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 73.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 26.8,

RS GROUP PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

It is proposed to approve the remuneration report. No variable remuneration (either short- or long-term) was paid during the year. It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 87.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.0,

16. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits. It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 89.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.1,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.4,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.4,

RENEWI PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

4. *Re-elect Ben Verwaayen - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment. However, in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the resolution for the re-election of Mr. Verwaayen received significant opposition of 19.32% of the votes. The Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.6, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.0,

BYTES TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

15. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 85.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.4,

TYMAN PLC EGM - 12-07-2024

1. *Adopt New Articles of Association*

It is proposed to the shareholders for the purpose of giving effect to the scheme of arrangement dated 11 June 2024 between the Company and the holders of Scheme Shares to approve the authority for the directors of the Company to take all such action as they may consider necessary or appropriate for carrying the Scheme into effect and with effect from the passing of this resolution, the articles of association of the Company be and are amended by the adoption and inclusion of a new Article of Association, Article 145. This proposal is considered to be a technical item in order to publish a new version of the Articles, including the proposed amendments.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 86.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.3,

TYMAN PLC COURT - 12-07-2024

1. *Approve Scheme of Arrangement*

Introduction & Background: On 22 April 2024, the boards of Tyman and Quanex announced that they had agreed the terms of a recommended cash and share offer pursuant to which Quanex will acquire the entire issued and to be issued ordinary share capital of Tyman. It is intended that the Transaction will be implemented by means of a scheme of arrangement under Part 26 of the Companies Act. Quanex has been following Tyman for a number of years and has been impressed with the strategy employed by the Tyman Directors and the Tyman management team in creating a well-balanced and diversified business with a growing global presence. Tyman's product offering is highly complementary and synergistic to Quanex's existing portfolio, which will enable the Enlarged Group to better serve its customers.

Quanex also believes that Tyman's existing business would benefit from the opportunity to market a broader product offering and range of services to existing and new customers. Critically, based on discussions with Tyman's senior management team, Quanex believes there is a high degree of alignment between the internal Quanex and Tyman cultural identities and a shared understanding of how people work together to execute the business strategies.

Proposal: Under the terms of the Transaction, Scheme Shareholders at the Scheme Record Time will receive GBP 240.0 pence in cash and 0.05715 of a New Quanex Share for each Scheme Share.

Rationale: The Tyman Directors therefore believe that a combination with Quanex strengthens Tyman's strategic positioning in the North America marketplace immediately. The Tyman Directors believe that the Transaction would offer further compelling strategic and operational benefits to all stakeholders, including: i) bringing together leading brands in the building products components market, particularly across the fenestration segment in North America, and creating a broad product portfolio with geographic and product complementarity, ii) creating a significant opportunity to cross-sell existing and new products and promote the value proposition to the combined customer base, via strategically aligned routes to market, iii) providing added scale to accelerate product innovation and development initiatives to sustain long-term growth, iv) offering greater capacity to pursue value-creating acquisitions supported by a healthy balance sheet position with modest pro forma leverage post completion of the Transaction, v) bringing together two respected and highly experienced customer-focused management teams with a common culture of excellence and innovation and vi) unlocking substantial value creation for both Tyman and Quanex shareholders, via a significant and tangible cost and potential future revenue synergy opportunity. In addition, As at Announcement, and based on the then announced look-through implied offer value of GBP 400.0 pence per Tyman Share, the Main Offer and the Capped All-Share Alternative represented a premium of approximately: a) 35.1% to the Closing Price of GBP 296.0 pence per Tyman Share on the 19 April 2024, b) 39.6% to the Closing ex Dividend Price of 286.5 pence per Tyman Share on the 19 April 2024, c) 36.0% to the one-month volume weighted average price of GBP 294.2 pence per Tyman Share during the one-month period ended on the 19 April 2024 and d) 40.5% to the six-month volume weighted average price of GBP 284.8 pence per Tyman Share during the six-month period ended on the 19 April 2024.

Recommendation: Such proposals are considered on the basis of whether they are deemed fair, whether they have been adequately explained, and whether there is sufficient independent oversight of the recommended proposal. No serious corporate governance concerns have been identified. The Company has disclosed sufficient details of the transaction and there is a sufficient balance of independence on the board in order to grant that the proposal received due independent oversight. It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 86.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.3,

BURBERRY GROUP PLC AGM - 16-07-2024

11. *Re-elect Antoine Bernard de Saint-Affrique - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director. Although there are concerns over potential aggregate time commitments, this director has attended all Board and committee meetings during the year under review.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 38.1, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL GROUP AGM - 16-07-2024

6. *Re-elect William Rucker - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

As no director has been appointed responsibility for sustainability issues the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's Sustainability programme. The Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise material risks linked to sustainability which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.0, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 12.6,

BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC AGM - 16-07-2024

14. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.1,

EXPERIAN PLC AGM - 17-07-2024

18. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.1, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 10.7,

HELICAL PLC AGM - 17-07-2024

17. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 15.3,

HICL INFRASTRUCTURE PLC AGM - 17-07-2024

9. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Shareholders are being asked to approve the Company's annual report on remuneration. Disclosure of figures and policy is adequate. The aggregate limit set in relation to Directors' remuneration was not exceeded during the year. Directors' remuneration does not comprise any performance-related element, which is welcomed. It is further noted that no additional discretionary payments were made in the year. There was no increase in individual fees during the year under review. Overall, the remuneration practices and the level of fees paid to the Board are considered acceptable.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 90.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.0,

PREMIER FOODS PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

18. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 89.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.5,

QINETIQ GROUP PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report and has failed to disclose sufficient measures taken to address shareholders' concerns. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.0, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 12.3,

SSE PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

21. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 12.0,

22. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 83.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 16.7,

UNITED UTILITIES GROUP PLC AGM - 19-07-2024

4. *Re-elect Sir David Higgins - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 87.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.3,

MITIE GROUP PLC AGM - 23-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are

employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 10.6,

3.a. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. However, it is noted that under the LTIP 2024, the Remuneration Committee will also have reference to leverage (average debt/EBITDA) and ESG underpins such that if leverage and/or progress against the firm's ESG strategy is poor, there is specific discretion to allow the award to be reduced accordingly. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is at least five years and therefore considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: EDD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 74.4, Abstain: 10.5, Oppose/Withhold: 15.1,

3.b. *Amend the rules of the Mitie Group plc Long Term Incentive Plan 2015 for the one-off award to be granted to Chief Executive, Phil Bentley*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the amendments of the Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP). The remuneration committee is proposing to grant Mr. Phil Bentley, Chief Executive of Mitie, an LTIP award of up to 600% of his basic salary within 42 days of 23 July 2024 to motivate and retain him over the next three years. The amendments proposed do not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 70.4, Abstain: 13.2, Oppose/Withhold: 16.4,

FIDELITY CHINA SPECIAL SITUATIONS PLC AGM - 23-07-2024

7. Re-elect Mr. Gordon Orr - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 87.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.5,

B&M EUROPEAN VALUE RETAIL SA EGM - 23-07-2024

2. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.0,

MOTORPOINT GROUP PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

11. Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 88.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.0,

12. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.1,

13. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a

specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.1,

MOLTEN VENTURES PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 78.9, Abstain: 7.5, Oppose/Withhold: 13.6,

11. Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors of the Company

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 57.14% of audit fees during the year under review and 41.18% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises major concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to

make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

12. Allow the Board to Determine the Auditor's Remuneration
Standard proposal.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 88.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.3,

PENNON GROUP PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

16. Climate-Related Financial Disclosures

Governance

There does not appear to be any individual accountability for the policy, and the policy does not list the chair as responsible for the climate strategy. Company management and the sustainability committee hold collective responsibility, which is considered insufficiently focussed for effective execution of policy and for overall accountability.

There is adequate experience and knowledge of climate change and decarbonisation on the board of directors, including at least one non-executive director with significant experience of decarbonisation measures from within the core sector of operations of the company.

There is no evidence of adequate training and learning on the Board or senior management of climate-related issues, most relevantly decarbonization.

The company has not pledged to review or end membership of trade associations or industry environmental lobbying groups, where these pursue goals or advertise actions contrary to the company's climate strategy, which appears inconsistent with its goals and an obstacle to its effectiveness.

Disclosure

The company climate strategy for the overall required energy transition includes a defined timeline, by which progress in emission reductions can be measured.

The company's targets are in line with a plan to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees when compared to pre-industrial levels. This is considered to be best practice, and represents one of the more resilient scenarios.

The company has committed to being carbon neutral by 2050 and includes scopes 1, 2 and 3 emission reductions in this commitment. The company strategy appears to include an actual reduction of carbon emissions rather than having a heavy reliance on offsetting.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.5, Abstain: 1.9, Oppose/Withhold: 17.7,

20. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.7,

NINETY ONE PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

24. *Ninety One Limited: Issue Shares for Cash*

Authority is limited to 5% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits. It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 82.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 17.6,

TATE & LYLE PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

5. *Re-elect Nick Hampton - Chief Executive*

Chief Executive.

As there is no director assigned to oversee sustainability issues, the Chief Executive is held accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Currently, the Company's sustainability policies and practices are deemed insufficient to mitigate material risks associated with sustainability, which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.3, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 11.5,

6. *Re-elect Dawn Allen - Executive Director*

Executive Director. Acceptable service contract provisions.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 88.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.2,

8. *Re-elect John Cheung - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 87.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.5,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 10.4,

DISCOVERIE GROUP PLC AGM - 26-07-2024

9. *Re-elect Clive Watson - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 88.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

14. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits. It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 86.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.6,

15. *Issue Additional Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to 66% of the Company's issued share capital when considering the amounts requested in the proposal above. The authority will expire at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 86.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.6,

CRANSWICK PLC AGM - 29-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.2,

RECORD PLC AGM - 30-07-2024**3. Approve Remuneration Policy**

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. The vesting scale attached to the LTIP is considered to be overly narrow. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: ADB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 13.7,

4. Approve the amendments to the Record plc Long Term Incentive Plan

It is proposed to approve the amendments of the Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan. The new limit and additional performance condition are required in order to facilitate the implementation of the Company's new Directors Remuneration Policy. The maximum opportunity is to increase from 150% of the salary to 200% of the salary and on the performance conditions Strategic measures will be count for one third of the award. The amendments proposed do not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.2, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 13.7,

CUSTODIAN PROPERTY INCOME REIT PLC AGM - 08-08-2024

3. *Elect David MacLellan - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 86.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.7,

7. *Re-elect Ian Thomas Mattioli - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Nomination Committee. It is noted that this director has significant links to the investment advisor and therefore cannot be supported on the Board. The interests of the fund manager are considered to be in conflict with those of shareholders and the company due to the impact of management fees.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 81.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 18.3,

8. *Re-elect Elizabeth McMeikan - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 75.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 24.7,

NEXTEnergy SOLAR FUND LIMITED AGM - 12-08-2024

14. *Approve the Discontinuation of the Company*

It is proposed that the Company discontinue as an investment trust. The average discount over the year was 31.7 %, and over three years, 16.3%. The decline in performance and the discount to NAV which has been above 10% on aggregate over the last three years, raises questions about its viability.

The discontinuation of an investment trust is supported if the trust's year end share price has been at a discount to NAV of more than 10% on aggregate over the past three fiscal year ends unless the board has provided a clear, cogent and compelling rationale, within the context of its overall investment strategy, in respect of the discount and the actions it is taking to address the situation. Given the Trust's significant discount to NAV over the past three years and the absence of appropriate justification.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 6.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 94.0,

C&C GROUP PLC AGM - 15-08-2024

3.b. *Re-elect Vineet Bhalla - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 83.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.8,

3.c. Re-elect Jill Caseberry - Non-Executive Director
Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 83.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.9,

5. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 40.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 59.4,

9. Issue Shares for Cash

Authority is limited to 5% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 85.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.1,

10. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 85.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.2,

PROSUS N.V. AGM - 21-08-2024

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

It is proposed to approve the implementation of the remuneration policy. There are concerns regarding excess as the total variable remuneration exceeded 200% of the salary. The Company has disclosed quantified targets against which the achievements and the corresponding variable remuneration has been calculated. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. However, opposition is recommended based on excessive remuneration.

Rating: BD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 83.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.5,

8. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

It is proposed to approve the remuneration policy. Variable remuneration appears to be consistently capped, although the payout may exceed 200% of fixed salary. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. The Company has disclosed quantified targets for performance criteria for the entirety of its variable remuneration component. Nevertheless, opposition is recommended based on excessiveness concerns.

Rating: BDC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 83.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.8,

11.2. *Re-elect Craig Enenstein - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Member of the Nomination Committee and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination and Remuneration Committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.3,

WATCHES OF SWITZERLAND GROUP PLC AGM - 03-09-2024

14. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 85.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.9,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 15.6,

JPMORGAN GLOBAL CORE REAL ASSETS LIMITED AGM - 03-09-2024

12. *Approve the Continuation of the Company*

It is proposed that the Company continue as an investment trust for a period expiring at the conclusion of the Company's upcoming annual general meeting. The average discount over the year was 30.5%, and over three years, 18.73%. The decline in performance and the discount to NAV which has been above 10% for each of the last three years, raises questions about its viability.

The continuation of an investment trust is not supported if the trust's year end share price has been at a discount to NAV of more than 10% for each of the past three fiscal year ends unless the board has provided a clear, cogent and compelling rationale, within the context of its overall investment strategy, in respect of the discount and the actions it is taking to address the situation. Given the Trust's significant discount to NAV over the past three years and the absence of appropriate justification, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 33.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 66.1,

AEW UK REIT PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

5. *Elect Robin Archibald - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 77.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 22.5,

ASHTeAD GROUP PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

3. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. The vesting scale attached to the LTIP is considered to be overly narrow. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed

the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to 850% of salary for the CEO and 300% of the salary for the CFO, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as one third of the bonus is deferred in shares over a period of three years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 61.9, Abstain: 2.0, Oppose/Withhold: 36.1,

9. *Re-elect Lucinda Riches - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. There are serious concerns regarding the implementation of remuneration at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.0,

16. *Amend Existing Long Term Incentive Plan*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the amendments of the Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan. The effect of the proposed amendment is to introduce a revised 'individual limit' into the Plan rules, so that awards will not be granted to a participant under the Plan over ordinary shares in the Company with a market value (as determined by the Company's Remuneration Committee at the time an award is granted) in excess of 850% of salary in respect of any financial year of the Company. The provision of the Plan rules approved by shareholders in 2021 stating that awards may be granted in excess of this 'individual limit' to an eligible employee in connection with their recruitment solely to compensate them for any awards forfeited as a result of leaving their former employer remains unchanged. The amendments proposed do not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 61.2, Abstain: 2.0, Oppose/Withhold: 36.8,

CURRYS PLC AGM - 05-09-2024**2. Approve the Remuneration Report**

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

XPS PENSIONS GROUP PLC AGM - 05-09-2024**3. Approve the Remuneration Report**

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 18.0,

4. Approve the Deferred Share Bonus plan

The Board of Directors proposes the shareholders to approve the XPS Pensions Group Deferred Share Bonus Plan (DSBP). Awards made under the DSBP will be in

the form of a deferred right to receive ordinary shares in the Company ('Shares'). The Remuneration Committee may grant an award in one of two forms: (A) nil or nominal cost options and (B) a conditional award. Eligible to participate are any current or former employee (including an Executive Director) of the Company and any of its subsidiaries. The DSBP may operate over new issue Shares, treasury Shares or Shares purchased in the market. In any ten-year period, the Company may not issue (or have the possibility to issue) more than 10% of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company in respect of awards made in that period under the DSBP and any other employee share plan adopted by the Company. Treasury Shares will count as new issue Shares for the purposes of these limits but they will also cease to count towards these limits if institutional investor bodies decide that they need not count. Awards will normally vest at the end of a two-year deferral period and provided the participant is still an employee in the Company's group (as explained further below). The Committee may allow awards to be settled in cash (in whole or in part) where it is appropriate to do so.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.1,

5. *Approve the increase in non-executives fees cap limit.*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the increase of the non-executive directors aggregate fees from GBP 500,000 to GBP 750,000. The proposed increase is of 50%, however, there is no increase of the aggregate fees for the Board since 2017 which provides an annual increase of approximately 7.2% for the period 2017 to 2024. The annual increase from the period 2017 to 2024 is within the limit of 10%. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 83.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.1,

6. *Re-elect Alan Bannatyne - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 81.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 18.6,

13. *Re-elect Margaret Snowden - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. There are serious concerns regarding the implementation of remuneration at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.8,

18. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so. Within recommended limits.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 82.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.7,

19. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits. It is noted that on the 2023 Annual General

Meeting the proposed resolution received significant opposition of 13.96% of the votes. the Company did not provide information as to how address the issue with its shareholders. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 83.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.9,

20. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 19.9,

21. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 20.0,

22. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.1,

SPEEDY HIRE PLC AGM - 05-09-2024

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Although it is noted that the Remuneration Committee has the flexibility to utilize non-financial performance targets. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. However, the deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is not considered adequate. Half of the bonus should be

deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BEB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 77.9, Abstain: 3.0, Oppose/Withhold: 19.2,

HALFORDS GROUP PLC AGM - 06-09-2024

12. *Approve Political Donations*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the authority for Political Donations. The Company states that: This resolution concerns Part 14 of the Companies Act 2006 (the Act), which provides that political donations made by a company to political parties, to other political organisations and to independent election candidates or political expenditure incurred by a company must be authorised in advance by shareholders. It is not the policy of the Company to make political donations and the Directors have no intention of changing that policy. However, as a result of the wide definitions in the Act, normal expenditure (such as expenditure on organisations concerned with matters of public policy, law reform and representation of the business community) and business activities (such as communicating with the Government and political parties at local, national and European level) might be construed as either political expenditure or as a donation to a political party or other political organisation and so fall within the restrictions of the Act. This resolution does not purport to authorise any particular donation or expenditure but is expressed in general terms as required by the Act and is intended to authorise normal donations and expenditure, which would not normally be considered to result in the making of political donations or political expenditure being incurred. If passed, resolution 12 would allow the Company and its subsidiaries to make donations to political parties, other political organisations and independent election candidates and to incur political expenditure (as defined in the Act) up to an aggregate limit of £150,000 during the period up to twelve months after the passing of resolution 12, in order to avoid inadvertent infringement of the Act. However, the authority will not be used to make political donations within the normal meaning of that expression. Any political donation made or political expenditure incurred which is in excess of £2,000 will be disclosed in the Company's Annual Report for the next year, as required by the Act.

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 150,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

TRIFAST PLC AGM - 10-09-2024**13. Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights**

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. The related proposal received 19.69% opposition at the previous AGM and the opposition has not been addressed by the Company.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.3,

14. Issue Shares for Cash

Authority is limited to 5% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This proposal was put forward at last years AGM and received 19.46% opposition which has not been addressed by the Company.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.3,

15. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.3,

19. Approve Trifast plc Equity Incentive Plan

The Board proposes the approval of the Trifast plc Equity Incentive Plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.4,

FORESIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED AGM - 13-09-2024

16. *Approve the Discontinuation of the Company*

It is proposed that the Company discontinue as an investment trust due to the high level of discount to NAV for the year under review.

The continuation of an investment trust is not supported if the trust's year-end share price has been at a discount to NAV of more than 10% for each of the past three fiscal year ends unless the board has provided a clear, cogent and compelling rationale, within the context of its overall investment strategy, in respect of the discount and the actions it is taking to address the situation. However, as the Company's discount level over the past three years is considered acceptable, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 7.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 92.6,

SCHRODER REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST AGM - 16-09-2024

5. *Re-elect Alastair Hughes - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 85.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.3,

11. *Issue Shares for Cash*

Authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. A closed-ended investment fund may not issue further shares of the same class as existing shares (including issues of treasury shares) for cash at a price below the net asset value per share of those shares. On this basis, any issuance would not disadvantage current shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 86.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.5,

UTILICO EMERGING MARKETS TRUST PLC AGM - 17-09-2024

7. *Re-elect Eric Stobart - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 78.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 22.0,

REAL ESTATE CREDIT INVESTMENTS LTD AGM - 18-09-2024

12. *Amend Articles*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the amendments of the Articles of Association. the proposed amendments to the Articles include: i) the removal of defined

terms which are not used in the Articles, ii) updating the notice provisions and other provisions regarding communication by electronic means. These updates will allow the Company to communicate with shareholders by electronic means and will provide that shareholders are deemed to accept communication by electronic means unless they notify the Company otherwise, iii) to include provisions allowing for virtual and hybrid meetings, iv) to remove provisions regarding preference shares, there being no preference shares in issue, v) to remove articles 5.10 and 5.11, which refer to an outdated provision of the Companies Law and an expired authority of the Directors to issue shares, vi) to provide the Directors with authority to accept late proxies; and vii) to remove provisions allowing payment of dividends by cheque, as the Company's registrars' bankers are removing cheques as a form of payment of dividends. No significant concerns have been identified. The proposed amendments are in line with applicable regulation.

It is recommended that Camden vote in favour.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 53.1, Abstain: 9.6, Oppose/Withhold: 37.3,

MOONPIG GROUP PLC AGM - 18-09-2024

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 11.1,

GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP PLC AGM - 18-09-2024

10. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 79.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 20.9,

11. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy fall below the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are not required to retain a sufficient shareholding in the Company. It is considered best practice that directors hold the equivalent to at least 200% of salary, built up over no more than five years. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BCB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 73.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 26.7,

FERREXPO PLC EGM - 19-09-2024

1. *Re-elect Vitalii Lisovenko - Designated Non-Executive*

Introduction & Background: At the Annual General Meeting of the Company held on 23 May 2024, Mr. Vitali Lisovenko, an Independent Non-executive Director, did not receive the requisite votes required for re-appointment by independent shareholders. As stated in the Company's Annual General Meeting Notice dated 29 April 2024 and under UK Listing Rule 6.2.9R, when a resolution to re-elect an Independent Director has not been passed by both a majority of the independent shareholders (i.e. shareholders of the Company who are entitled to vote on the election of Directors and who are not controlling shareholders) and a majority of all shareholders (including the controlling shareholders), the Company may put the matter to a second vote of all shareholders, to be held between 90 and 120 days after the Annual General Meeting. Pending the second vote, the relevant Director is deemed to have been re-elected to the Board of the Company for the period from the date of the Annual General Meeting until the earlier of: (a) the conclusion of any second vote; (b) the date 120 days after the Annual General Meeting; and (c) the date of any announcement by the Board that it does not intend to hold a second vote. If the Independent Director's re-election is approved by a majority vote of all shareholders voting at the second General Meeting, the Director will then be re-elected until the next Annual General Meeting. The Company has reached out to shareholders, and the Board now intends to hold a second vote for shareholders to vote on the re-election of Mr. Vitali Lisovenko.

Rationale: Mr. Lisovenko contributes to Ferrexpo plc over 25 years' experience in government finance. In 2005, he served as the head of the Trade and Economic Mission at the Ukrainian Embassy in London. He was an Associate Professor of Finance at the Kyiv State Economic University. Mr. Lisovenko brings extensive experience in the field of Ukrainian government finance together with a deep understanding of geopolitical developments in Ukraine which is valuable to the Company.

In addition, Mr. Lisovenko was appointed Non-executive Director for workforce engagement on 18 February 2021, given that he is located in Ukraine and speaks Ukrainian the language of the majority of the Company's workforce.

Recommendation: Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It would be preferred that companies appoint directors from the workforce rather than designate a non-executive director (NED). Support will be recommended for the election or re-election of designated NEDs provided that no significant employment relations issues have been identified.

It is noted that although the Company following the UK code put the re-election of Mr. Lisovenko to a separate meeting, it did not disclose information for the reason of the significant opposition Mr. Lisovenko received in the Annual General Meeting and how the Company address the issue arise with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.4, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 15.1,

KAINOS GROUP PLC AGM - 24-09-2024

13. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.6,

WIZZ AIR HOLDINGS PLC AGM - 25-09-2024

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration Policy. However, it is clear from Company reporting that sufficient steps have been taken in order to address the concerns raised. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. There is no mitigation statement included within the remuneration policy. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. There is no deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus. Best practice would see half of the bonus deferred in shares over at least two years. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The performance period for the LTIP is at least five years and therefore considered sufficiently long-term.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The

disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 63.0, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 36.5,

4. Amend Existing Omnibus Plan

In addition to the changes to the Directors' Remuneration Policy, the Omnibus Plan rules are proposed to be amended to allow for the LTIP awards described to be awarded to Mr Váradi. Mr Váradi holds a one-off award of 837,943 Ordinary Shares granted under the VCP that was approved by Shareholders at the AGM in 2021 and amended by Shareholders AGM in 2023, (the 'VCP Award'). The terms of the VCP Award would be amended so that any vesting under the VCP would be offset against any vesting under the LTIP.

Long-Term Incentives schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 73.6, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 26.0,

8. Re-elect Barry Eccleston - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. It is noted that on the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Eccleston received significant opposition of 13.37% of the votes and the Company did not disclosed information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

A director on the Board has received more than 10% of the vote in opposition to their election at the previous AGM, and this has not been adequately addressed by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 77.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 22.3,

9. Re-elect Barry Eccleston (Independent Shareholder Vote)

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. It is noted that on the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Eccleston received significant opposition of 13.37% of the votes and the Company did not disclosed information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

A director on the Board has received more than 10% of the vote in opposition to their election at the previous AGM, and this has not been adequately addressed by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 55.4, Abstain: 22.3, Oppose/Withhold: 22.3,

17. *Re-elect Dr Anthony Radev - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.9,

18. *Re-elect Dr Anthony Radev (Independent Shareholder Vote)*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 64.8, Abstain: 22.3, Oppose/Withhold: 12.9,

19. *Re-elect Anna Gatti - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 87.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.9,

20. *Re-elect Anna Gatti (Independent Shareholder Vote)*

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 64.8, Abstain: 22.3, Oppose/Withhold: 12.9,

26. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 81.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 18.9,

27. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 74.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 25.2,

LAMB WESTON HOLDINGS INC AGM - 26-09-2024

4. Amend Articles: Approval of an Amendment to the Company's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Allow for Exculpation of Officers as Permitted by Delaware Law

It is proposed that the Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Juniper, is amended, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding officer exculpation. The Board seeks authority to amend the articles, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding the exculpation of officers. Article VII of the Company's Certificate of Incorporation (Certificate) currently provides for the Company to limit the monetary liability of directors in certain circumstances pursuant to and consistent with the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The State of Delaware recently amended Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL to allow Delaware corporations to extend similar protections to officers. Specifically, the amendments to the DGCL allow Delaware corporations to exculpate their officers for personal liability for breaches of the duty of care in certain circumstances.

While efforts to align executive and non-executive liabilities and harmonize corporate articles are acknowledged, decisions taken by executives, may cause significant higher losses compared to those taken by directors. While officers remain liable for lack of fiduciary duty due to wrongful actions committed wilfully, they would nevertheless be exculpated against direct actions, such as class actions. Shareholders could still act via derivative lawsuits, which are however more complex and less lucrative legal avenue since shareholders would bring an action in the name of the corporation and not in the name of shareholders. This could potentially dissuading shareholders from pursuing actions and entrench poorly performing officers.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.2, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.5,

DIAGEO PLC AGM - 26-09-2024

13. Re-elect Ireena Vittal - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Vote Cast: *For*

Results: For: 89.6, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 10.2,

BALTIC CLASSIFIEDS GROUP PLC AGM - 27-09-2024

18. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.



Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 15.6,

3 Oppose/Abstain Votes With Analysis

MARKS & SPENCER GROUP PLC AGM - 02-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Dividend accrual has been separately categorised which is welcome. Awards made under all schemes during the year are considered excessive as they exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.7,

6. Re-elect Evelyn Bourke - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director. It is noted that on the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Ms. Bourke receive significant opposition of 13.78% of the votes and the Company did not disclosed information as to how address the issue with its shareholders

A director on the Board has received more than 10% of the vote in opposition to their election at the previous AGM and this has not been adequately addressed by the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.9, Abstain: 0.9, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

17. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.1,

18. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.3, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 9.0,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

CAPITAL GEARING TRUST PLC AGM - 02-07-2024

4. *Re-elect Jean Matterson - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as she has served on the Board for over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

11. *Issue Shares for Cash*

Authority is sought to issue more than 10% of the issued share capital for cash and expires at the next AGM. The proposed limit is considered excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.0,

12. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

SNOWFLAKE INC AGM - 02-07-2024**2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation***

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance metrics are replicated under different incentive plans, raising concerns that executives are being rewarded twice for the same performance. Retention awards made up less than one-third of the awards granted to executives, which is considered best practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ACA.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

3. *Appoint the Auditors: PwC LLP*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 36.79% of audit fees during the year under review and 17.31% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

Non-audit fees exceed 25% of audit fees for the year under review and this level of non-audit fees raises concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: Oppose

PHOENIX SPREE DEUTSCHLAND AGM - 02-07-2024**3. *Re-elect Robert Hingley - Chair (Non Executive)***

Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

8. *Appoint the Auditors*

RSM UK Audit LLP proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

10. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

JPMORGAN EUROPEAN GROWTH & INCOME PLC AGM - 03-07-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is considered appropriate. The functions of Investment Manager and Company Secretary are performed by the same company, which is against best practice recommended guidelines. Regarding the lack of vote on the final dividend or dividend policy, PIRC sees this as a derogation of shareholder's rights. It is appreciated that quarterly dividends may be more favourable to shareholders and be what was agreed in the prospectus, however, shareholders should be provided an opportunity to ratify this approach annually through a vote on the dividend policy. This in turn gives the company a mandate to take that particular approach. Such an annual vote on the policy is not considered as overly burdensome and is a useful way for the company to receive feedback on the chosen approach. Based on the lack of vote on dividend and dividend policy, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Dividends have been paid but the final dividend or dividend policy has not been put to a shareholder vote.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

9. Appoint the Auditors

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm

that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

12. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

AIRTEL AFRICA PLC AGM - 03-07-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are considered excessive as they exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are

employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.5, Abstain: 4.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.6,

4. *Re-elect Sunil Bharti Mittal - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent as as Airtel Africa PLC is a subsidiary of Bharti Airtel LTD, of which Sunil Bharti Mittal is the Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

This director is a chair of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.2,

10. *Re-elect Tsega Gebreyes - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

11. *Re-elect Annika Poutiainen - Non-Executive Director*

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

Independent Non-Executive Director and Sustainability champion as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee is the newly appointed CEO the Company's sustainability champion is considered to be accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. The Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise material risks linked to sustainability which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

13. *Re-elect Akhil Kumar Gupta - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director is currently employed by Airtel Africa's parent company in the Bharti Group. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. Therefore, opposition is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

14. *Re-elect Shravin Bharti Mittal - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as a manager in Airtel Africa, the director has also

worked for other subsidiaries and now the parent company Bharti Global LTD. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. Therefore, opposition is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

15. *Re-appoint Deloitte LLP as auditor of the Company*

Deloitte proposed. Non-audit fees represented 37.72% of audit fees during the year under review and 35.56% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Non-audit fees exceed 25% of audit fees for the year under review and this level of non-audit fees raises concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.0, Abstain: 4.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

20. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.6, Abstain: 4.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

J SAINSBURY PLC AGM - 04-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a

vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

7. Re-elect Jo Harlow - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.1,

13. Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as auditor of the Company

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid in the year under review and non-audit fees represents 9.17% of Audit fees on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

17. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

18. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

20. *Approve the renewal of the Long Term Incentive Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of the renewal of the long-term incentive plan. The purpose of the proposal is to renew the plan which was adopted in 2016 for ten years. The operation of the Long-Term Incentive plan will remain the same with only some minor changes for administrative purposes and for the alignment with market practice.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

ASSURA PLC AGM - 04-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating:BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.4, Abstain: 2.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.7,

3. *Re-appoint EY as the Auditors*

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

6. *Re-elect Louise Fowler - Designated Non-Executive*

It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

9. *Re-elect Jonathan Davies - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.8, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 6.9,

16. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

PIRAEUS PORT AUTHORITY AGM - 04-07-2024

3. Approve the Remuneration Report

The remuneration report has not been disclosed at the time. It is considered that the Company has disclosed insufficient details of the remuneration report for the FY2023.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

6. Receive the Directors Report

The report was not made available sufficiently before the meeting. This is considered a serious reporting omission.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

7. Approval of the overall management of the Company and discharge of the Auditors

In this market, auditors discharge may prevent lawsuits or claims for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders. As a consequence, releasing auditors from liability will weaken the governance framework and introduce great risks for investors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

3I INFRASTRUCTURE PLC AGM - 04-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board. Where administrative duties are carried out by the company related to the manager, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Dividends have been paid but the final dividend or dividend policy has not been not put to a shareholder vote.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.3, Abstain: 3.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

5. *Re-elect Doug Bannister - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Member of the Audit & Risk Committee and Member of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that the Audit & Risk Committee and the Remuneration Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members.

This director is a member of the audit committee. The director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. The audit committee is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.7,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

JD SPORTS FASHION PLC AGM - 04-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.6, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

7. Re-elect Kath Smith - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director. Not considered independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as interim CEO from May 2022 to September 2022. It is considered that a Senior Independent Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role. Therefore, an oppose vote is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

13. Re-elect Angela Luger - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

21. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

GREAT PORTLAND ESTATES PLC AGM - 04-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.9,

4. *Re-elect Richard Mully - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

As no director has been appointed responsibility for sustainability issues the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's Sustainability programme. The Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise material risks linked to sustainability which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.7, Abstain: 1.9, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

8. *Re-elect Nick Hampton - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. There are concerns over a potential conflict of interest between his role as an Executive in a listed company

and membership of the remuneration committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

9. *Re-elect Mark Anderson - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director. There are concerns over a potential conflict of interest between his role as an Executive in a listed company and membership of the remuneration committee

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

14. *Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 18.75% of audit fees during the year under review and 17.42% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. [PwC] proposed as new auditor. Auditor rotation is considered a positive factor. Acceptable proposal.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.5, Abstain: 0.9, Oppose/Withhold: 4.6,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.1,

SCOTTISH MORTGAGE I.T. PLC AGM - 04-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

10. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 1.95% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.05% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm

that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

INDITEX (INDUSTRIA DE DISENO TEXTIL) SA AGM - 09-07-2024

1.b. *Discharge the Board*

Standard resolution. At the company, there is no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that such concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

5.b. *Amend Articles 15,17 and 19: General Meetings*

The proposed change aims to make virtual-only General Meetings more flexible by removing the requirement for the board of directors to justify the need for such meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters. Without a clear justification, we recommend Camden opposing virtual-only meetings.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

5.d. *Amend Article 36 : Approval of the Accounts and Distribution of the Income or Loss*

The Board proposes to amend Articles related to the approval of the accounts and distribution of the income or loss. The Company has not disclosed sufficient details in English regarding the amendment. When proposing amendments to the Articles, it is expected that Companies disclose a comparative version of the Articles, before and after the amendments. Therefore, opposition is recommended Camden based on lack of disclosure.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

7.a. *Elect Flora Pérez Marcote - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered to be independent as she is representative of Pontegadea Inversiones, S.L., the majority shareholder. Until 9 December 2015 Ms. Marcote was the representative of Gartler, S.L. on the Board, company which merged with Pontegadea Inversiones, S.L. Ms Flora Pérez Marcote has spent a long career within the Inditex Group, where she held different positions in areas relating to both design and purchase of products in the Zara brand. Additionally, not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

8. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

It is proposed to approve the annual report on remuneration of Executive and Non-Executive directors with an advisory vote. There are excessiveness concerns as the total variable remuneration exceeded 200% of the salary. In addition, the Company has not fully disclosed quantified targets against which the achievements and the corresponding variable remuneration has been calculated. Although a common practice in this market as this is deemed to be sensitive information, it prevents an accurate assessment and may lead to overpayment against underperformance. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. However, opposition is recommended based on excessive remuneration.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

BRITISH LAND COMPANY PLC AGM - 09-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a

vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 7.2,

6. *Re-elect Lynn Gladden - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is sufficient independent representation on the Board. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Remuneration Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

10. *Elect Amanda Mackenzie - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

14. *Elect William Rucker - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

16. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC) as auditor of the Company*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm

that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

19. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to one third of the Company's issued share capital. This cap can increase to two-thirds of the issued share capital if shares are issued in connection with an offer by way of a rights issue. All directors are standing for annual re-election. This resolution is in line with normal market practice and expires at the next AGM. However, it is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the proposed resolution received significant opposition of 14.2% of the votes. The Company did not disclose information's as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 85.9, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 13.9,

21. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.9,

22. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.0, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 10.4,

23. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

24. *Meeting Notification-related Proposal*

It is proposed that a general meeting of the Company other than an annual general meeting may be called on not less than 14 clear days' notice.

It is considered that all companies should aim to provide at least 20 working days notice for general meetings in order to give shareholders sufficient time to consider what are often complex issues. However, as the proposed change is permissible by the Companies Act. However, it is noted that in the 2023 Annual general Meeting the proposed resolution received significant opposition of 13.29% of the votes. The Company did not disclosed information's as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 11.1,

PERSONAL ASSETS TRUST PLC AGM - 09-07-2024

11. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Auditors of the Company and Allow the Board to Determine their Remuneration*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

14. *Issue Shares for Cash*

Authority is sought to issue more than 10% of the issued share capital for cash and expires at the next AGM. The proposed limit is considered excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the

effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

PERSONAL ASSETS TRUST PLC EGM - 09-07-2024

1. Authorise Share Repurchase

Introduction & Background: The Company's discount and premium control policy ("DCP") is enshrined in its Articles of Association. The policy is to ensure that its shares always trade close to net asset value. This is achieved through a combination of share buy backs at a small discount to net asset value where supply exceeds demand or the issue of shares at a small premium to net asset value where demand exceeds supply. The recent high levels of buy backs mean that there is a risk that the Company's existing authority to buy back shares granted at the Annual General Meeting in July 2023 may be exhausted prior to being refreshed at the Company's next Annual General Meeting. Therefore, in order to ensure the continued operation of the DCP, the Board is seeking to renew its shareholder authority to buy back Ordinary Shares.

Rationale: At the 2023 AGM, shareholders granted the Company the authority to buy back 57,305,001 Ordinary Shares (being equivalent to 14.99% of the issued share capital of the Company at that time). Since the 2023 AGM, the Company has bought back 45,739,828 Ordinary Shares for a total consideration of approximately GBP 218 million. As a result, as at 18 June 2024 (the latest practicable date prior to the publication of this document) the Company has the capacity to buy back only a further 11,565,173 Ordinary Shares. The Board believes there is a risk that this current capacity under the existing buy back authority may prove insufficient to allow the Board to continue to buy back Ordinary Shares under the DCP in the period up to the Company's next Annual General Meeting which will be held on 19 July 2024. If such authority is renewed, the Directors will only use the authority to buy back Ordinary Shares: (a) at a discount to net asset value; (b) to meet supply from investors; and (c) when the Directors believe that it is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders to do so.

Recommendation: Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalization of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

PACIFIC ASSETS TRUST PLC AGM - 09-07-2024

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might

be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

NATIONAL GRID PLC AGM - 10-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

Strategic report meets guidelines. Adequate employment and environmental policies are in place and relevant, up-to-date, quantified, environmental reporting is disclosed. The Company also disclosed the proportion of women on the Board, in Executive Management positions and within the whole organisation.

Despite having some climate targets, the company does not have both a clear commitment to net zero by 2050 and an adequate short-term target. These targets are considered essential for companies that are strategically important for the transition to net zero. Having a target for net zero by 2050 at the latest shows overall commitment of the company to adequately manage climate risks. Short term emission reductions are required to keep alive the ambition of holding global warming to 1.5 degrees while short term targets are also critical for accountability purposes. Given the time passed since the Paris Agreement and the scale investment risks posed by climate change not having both adequate short term target and a net zero by 2050 commitment is considered to fall short of best practice and poses a major risk for investors.

Company does not report adequately on climate risk in the strategic report (or equivalent).

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

3. *Re-elect Paula Rosput Reynolds - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Despite having some climate targets, the company does not have both a clear commitment to net zero by 2050 and an adequate short-term target. These targets are considered essential for companies that are strategically important for the transition to net zero. Having a target for net zero by 2050 at the latest shows overall commitment of the company to adequately manage climate risks. Short term emission reductions are required to keep alive the ambition of holding global warming to 1.5 degrees while short term targets are also critical for accountability purposes. Given the time passed since the Paris Agreement and the scale investment risks posed by climate change not having both adequate short term target and a net zero by 2050 commitment is considered to fall short of best practice and poses a major risk for investors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.5,

11. *Re-elect Jonathan Silver - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director. It is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Silver, received significant opposition of 11.54% of the votes. The Company did not disclose information's as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

One or more directors received a significant level of oppose votes, exceeding 10% of all shares voted at the previous AGM and this has not been adequately addressed.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

13. *Re-elect Martha Wyrsh - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

16. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.3,

17. *Approve the Climate Transition Plan*

Governance

There does not appear to be any individual accountability for the policy, and the policy does not list the chair as responsible for the climate strategy. Company management and the sustainability committee hold collective responsibility, which is considered insufficiently focussed for effective execution of policy and for overall accountability.

There is adequate experience and knowledge of climate change and decarbonisation on the board of directors, including at least one non-executive director with significant experience of decarbonisation measures from within the core sector of operations of the company.

There is evidence of adequate training and learning on the Board and senior management of climate-related issues.

Disclosure

The company climate strategy for the overall required energy transition includes a defined timeline, by which progress in emission reductions can be measured.

While the company's targets are in line with a plan to limit global warming to 2.0 degrees, setting targets in line with changes of 1.5 degrees or lower would be considered to be in line with a more resilient scenario.

The company has committed to being carbon neutral by 2050 and includes scopes 1, 2 and 3 emission reductions in this commitment. The company strategy appears to include an actual reduction of carbon emissions rather than having a heavy reliance on offsetting.

Finally, the Climate Report is not included within the annual report and accounts. The legal status of the annual report is protected to be reliable for the purpose of

holding to account at AGMs, and the inclusion of the transition report in the annual report and accounts submitted to vote at the AGM make it becomes both strategically reliable information as well as forward-looking. On the contrary, excluding it from the annual report makes it an informational document and not binding the company in any way.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.1, Abstain: 4.9, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

18. Approve Political Donations

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 125,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so. However, the aggregate total amount exceeds recommended limits.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

21. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.9,

22. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

INTRAKAT SA of TECHICAL & ENERGY PROJECTS AGM - 10-07-2024

3. Approval of the overall management of the Company by the Board of Directors and Discharge the Auditors

In this market, auditors discharge may prevent lawsuits or claims for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders. As a consequence, releasing auditors from liability will weaken the governance framework and introduce great risks for investors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

6. *Approve Release of Directors from Non-Competition Restriction*

Approval is sought for directors to serve on the board of other companies engaged in activities within the scope of the company's business. There are concerns over the risks and potential negative impact on shareholders interest connected to directors or other officers of the Company serving for competing companies. In addition, there is insufficient description on how the Company will take measure to monitor the conflicts of interest and prevent any negative effect for the Company and ultimately its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

WORLDWIDE HEALTHCARE TRUST PLC AGM - 10-07-2024

4. *Re-elect Mr. Doug McCutcheon - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of more than nine years in the Board. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 71.0, Abstain: 4.9, Oppose/Withhold: 24.1,

9. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's Auditors and to authorise the Audit & Risk Committee to determine their remuneration*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.00% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.19% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

14. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.1,

SEVERN TRENT PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.5,

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. A welcome addition is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. The Annual Bonus is deferred, and claw-back

provisions are attached. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. After the initial performance period, which determines the extent of which the LTIP will vest, the Company does not require Directors to defer any of the award for a further holding period to apply, which is not considered in line with market best practice.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.5,

14. *Re-appoint Deloitte as the Auditors*

Deloitte proposed. No non-audit fees were paid during the year under review and 7.14% was paid on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.8, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 5.9,

20. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

BYTES TECHNOLOGY GROUP PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes did not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

The total potential variable pay can reach 350% of the salary, which is considered excessive as it exceeds the 200% threshold. The maximum annual bonus opportunity is 150% of base salary, with bonuses typically paid in cash, except for one-third, which is deferred into shares for two years. This deferral is deemed inadequate; a preferable approach would be to pay 50% in cash and defer 50% into shares for at least three years. The Performance Share Plan (PSP) is based on EPS and relative

TSR targets, but lacks non-financial parameters, which are vital for assessing long-term performance and aligning with best practices. Non-financial parameters help focus on the overall operational performance and the individual roles of senior executives. The three-year performance period is not considered long-term enough, although the additional two-year holding period is appreciated. Malus and clawback provisions apply to all variable pay.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

6. *Re-elect Patrick De Smedt - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment. As the Sustainability Committee was not in place during the year under review, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. As such, given the concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. Chair. I

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

13. *Re-appoint EY as the Auditors*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 15.17% of audit fees during the year under review and 14.78% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY

or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors. [

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

BT GROUP PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are considered excessive as they exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden vote in support.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

4. *Re-elect Adam Crozier - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

5. *Re-elect Allison Kirkby - Chief Executive*

Chief Executive. It is noted that Ms. Kirby election on the 2023 Annual General Meeting received significant opposition of 12.43% of the votes. The Company did not disclosed information's as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

A director on the Board has received more than 10% of the vote in opposition to their election at the previous AGM and this has not been adequately addressed by the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

7. *Re-elect Ruth Cairnie - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

8. *Re-elect Maggie Chan Jones - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

12. *Elect Raphael Kübler - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as Mr. Raphael Kübler is representing Deutsche Telekom AG a significant shareholder of the Company. There is sufficient independent representation on the Board. However, Mr. Raphael Kübler is member of the Nomination Committee.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

14. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as the Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.16% of audit fees during the year under review and 0.37% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

21. *Approve Political Donations*

Although the aggregate limit sought is within acceptable limits, the company has made donations which are deemed to be political during the year. The Group made

political donations of GBP 9,343 to support candidates for nomination and/or election to public office. This raises concerns about the potential donation which could be made by the Company under this authority. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

RS GROUP PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 2.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

4. *Re-elect Alex Baldock - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

5. *Re-elect Louisa Burdett - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

6. *Re-elect Rona Fairhead - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. Chair. Independent upon appointment.

As no director has been appointed responsibility for sustainability issues the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's Sustainability programme. The Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise material risks linked to sustainability which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.9, Abstain: 3.7, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

11. *Re-elect David Sleath - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

12. *Re-elect Joan Wainwright - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.4,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.4,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

RENEWI PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The total combined variable reward paid during the year falls below the 200% recommended threshold and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

4. *Re-elect Ben Verwaayen - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment. However, in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the resolution for the re-election of Mr. Verwaayen received significant opposition of 19.32% of the votes. The Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.6, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.0,

6. *Re-elect Katleen Vandeweyer - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee. Although there are concerns over potential aggregate time commitments, this director has attended all Board and committee meetings during the year under review. The Company has no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. The chair of the audit committee is considered accountable for the whistle-blowing reporting structure. It is recommended Camden to Oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

7. *Re-elect Jolande Sap - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

17. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

DR. MARTENS PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

3. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

A new remuneration policy is proposed for approval with no changes introduced. The CEO's total maximum opportunity for variable pay is set at 500% of their salary, a level considered excessive as it exceeds the recommended 200% limit. Of the bonus earned, one-third will be deferred into shares for two years, with the remaining two-thirds paid in cash. This arrangement is deemed insufficient; it would be more appropriate for 50% of the bonus to be in cash and 50% to be deferred into shares for at least three years. The long-term incentive plan (LTIP) lacks non-financial performance measures, focusing instead on financial KPIs, which are largely outside the control of individual directors. The three-year vesting period is not considered long enough, although the two-year holding period is seen as a positive aspect. Malus and clawback provisions are applicable to all variable pay.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

6. *Re-elect Paul Mason - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as he has acted previously as Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. It is additionally considered that the the Nomination Committee should only include independent directors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.5, Abstain: 5.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

11. *Re-elect Robyn Perris - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Designated Non-Executive Director workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

12. *Re-elect Tara Alhadeff - Non-Executive Director*

Non-executive Director and Member of the Nomination Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure that exceeds nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

13. *Re-appoint the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 25.00% of audit fees during the year under review and 25.00% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being

dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.1, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 5.4,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.0, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 5.5,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

DCC PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

3. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are considered excessive as they exceed 200% of base salary. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report and has failed to disclose sufficient measures taken to address shareholders' concerns. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

4. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDB

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

5.b. Re-elect Mark Breuer - Chair (Non Executive)

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is considered to be accountable for the Company's sustainability programme, and the Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise the material risks linked to sustainability. In addition, the Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

5.i. Re-elect Mark Ryan - Designated Non-Executive

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

9. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

10. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

TEMPLETON EMERGING MARKETS I.T. PLC AGM - 11-07-2024**1. Receive the Annual Report**

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

5. Re-appoint EY as the Auditors

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

10. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the

effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

FIELMANN AG AGM - 11-07-2024

4. Approve Discharge of Supervisory Board for Fiscal Year 2023

Approval is sought to release the members of the Board regarding their activities in the Financial Year under review. The Company does not have an established whistle-blower hotline. It is considered that without a whistle-blower hotline, the company is potentially subject to reputational and financial damage by a lack of supervision of potential malpractice.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

5. Appoint the Auditors

PwC proposed. An adequate break-down of the nature of non-audit fees is not provided, which makes the assessment of auditor's independence based on the non-audit fee impossible. The date of appointment of the auditor is not disclosed, meaning that there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

6. Appoint the Sustainability Auditors

PwC proposed. An adequate break-down of the nature of non-audit fees is not provided, which makes the assessment of auditor's independence based on the non-audit fee impossible. The date of appointment of the auditor is not disclosed, meaning that there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

7. Elect Georg Alexander Zeiss - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as Chief Financial Officer.

This director is a member of the audit committee. The director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. The audit committee is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

It is proposed to approve the implementation of the remuneration policy. The payout is in line with best practice, under 200% of the fixed salary. However, the Company has not fully disclosed quantified targets against which the achievements and the corresponding variable remuneration has been calculated. Although a common practice in this market as this is deemed to be sensitive information, it prevents an accurate assessment and may lead to overpayment against underperformance. In addition, there are no claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration component which makes it unlikely that shareholders will be able to reclaim any variable remuneration unfairly paid out.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

9. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

It is proposed to approve the remuneration policy. Variable remuneration appears to be consistently capped, and the payout is in line with best practice. However, the Company has not fully disclosed quantified targets for the performance criteria of its variable remuneration component, which as a consequence may lead to overpayment against underperformance. In addition, there are no claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration component which makes it unlikely that shareholders will be able to reclaim any variable remuneration unfairly paid out.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

VALUE AND INDEXED PROPERTY INCOME TRUST PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

4. *Re-elect John Kay - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board and member of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 46.4, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

5. *Re-elect Matthew Alan Oakeshott - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered to be independent, as this director is considered to be connected with the Investment Manager. The director has also previously served on the Board in a previous term as director from 1 April 2007 to 1 April 2019 and therefore has a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 49.1, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

6. *Re-elect David Smith - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit and Nomination Committees. Not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years. In

terms of best practice, it is considered that the Audit and Nomination Committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 46.6, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.4,

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 49.9, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

EYDAP-ATHENS WATER & SEWERAGE AGM - 11-07-2024

3. *Approval of the Management and Discharge the Auditors*

In this market, auditors discharge may prevent lawsuits or claims for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders. As a consequence, releasing auditors from liability will weaken the governance framework and introduce great risks for investors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

It is proposed to approve the remuneration policy with a binding vote. Variable remuneration seems to be consistently capped so the total potential variable remuneration will not exceed 200% of the salary. The Company has not fully disclosed quantified targets for performance criteria for its variable remuneration component, which may lead to overpayment against underperformance. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. Nevertheless, based on inadequate disclosure of the performance targets, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

10. *Appoint the Auditors and Allow the Board to Determine their Remuneration*

Grant Thornton proposed. Non-audit fees represented 59.20% of audit fees during the year under review. This level of non-audit fees raises major concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

LAND SECURITIES GROUP PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

2. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. However, the deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is not considered adequate. Half of the bonus should be deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: ADB

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

3. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. Total combined variable reward paid during the year is considered excessive, exceeding the 200% recommended threshold. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit

pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.3,

7. Re-elect Sir Ian Cheshire - Chair (Non Executive)

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

10. Re-elect Madeleine Cosgrave - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent as the director has a relationship with the Company, which is considered material. She has commercial relationship with peer companies. She is a Regional Head of Europe at GIC Real Estate which owns a 17.5% stake in Bluewater. Landsec has a joint arrangement with Bluewater. GIC also has a stake in AccorInvest which operates the hotels in Landsec's portfolio. The Director is a Management Committee member of BWAT Retail Property Unit Trust.

This director is a member of the audit committee. The director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. The audit committee is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

11. Re-elect Christophe Evain - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

14. Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP (EY) as auditor of the Company

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 15.38% of audit fees during the year under review and 16.13% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High

Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

18. *Approve the Company's Omnibus Share Plan 2024*

The Company's existing Long Term Incentive Plan 2015 was approved by shareholders on 23 July 2015 (the 2015 LTIP). The 2015 LTIP had a ten year 'life', with no awards permitted to be made after the tenth anniversary of its approval. The Company is therefore seeking shareholder approval of the implementation of the Omnibus Plan in order to be able to grant awards over ordinary shares in the Company so as to replace the 2015 LTIP. The Omnibus Plan is a discretionary share plan, under which the Company's Remuneration Committee (the Committee) may grant awards (Awards) over ordinary shares in the Company (Shares) to incentivise and retain eligible employees. The Committee may grant Awards as: (i) conditional awards of Shares; (ii) nil or nominal cost options over Shares; or (iii) forfeitable awards of Shares. Awards may take the form of either: (a) Deferred Awards, representing the element of a participant's bonus that is deferred into Shares; or (b) Incentive Awards, designed to incentivise the future performance of, and retain, key employees. No payment is required for the grant of an Award. Any employee of the Company's group (Group), including the Company's executive directors (Executive Directors), may be selected to participate in the Omnibus Plan at the Committee's discretion.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries: it is considered that support should not be given to stock or share option plans that do not lay out clear performance criteria, targets and conditions.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.4,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.3, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 9.0,

21. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

PETS AT HOME GROUP PLC AGM - 11-07-2024

11. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 1.8, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

12. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

INTERMEDIATE CAPITAL GROUP AGM - 16-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it

is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

3. Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as auditor of the Company

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 4.76% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.45% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

6. *Re-elect William Rucker - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

As no director has been appointed responsibility for sustainability issues the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's Sustainability programme. The Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise material risks linked to sustainability which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.0, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 12.6,

10. *Re-elect Virginia Holmes - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election. In addition, it is noted that, Ms. Holmes was a Board Director on the Post Office we cannot support her re-election whilst the Horizon Enquiry into the Post Office is ongoing.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.9, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 4.7,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.1, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.8,

18. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would

benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING PLC AGM - 16-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee is within the recommended limit at 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating:BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.3,

5. Re-elect Nigel Newton - Chief Executive

The Chief Executive Officer is member of the Nomination Committee. It is considered best practice that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Membership of the committee by the CEO raises serious concerns in this regard. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

6. Re-elect Leslie-Ann Reed - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Audit Committee. Non-Executive Director, chair of the audit committee. At the company, there is no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that such concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the chair of the audit committee, who is considered to be accountable for the concerns with the whistle-blowing reporting structure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.4,

13. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.1,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 1.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

BURBERRY GROUP PLC AGM - 16-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 43.4, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.6,

4. *Re-elect Dr Gerry Murphy - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 47.5, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

7. *Re-elect Fabiola Arredondo - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Member of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 47.9, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.1,

15. *Re-appoint EY as the Auditors*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 5.88% of audit fees during the year under review and 4.26% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 49.8, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 49.5, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

21. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 49.8, Abstain: 50.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

AUTODESK INC. AGM - 16-07-2024

1f. *Elect Mary T. McDowell - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Remuneration Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the Chair.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.2, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.9,

1h. *Elect Lorrie M. Norrington - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Nomination Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the Chair. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

PIRC issue: At this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. . It is considered that the chair of nomination committee be responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

This director is a member of the nomination committee.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.7, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.3,

1i. *Elect Betsy Rafael - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that Audit Committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the Chair.

At the company, the Audit Committee does not oversee the whistle-blowing hotline. This may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalated which may mean the issue is concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the chair of the audit committee, who is considered to be accountable for the concerns with the whistle-blowing reporting structure.

Chair of the Audit Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.7, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.4,

1k. *Elect Stacy J. Smith - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

As no director has been appointed responsibility for sustainability issues the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's Sustainability programme. The Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise material risks linked to sustainability which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.4, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 9.6,

2. *Appoint the Auditors*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.33% of audit fees during the year under review and 4.15% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 10.1,

3. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. The annual incentive award made during the year under review is not considered to be overly excessive as it amounts to less than 200% of base salary. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance metrics are replicated under different incentive plans, raising concerns that executives are being rewarded twice for the same performance. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. The minimum performance period prior to vesting is less than three years, which is considered to be short term. Five-year vesting would be preferred. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ADB.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 17.7,

4. *Right to Call Special Meeting*

The right to call a special shareholder meeting provides shareholders with a way of communicating with the Board and debating and voting on issues with the rest of shareholders which in itself enhances shareholders' rights. A 10% threshold would be recommended and the 25% threshold requested by the Proponent is considered to be excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.6, Abstain: 8.3, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

CALEDONIA INVESTMENTS PLC AGM - 17-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Shareholders are being asked to approve the Company's annual report on remuneration. Disclosure of figures and policy is adequate. However, performance-based variable remuneration was paid during the year under review. As a result of this variable remuneration component, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

4. *Re-elect David Stewart - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board, Member of the Remuneration Committee and Chair of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

This director is the chair of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

8. *Re-elect Charles W. Cayzer - Non-Executive Director*

Non-executive Director and Member of the Nomination Committee. Not considered independent as he is a former executive of the Company and he has served on the Board for more than nine years.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

9. *Re-elect William Wyatt - Non-Executive Director*

Non-executive Director and Member of the Nomination Committee. Not considered independent as the director served as Chief Executive until July 2022. Additionally, he has been on the board for over nine years.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

17. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 10% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

EXPERIAN PLC AGM - 17-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.9, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 5.8,

9. *Re-elect Jonathan Howell - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee.

During the year under review, a fine has been issued by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission USD 650,000 for sending customers unsolicited emails with no opt out options, which is required under the CAN-SPAM Act. While the full impact of this decision is yet to be ascertained, there are concerns about the sufficiency of the board-level ethics and compliance oversight. The Audit Committee should take responsibility for overseeing the company's compliance policies, including through effective whistleblower policies. Owing to the apparent failure of board-level oversight to prevent the issue, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the Audit Committee Chair.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.2,

11. *Re-elect Louise Pentland - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

13. *Re-elect Mike Rogers - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent non-executive Chair.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.7, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.3,

14. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditor of the Company*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 5.56% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.83% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state.

PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.1,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.1, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 10.7,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

EDINBURGH INVESTMENT TRUST PLC AGM - 17-07-2024

9. *Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors of the Company*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High

Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.7,

HELICAL PLC AGM - 17-07-2024

12. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.0,

13. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: ADB

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.9,

14. *Renewal of the Helical Performance Share Plan*

The Board of Directors seeks authority from Shareholders to renew and continue to operate the Helical Performance Share Plan ("PSP") for a period of a further 10 years from the date of the 2024 Annual General Meeting. The Plan is a revised and updated version of the previous long-term incentive arrangement that has been operated by the Company for senior executives since it was initially approved by Shareholders at the 2014 Annual General Meeting. Under the plan, any employee (including an executive Director) of the Company and its subsidiaries will be eligible to participate in the PSP at the discretion of the Committee. An employee may not receive awards in any financial year over Shares having a market value in excess of a reference percentage of his annual base salary in that financial year. The PSP

may operate over new issue Shares, treasury Shares or Shares purchased in the market. In any ten calendar year period, the Company may not issue (or grant rights to issue) more than: (a) 10% of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company under the PSP and any other employees' share plan adopted by the Company; and (b) 5% of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company under the PSP and any other discretionary share plan adopted by the Company. The vesting of awards will normally be subject to the satisfaction of performance conditions and/ or any other conditions set by the Committee. Awards may also be granted to employees other than executive Directors, without performance conditions. Awards normally vest three years after grant to the extent that the applicable performance conditions (if any) have been satisfied and provided the participant is still employed in the Company's group. Awards granted as nil (or nominal cost) options are then normally exercisable up until the tenth anniversary of grant unless they lapse earlier.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries, LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

16. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

17. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 15.3,

18. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

HARBOURVEST GLOBAL PRIVATE EQUITY LTD AGM - 17-07-2024**8. *Appoint the Auditors***

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

10. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

HICL INFRASTRUCTURE PLC AGM - 17-07-2024**11. *Re-appoint KPMG as the Auditors of the Company***

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 33.33% of audit fees during the year under review and 44.44% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence

of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

12. *Allow the Board to Determine the Auditor's Remuneration*

Standard proposal.

Non-audit fees exceed 25% of audit fees for the year under review, which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.0, Abstain: 5.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

CONSTELLATION BRANDS, INC. AGM - 17-07-2024

1a. *Elect Christopher J. Baldwin - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters. Without a clear justification, we recommend Camden opposing the Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

1c. *Elect Jennifer M. Daniels - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Corporate Governance, Nominating, and Responsibility Committee.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

This director is Chair of the Nomination Committee and less than 33% of the Board are women which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

PIRC issue: Additionally, at this time, individual attendance records at board and committee meetings are not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the Chair of the Corporate Governance, Nominating, and Responsibility Committee is responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 10.0,

1f. *Elect Ernesto M. Hernández - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Human Resources Committee and member of the Corporate Governance, Nominating, and Responsibility Committee. Not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Remuneration and Corporate Governance, Nominating, and Responsibility Committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.0,

1l. *Elect Judy A. Schmeling - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Audit Committee and member of the Corporate Governance, Nominating, and Responsibility Committee. Not considered independent as she has served on the Board for over nine years. It is considered that audit committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

Chair of the Audit Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.3,

2. *Appoint the Auditors*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.23% of audit fees during the year under review and 0.11% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

3. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ACA.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.8, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 3.0,

SSE PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

Strategic report meets guidelines. Adequate employment and environmental policies are in place and relevant, up-to-date, quantified, environmental reporting is disclosed. The Company also disclosed the proportion of women on the Board, in Executive Management positions and within the whole organisation.

Despite having some climate targets, the company does not have both a clear commitment to net zero by 2050 and an adequate short-term target. These targets are considered essential for companies that are strategically important for the transition to net zero. Having a target for net zero by 2050 at the latest shows overall commitment of the company to adequately manage climate risks. Short term emission reductions are required to keep alive the ambition of holding global warming to 1.5 degrees while short term targets are also critical for accountability purposes. Given the time passed since the Paris Agreement and the scale investment risks posed by climate change not having both adequate short term target and a net zero by 2050 commitment is considered to fall short of best practice and poses a major risk for investors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are considered excessive as they exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer

comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

4. *Re-elect Lady Elish Angiolini - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.2,

9. *Re-elect Sir John Manzoni - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Despite having some climate targets, the company does not have both a clear commitment to net zero by 2050 and an adequate short-term target. These targets are considered essential for companies that are strategically important for the transition to net zero. Having a target for net zero by 2050 at the latest shows overall commitment of the company to adequately manage climate risks. Short term emission reductions are required to keep alive the ambition of holding global warming to 1.5 degrees while short term targets are also critical for accountability purposes. Given the time passed since the Paris Agreement and the scale investment risks posed by climate change not having both adequate short term target and a net zero by 2050 commitment is considered to fall short of best practice and poses a major risk for investors.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.7,

13. *Re-elect Melanie Smith - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

16. *Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as the Auditors of the Company*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.92% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.51% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

18. *Receive the Company's Net Zero Transition Report for the year ended 31 March 2024.*

Governance

There does not appear to be any individual accountability for the policy, and the policy does not list the chair as responsible for the climate strategy. Company management and the sustainability committee hold collective responsibility, which is considered insufficiently focussed for effective execution of policy and for overall accountability.

There is adequate experience and knowledge of climate change and decarbonisation on the board of directors, including at least one non-executive director with significant experience of decarbonisation measures from within the core sector of operations of the company. **Disclosure**

The company climate strategy for the overall required energy transition includes a defined timeline, by which progress in emission reductions can be measured.

The company has not pledged to review or end membership of trade associations or industry environmental lobbying groups, where these pursue goals or advertise actions contrary to the company's climate strategy, which appears inconsistent with its goals and an obstacle to its effectiveness.

The company's targets are in line with a plan to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees when compared to pre-industrial levels. This is considered to be best practice, and represents one of the more resilient scenarios.

The company has committed to being carbon neutral by 2050 and includes scopes 1, 2 and 3 emission reductions in this commitment. The company strategy appears to include an actual reduction of carbon emissions rather than having a heavy reliance on offsetting.

The Climate/Transition report is not included within the annual report and accounts. The legal status of the annual report is protected to be reliable for the purpose of holding to account at AGMs, and the inclusion of the transition report in the annual report and accounts submitted to vote at the AGM make it becomes both strategically reliable information as well as forward-looking. On the contrary, excluding it from the annual report makes it an informational document and not binding the company

in any way.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.0, Abstain: 2.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

21. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 12.0,

22. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 83.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 16.7,

23. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

TR PROPERTY INVESTMENT TRUST PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

9. *Re-Appoint KPMG as the Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the

standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: Oppose

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

FD TECHNOLOGIES PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

It is proposed to approve the remuneration paid or due to executives with an advisory vote. The pay-out is in line with best practice, under 200% of the fixed salary. The Company has fully disclosed quantified targets against which the achievements and the corresponding variable remuneration has been calculated.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

6. Re-elect Usama Fayyad - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director.

This director attended less than ninety per cent of the board and committee meetings which they were entitled to attend. There are therefore concerns surrounding this director's aggregate time commitments and support cannot be recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

11. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

12. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

BIG YELLOW GROUP PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.3, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

4. Approve the the rules of the Big Yellow Group PLC 2014 Long Term Incentive Plan

The LTIP is a proposed updated form of the Big Yellow Group PLC 2014 Long Term Incentive Plan and will allow the Company to continue to provide long term incentives for Executive Directors and other members of the Company's senior management team. The aim of the LTIP is to incentivise performance of the Company thus creating long term shareholder value. The terms of awards granted under the LTIP to the Company's Executive Directors shall necessarily align with applicable shareholder approved Directors' Remuneration Policy. The Board of Directors will be responsible for the administration of the LTIP. Eligible to participate are all employees and executive directors of the Group. LTIP Awards will be granted under the LTIP in respect of Shares. No payment is required for the grant of an LTIP Award. LTIP Options will be exercisable for nil or nominal value. The sub-plan to the LTIP permits the grant of LTIP CSOP Options over Shares with a total market value of up to the permitted limit from time to time applying to options granted under a CSOP (currently £60,000). Where an employee is granted an LTIP Option, he may also be granted an LTIP CSOP Option. The exercise price payable for each Share subject to an LTIP CSOP Option shall be determined by the Board and shall not be less than the market value of a Share determined in accordance with the requirements of the applicable CSOP legislation. LTIP Awards may be satisfied by the issue of new Shares, treasury Shares or Shares purchased in the market. Other than in respect of an LTIP CSOP Option, the LTIP rules allow for settlement in cash when settlement in Shares is not possible or practicable. The overall number of Shares issued or issuable under all employee share plans (including all-employee plans) operated by the Company cannot exceed 10% of the issued share capital of the Company in any ten year rolling period. The extent of vesting of LTIP Awards may be subject to performance conditions set by the Board (performance share awards to Executive Directors under current Director's Remuneration Policy are subject to performance conditions). Performance conditions may be varied or waived to the extent they are no longer appropriate and the Board thinks is reasonable in the circumstances. A varied performance condition must produce a fairer measure of performance and cannot be materially more or less difficult to satisfy than when the condition was first imposed. If the Board determines that a performance condition can no longer be satisfied in whole or in part the Board may decide that the relevant proportion of the LTIP Award shall lapse in whole or in part. In the case of a LTIP CSOP Option any discretion exercised by the Board shall be exercised fairly and reasonably.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.3, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 4.0,

7. Re-elect Dr. Anna Keay - Designated Non-Executive

It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

8. Re-elect Vince Niblett - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. It is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the election of Mr. Niblett received significant opposition of 11.61% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders. One or more directors received a significant level of oppose votes, exceeding 10% of all shares voted at the previous AGM, and this has not been adequately addressed.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.8, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 9.0,

10. *Re-elect Nicholas Vetch - Chair (Executive)*

Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.2, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 7.0,

14. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 2.2,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.1, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 4.2,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

PREMIER FOODS PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Dividend accrual has been separately categorised which is welcome. Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

11. *Re-elect Helen Jones - Designated Non-Executive*

It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

14. *Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 8.33% of audit fees during the year under review and 10.00% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

QINETIQ GROUP PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report and has failed to disclose sufficient measures taken to address shareholders' concerns. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.0, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 12.3,

8. *Re-elect Neil Johnson - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The chair holds another chair position at a listed company, which raises time commitment concerns. It is considered that the chair should be able to wholly dedicate their time to the company in times of company crisis. The COVID pandemic has shown that there are times when multiple unrelated companies will require the Chair's full attention in order to be able to handle times of crisis. It is considered that there is insufficient time to be able to effectively chair two or more companies at the same time.

Since there is no director up for election who is responsible for sustainability, such as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee or any of its members, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Given the concerns regarding the Company's sustainability policies and practices, a vote to oppose is recommended.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

11. *Re-elect Susan Searle - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the three principle committees

- Audit, Remuneration and Nomination should be comprised exclusively of independent members.
Chair of the Audit Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

13. *Re-appoint PwC the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 5.56% of audit fees during the year under review and 17.02% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

JOHNSON MATTHEY PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The total combined variable reward paid during the year falls below the 200% recommended threshold and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

13. Re-appoint the Auditors

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.3,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.9,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

THE BIOTECH GROWTH TRUST PLC AGM - 18-07-2024

7. *Re-elect The Rt Hon Lord Willetts - Non-Executive Director*

This director attended less than ninety per cent of the board and committee meetings which they were entitled to attend. There are therefore concerns surrounding this director's aggregate time commitments and support cannot be recommended. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

12. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might

be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

UNITED UTILITIES GROUP PLC AGM - 19-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

Strategic report meets guidelines. Adequate employment and environmental policies are in place and relevant, up-to-date, quantified, environmental reporting is disclosed. The Company also disclosed the proportion of women on the Board, in Executive Management positions and within the whole organisation.

Ongoing legal allegations against the company have not been adequately resolved at this stage, and while no wrongdoing has been identified at this time, there are concerns that the litigation could lead to significant financial or reputational consequences for the company and may not have adequately been represented in the financial statements.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.4,

12. *Re-elect Doug Webb - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee.

The company has been subject to litigation during the year under review and while no wrongdoing has been identified at this time, there are concerns about the potential financial and reputational impacts of this litigation on the company. The Audit Committee is considered responsible for risk oversight.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 3.2,

13. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 20.27% of audit fees during the year under review and 18.85% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.4, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 7.3,

18. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would

benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

LONDONMETRIC PROPERTY PLC AGM - 22-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.6, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the lower quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.7,

3. *Re-appoint Deloitte as the Auditors*

Deloitte proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

7. *Re-elect Alistair Elliott - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

Since there is no director up for election who is responsible for sustainability, such as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee or any of its members, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Given the concerns regarding the Company's sustainability policies and practices, a vote to oppose is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.7, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

8. Re-elect Andrew Livingston - Designated Non-Executive

It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

16. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

17. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.6, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 4.2,

18. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

FIDELITY CHINA SPECIAL SITUATIONS PLC AGM - 23-07-2024**1. *Receive the Annual Report***

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

10. *Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as Auditor of the Company*

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

GB GROUP PLC AGM - 23-07-2024

4. *Elect Dev Datt Dhiman - Chief Executive*

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

9. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

For these reasons it is recommended that Camden oppose the remuneration policy.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

10. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers as the Auditors of the Company*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. [PwC] proposed as new auditor. Auditor rotation is considered a positive factor. Acceptable proposal.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to

make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

13. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. An oppose vote is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

14. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

FULLER, SMITH & TURNER PLC AGM - 23-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive

schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.8,

4. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards once they are in a holding period (after the performance condition has been tested and vesting outcome agreed). The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.4,

5. *Re-elect Juliette Stacey - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and member of the Nomination Committee.

This director is member of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

7. *Re-elect Simon Emeny - Chief Executive*

Chief Executive.

As there is no director assigned to oversee sustainability issues, the Chief Executive is held accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Currently, the Company's sustainability policies and practices are deemed insufficient to mitigate material risks associated with sustainability, which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

9. *Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as auditor of the Company*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented % of audit fees during the year under review and 1.16% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

ICON PLC AGM - 23-07-2024

1.1. *Elect Ciaran Murray - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as CEO of the company from October 2011 until March 2017, and was Chief Financial Officer from joining ICON Plc in 2005 until his appointment as Chief Executive Officer in 2011. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.4. *Elect John Climax - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as Chief Executive Officer from June 1990 to October 2000. In addition, he has a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.6. *Elect Eugene McCague - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Sustainability and Governance Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.7. *Elect Linda S. Grais - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

7. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

MITIE GROUP PLC AGM - 23-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 10.6,

3.a. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. However, it is noted that under the LTIP 2024, the Remuneration Committee will also have reference to leverage (average debt/EBITDA) and ESG underpins such that if leverage and/or progress against the firm's ESG strategy is poor, there is specific discretion to allow the award to be reduced accordingly. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is at least five years and therefore considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties

and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: EDD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 74.4, Abstain: 10.5, Oppose/Withhold: 15.1,

3.b. Amend the rules of the Mitie Group plc Long Term Incentive Plan 2015 for the one-off award to be granted to Chief Executive, Phil Bentley

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the amendments of the Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan (LTIP). The remuneration committee is proposing to grant Mr. Phil Bentley, Chief Executive of Mitie, an LTIP award of up to 600% of his basic salary within 42 days of 23 July 2024 to motivate and retain him over the next three years. The amendments proposed do not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 70.4, Abstain: 13.2, Oppose/Withhold: 16.4,

8. Re-elect Jennifer Duvalier - Designated Non-Executive

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

Additionally, there are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

18. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

EFG EUROBANK ERGASIAS SA AGM - 23-07-2024**2. Approval of the overall management for the financial year 2023 and discharge of the Auditors for the financial year 2023**

In this market, auditors discharge may prevent lawsuits or claims for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders. As a consequence, releasing auditors from liability will weaken the governance framework and introduce great risks for investors. On this basis, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

10. Approve Remuneration Policy

It is proposed to approve the remuneration policy. Variable remuneration appears to be consistently capped, and the payout is in line with best practice. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. However, the Company has not fully disclosed quantified targets for performance criteria for its variable remuneration component, which may lead to overpayment against underperformance. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

12. Approve the Remuneration Report

It is proposed to approve the implementation of the remuneration policy. The payout is in line with best practice, being under 200% of the fixed salary. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. However, the Company has not fully disclosed quantified targets against which the achievements and the corresponding variable remuneration has been calculated. Although a common practice in this market as this is deemed to be sensitive information, it prevents an accurate assessment and may lead to overpayment against underperformance. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

14.5. Re-elect George Zantias - Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as the director is considered to be connected with Hellenic Financial Stability Fund, once a significant shareholder and currently a non-significant shareholder. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

14.9. Re-elect Irene Rouvitha Panou - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Nomination Committee Chair.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

14.12. *Re-elect Bradley Paul Martin - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Nomination Committee. Not considered independent as he is the Vice President of Fairfax Financial Holdings, the largest shareholder of the Company.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

B&M EUROPEAN VALUE RETAIL SA AGM - 23-07-2024

2. *Receive Consolidated and Unconsolidated Annual Accounts and Financial Statements, and Auditors' Reports Thereon*

The financial statements were made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. *Approve the Annual Accounts and Financial Statements of the Company for the year ended 31 March 2024*

The financial statements were made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

4. *Approve the consolidated Annual Accounts and Financial Statements of the Group for the year ended 31 March 2024*

The financial statements were made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns surrounding the sustainability policies and practice at the company. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. and the lack of board level accountability for sustainability issues. Therefore, it is considered that the annual report and the financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders, however the annual report fails to address these concerns adequately and therefore this resolution cannot be supported. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

7. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating:BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.9, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 3.4,

8. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. There is no mitigation statement included within the remuneration policy. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: ADC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.2, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

9. *Approve the the terms of the new LTIP*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the new Long-Term Plan (LTIP) of the Company. Under the proposed plan eligible to participate are all employees including executive directors. Awards may be granted by the Board as: (a) conditional awards of ordinary shares in the Company ("Shares"), (b) options to acquire Shares for nil cost or for a per Share exercise price equal to the nominal value of a Share or (c) cash-based awards relating to a number of "notional" Shares, although it is intended that awards will be granted in relation to Shares wherever practicable. Awards are not transferable except on death and will not form part of pensionable earnings. Awards may be granted on the basis that their vesting is subject to the satisfaction of a performance condition. The application of performance conditions to awards granted to the Company's Executive Directors (including the period over which they are assessed) will be consistent with the Company's Directors' Remuneration Policy as approved by shareholders from time to time. The 2024 LTIP may operate over new issue Shares, treasury Shares or Shares purchased in the market other than into treasury. In any 10-year period, the number of Shares which may be issued under the 2024 LTIP and any other employee share plan adopted by the Company may not exceed 10% of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company from time to time. In any 10-year period, the number of Shares which may be issued under the 2024 LTIP and any other discretionary employee share plan adopted by the Company may not exceed 5% of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company from time to time. Awards subject to performance conditions will normally vest as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of the performance period (or on such later date as the Board determines) to the extent that the performance conditions have been satisfied. Awards not subject to performance conditions will vest on such date as the Board determines at grant. The Board may decide to award dividend equivalents on vested Shares in respect of dividends paid over such period as the Board determines, ending no later than the date on which the award vests (or, if relevant, is released). Dividend equivalents may be paid in Shares or cash and may assume the reinvestment of the dividends in Shares.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries, LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

11. *Re-elect Alex Russo - Chief Executive*

Chief Executive. Acceptable service contract provisions.

As no director has been appointed responsibility for sustainability issues the Chief Executive is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. The Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise material risks linked to sustainability which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

14. *Re-elect Paula MacKenzie - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be

given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

15. Re-elect Oliver Tant - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director and Audit Committee Chair. Non-Executive Director, chair of the audit committee. At the company, there is no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that such concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the chair of the audit committee, who is considered to be accountable for the concerns with the whistle-blowing reporting structure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 97.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

18. Discharge the Auditors

Discharge of auditor is not compulsory in this market and is not included in or recommended by the local corporate governance code (the Ten Principles). Auditors discharge may prevent lawsuits or claims for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

19. Re-appoint KPMG Audit S.A.R.L as Auditor of the Company

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

21. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

B&M EUROPEAN VALUE RETAIL SA EGM - 23-07-2024

1. *Issue Shares for Cash and amend Article 5.2 of the Articles of Association*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 9.8,

2. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.0,

JPMORGAN EUROPEAN DISCOVERY TRUST PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

9. Re-appoint Ernst & Young as the Auditors of the Company and Allow the Board to Determine their Remuneration

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the 'expectations gap' in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is 'useful to users'. That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being 'useful for users', a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state.

PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the 'expectations gap' being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, PIRC is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

12. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

ALPHA SERVICES AND HOLDINGS S.A AGM - 24-07-2024

4. Approval of the overall management for the financial year 2023 and discharge of the Statutory Certified Auditors

In this market, auditors discharge may prevent lawsuits or claims for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders. As a consequence, releasing auditors from liability will weaken the governance framework and introduce great risks for investors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

*Vote Cast: Oppose**14. Amendment to the Company's Share Buyback Program in accordance with article 49 of law 4548/2018 and authorization to the Board of Directors for its implementation.*

Following the relevant approval by the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) of the European Central Bank (ECB) on September 28, 2023, under articles 77 and 78 of the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR) II, that was granted for one year from the date that the ECB notified the Company of its permission and related resolutions of the Board of Directors, 5,855,794 own shares, at a total cost of Euro 8,996,229.19, have been purchased. Following the above purchases, the Company announced that the part of the Company's share buybacks under the Share Buyback Program, which corresponds to the period for which approval has been granted by the ECB (i.e. until 28.9.2024), was completed. The Board of Directors of the Company, taking into consideration the Company's Shareholder Dividend Policy, in combination to its proposal for cash distribution to the Shareholders under Item 2 above, proposes that the General Meeting of Shareholders increase the maximum number of own shares that may be acquired under the Share Buyback Program. In particular, shares representing up to 3.0% of the Company's paid in share capital, i.e. a total of up to 70,000,000 own shares, are proposed to be acquired under the Share Buyback Program, taking into account the applicable legal and regulatory framework, including article 49 par. 2 (a) of law 4548/2018. The above is part of the overall proposal for distribution to the Company's Shareholders' and, in addition to the distribution in cash of Euro 61,133,013 in the form of dividend proposed under Agenda Item 2, provides for the application of an amount of Euro 61,133,013 for the acquisition of own shares under the Share Buyback Program and subsequently their cancelation, thus increasing the value per share. Moreover, it should be noted that the cancelation of the own shares that will be acquired by using the aforesaid amount of Euro 61,133,013 has already been approved by the ECB under article 78 of the CRR II by virtue of its decision dated June 5, 2024. Any acquisition of own shares under the Share Buyback Program for any other purpose permitted by applicable laws and regulations, including the free distribution of own shares to Members of the Management and the Staff of the Company and its Affiliates, within the meaning of article 32 of law 4308/2014, is subject to the prior permission of the ECB under article 78 of the CRR II and will be completed only if such permission is obtained. Last but not least, it is proposed to the General Meeting to authorize the Board of Directors of the Company to proceed with all necessary actions for the implementation of the above.

PIRC generally does not support share repurchases unless there is a detailed and compelling justification. This is owing to potential manipulation to the share price. For the sake of these authorities, flexibility for potential future opportunities is not considered a sufficient justification. Other reasons for requesting the authority, such as increased flexibility or the increase of EPS would also not be considered valid reasons for a share buyback. Rather, the boosting of EPS through artificial means such as share buybacks is seen as a net negative for shareholders, as it can disguise long term company stagnation and share price falls. It is also considered that EPS should be boosted through company performance, and subsequently increased value, rather than through financial instruments. A sufficient reason would constitute an acquisition/merger, and the Board would be expected to seek shareholder approval for each specific action with a specific authority.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

*Vote Cast: Oppose**16. Approve Release of Directors from Non-Competition Restriction*

Approval is sought for directors to serve on the board of other companies engaged in activities within the scope of the company's business. There are concerns over the risks and potential negative impact on shareholders interest connected to directors or other officers of the Company serving for competing companies. In addition, there is insufficient description on how the Company will take measure to monitor the conflicts of interest and prevent any negative effect for the Company and ultimately its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

PENNON GROUP PLC AGM - 24-07-2024**1. Receive the Annual Report**

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.. The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the lower quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.1, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 4.3,

7. Re-elect Iain Evans - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee. Considered independent.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.8,

12. Appoint PwC as the Auditors

PwC proposed as new auditor. Auditor rotation is considered a positive factor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

14. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 75,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

16. *Climate-Related Financial Disclosures*

Governance

There does not appear to be any individual accountability for the policy, and the policy does not list the chair as responsible for the climate strategy. Company management and the sustainability committee hold collective responsibility, which is considered insufficiently focussed for effective execution of policy and for overall accountability.

There is adequate experience and knowledge of climate change and decarbonisation on the board of directors, including at least one non-executive director with significant experience of decarbonisation measures from within the core sector of operations of the company.

There is no evidence of adequate training and learning on the Board or senior management of climate-related issues, most relevantly decarbonization.

The company has not pledged to review or end membership of trade associations or industry environmental lobbying groups, where these pursue goals or advertise actions contrary to the company's climate strategy, which appears inconsistent with its goals and an obstacle to its effectiveness.

Disclosure

The company climate strategy for the overall required energy transition includes a defined timeline, by which progress in emission reductions can be measured.

The company's targets are in line with a plan to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees when compared to pre-industrial levels. This is considered to be best practice, and represents one of the more resilient scenarios.

The company has committed to being carbon neutral by 2050 and includes scopes 1, 2 and 3 emission reductions in this commitment. The company strategy appears to include an actual reduction of carbon emissions rather than having a heavy reliance on offsetting.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.5, Abstain: 1.9, Oppose/Withhold: 17.7,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.7,

21. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

MOTORPOINT GROUP PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs

but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.2,

3. Re-elect Mark Carpenter - Chief Executive

Chief Executive Officer. Member of the Nomination Committee. It is considered best practice that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

This executive director is a member of the Nomination Committee which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

7. Re-elect Adele Cooper - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

9. Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as auditors of the Company

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

12. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.1,

13. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.1,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

NORCROS PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

4. *Re-elect Steve Good - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. Chair. Independent upon appointment.

Since there is no director up for election who is responsible for sustainability, such as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee or any of its members, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Given the concerns regarding the Company's sustainability policies and practices, a vote to oppose is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

MOLTEN VENTURES PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year

under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 78.9, Abstain: 7.5, Oppose/Withhold: 13.6,

3. *Elect Laurence Hollingworth - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

9. *Re-elect Gervaise Slowey - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Designated Non-Executive Director Workforce Engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

11. *Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors of the Company*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 57.14% of audit fees during the year under review and 41.18% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises major concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state.

PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.2,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 9.2,

16. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

URBAN LOGISTICS REIT PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

3. *Re-elect Nigel Rich - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. It is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Rich received significant opposition of 10.43% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.6, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 7.2,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.2,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

PALACE CAPITAL PLC AGM - 24-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified. The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a

vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

6. *Re-elect Steven Owen - Chair (Executive)*

Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this. In addition, Mr. Owen is Chair of the Nomination Committee and member of the Audit and Remuneration Committees. It is considered that audit, nomination and remuneration committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders. Overall, opposition is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.5, Abstain: 6.4, Oppose/Withhold: 4.1,

8. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

WORKSPACE GROUP PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

17. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

VICTORIA PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

Disclosure is adequate and the Annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting. The financial statements have been audited and unqualified. Although not required to do so under AIM listing regulations, it is considered best practice for the Remuneration report to be submitted to a shareholder vote. As the Company has failed to do this.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2. *Re-elect Geoffrey Wilding - Chair (Executive)*

Executive Chair and member of the Nomination Committee. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this. In addition, in terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

3. *Re-elect Gavin Petken - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director member of the Audit and Nomination Committees and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

5. Re-appoint Grant Thornton UK LLP as auditors of the Company and authorise the Directors to determine their remuneration.

Grant Thornton UK LLP proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors for the year under review. The date of appointment of the current audit firm is undisclosed, meaning the length of tenure is not known. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

7. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

9. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 15% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

OXFORD INSTRUMENTS PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the lower quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary

duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

10. *Elect Hannah Nichols - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.2,

17. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

HALMA PLC AGM - 25-07-2024**3. Approve the Remuneration Report**

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.9,

4. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. There is no mitigation statement included within the remuneration policy. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. However, the deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is not considered adequate. Half of the bonus should be deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.7,

5. *Elect Liam Condon - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

12. *Re-elect Jo Harlow - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. There are serious concerns regarding the implementation of remuneration at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

15. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.23% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.90% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

20. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

21. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

JAZZ PHARMACEUTICALS PLC AGM - 25-07-2024**1c. Re-elect Kenneth W. OKeefe - Non-Executive Director**

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that the Audit Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2. Appoint the Auditors and Allow the Board to Determine their Remuneration

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.97% of audit fees during the year under review and 2.07% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

3. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment.

The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to

assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

5. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought is exceeding 10% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. This exceeds the recommended acceptable threshold.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

6. Adjourn the Meeting

The board requests authority to adjourn the special meeting until a later date or dates, if necessary, in order to permit further solicitation of proxies if there are not sufficient votes at the time of the special meeting to approve the merger. An oppose vote is recommended to any adjournment or postponement of meetings if a sufficient number of votes are present to constitute a quorum. It is considered that where a quorum is present, the vote outcome should be considered representative of shareholder opinion.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

BROWN-FORMAN CORPORATION AGM - 25-07-2024

1a. Elect Campbell P. Brown - Chair (Executive)

Executive Chair and member of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this. It is also considered best practice that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Membership of the committee by Executive Directors raises serious concerns in this regard and therefore, due also to his lack of independence as chair.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

1b. Elect Elizabeth M. Brown - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as she has close family ties as she is a Brown Family Director. Elizabeth M. Brown, Stuart R. Brown, and Augusta Brown Holland are first cousins. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

1e. Elect W. Austin Musselman, Jr. - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director is considered to be connected with a significant shareholder: W. Austin Musselman, Jr. is a Brown family director. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

1f. Elect Michael J. Roney - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Compensation Committee and member of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee. Not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years.

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.1,

1h. Elect Tracy L. Skeans - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee.

PIRC issue: At this time, individual attendance records at board and committee meetings are not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is also considered that the Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee is responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

As the Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee is considered to be accountable for the Company's sustainability programme, and given the serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

1j. Elect Michael A. Todman - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years.

Chair of the Audit Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

2. Appoint the Auditors

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 53.17% of audit fees during the year under review and 68.00% on a three-year aggregate basis.

Non-audit fees exceed 25% of audit fees for the year under review and this level of non-audit fees raises concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

JPMORGAN JAPAN SMALL CAP GROWTH & INCOME PLC AGM - 25-07-2024**1. *Receive the Annual Report***

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

11. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

NATIONAL BANK OF GREECE AGM - 25-07-2024**4.1. *Approval of the overall management by the Board of Directors and discharge of the Auditors of the Bank, with respect to the financial year 2023***

In this market, auditors discharge may prevent lawsuits or claims for activities carried out during the year relating to facts that have not been disclosed to shareholders. As a consequence, releasing auditors from liability will weaken the governance framework and introduce great risks for investors. On this basis, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8.1. *Elect Gikas Hardouvelis - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as Director of Strategic Planning & Research & Group Chief Economist between 1996 and 2000. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

13.1. Amendment of the program for the purchase of own shares in accordance with article 49 of Law 4548/2018, as in force.

The Board of Directors proposes the increase of the total cost of the Program for the purchase of own shares from EUR 30,000,000 to EUR 40,000,000, i.e., an increase of EUR 10,000,000. The rest of the terms of the program will remain unchanged. Specifically, the proposed increase of the total cost of the Program for the purchase of own shares by EUR 10,000,000 satisfies the distribution of free shares of the Bank in the context of the established Stock Award Program by the Annual General Meeting of 2023. The amendments proposed do not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8.8. Elect Wietze Reehoorn - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8.13. Elect Periklis Drougkas - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the Director is representative of the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF) a significant shareholder of the Company.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

NINETY ONE PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

3. Re-elect Gareth Penny - Chair (Non Executive)

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

5. *Re-elect Colin Keogh - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Considered independent.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

8. *Re-elect Khumo Shuenyane - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent as the director is considered to be connected with a significant shareholder: he is an Investec appointee based on a relationship agreement.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.4, Abstain: 4.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

9. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.7,

10. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

A welcome feature to the EIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics to assess individual performance. This enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole, as well as the individual roles of each executive in achieving that performance. The maximum potential awards for both the EIP have been adequately disclosed, though there is no mitigation statement included within the remuneration policy. Vesting scales are considered sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest-paid Director's base salary. The CEO is required to build a shareholding of at least 1,000%; and for the Finance Director the requirement is at least 800%. This shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive with those of the shareholders. Part of the EIP is deferred, with the deferral period in line with best practice as half of the EIP is deferred in shares over at least three years. However, the performance period for the EIP multi-year element is less than five years and is

not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over the EIP, and recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.0,

11. *Say on Climate*

Governance

There does not appear to be any individual accountability for the policy, and the policy does not list the chair as responsible for the climate strategy. Company management and the sustainability committee hold collective responsibility, which is considered insufficiently focussed for effective execution of policy and for overall accountability.

There is adequate experience and knowledge of climate change and decarbonisation on the board of directors, including at least one non-executive director with significant experience of decarbonisation measures from within the core sector of operations of the company.

There is no evidence of adequate training and learning on the Board or senior management of climate-related issues, most relevantly decarbonization.

The company has pledged to review or end membership of trade associations or industry environmental lobbying groups, where these pursue goals or advertise actions contrary to the company's climate strategy.

Disclosure

The company climate strategy for the overall required energy transition includes a defined timeline, by which progress in emission reductions can be measured.

The company's targets are in line with a plan to limit global warming to 1.5 degrees when compared to pre-industrial levels. This is considered to be best practice, and represents one of the more resilient scenarios.

The company has committed to being carbon neutral by 2050 and includes scopes 1, 2 and 3 emission reductions in this commitment. The company strategy appears to include an actual reduction of carbon emissions rather than having a heavy reliance on offsetting.

. Owing to the lack of accountability and climate-related training for board members and management, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.3, Abstain: 15.9, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

14. *Ninety One plc: Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 15.38% of audit fees during the year under review and 19.44% on a three-year aggregate basis.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High

Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

17. *Ninety One plc: Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 5% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

21. *Ninety One Limited: Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 15.38% of audit fees during the year under review and 19.44% on a three-year aggregate basis.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

22.iii. Ninety One Limited: Re-elect Khumo Shuenyane as Audit Committee Member

Non-Executive Director, member of the audit committee. Not considered to be independent. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the audit committee should only comprise independent members.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.1,

25. Ninety One Limited: Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

26. Ninety One Limited: Approve Financial Assistance

It is proposed to obtain approval from shareholders to enable the company to provide financial assistance to a related or interrelated company or corporation, subject to section 44 and/or 45 of the Companies Act.

The purpose of the resolution is to confirm financial assistance to related directors (unless specifically not provided for in the company's memorandum of incorporation) and/or inter-related companies granted during the year under review and to authorise the Board to give effect to any financial assistance deemed appropriate to implement during a two-year period, starting from the date of the adoption of this resolution. While the opportunity for shareholders to approve intra group loans is welcomed, there are reservations about the potential use of this authority for loans to associates, as allowed for by these sections of the Act.

The proposal holds the likelihood of raising potential conflicts of interest between the company and its associates or employees. Also, there are concerns over the risk carried by the company's shareholders in the event of a default of a loan or guaranteed credit made to a related company in which it holds less than 50% of the capital. Based on the above, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

MONTANARO UK SMALLER COMPANIES I.T. PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

12. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the

effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

CMC MARKETS PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

3. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. There is no mitigation statement included within the remuneration policy. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance.

Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

4. Approve the rules of the CMC Markets plc Management Equity Plan

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the rules of the CMC Markets plc Management Equity Plan. Under the plan eligible to participate are, employees (including employed executive directors) of the Company and its subsidiaries. Awards will be granted in one or more of the following forms, at the discretion of the Board: i) a share award, being a conditional right to acquire fully paid ordinary shares in the capital of the Company ('Shares') in the future, ii) a forfeitable share award, being an award of Shares subject to forfeiture restrictions, iii) an option, structured as an option to acquire Shares in the future and iv) a phantom award, being a right to receive a cash sum in the future linked to the value of notional Shares, structured as an option or Share award. Share awards and options may be settled using newly issued, treasury or existing Shares. Awards may be granted subject to performance conditions, or other conditions, that must normally be satisfied in order for awards to vest. All MEP awards granted to Executive Directors will be subject to performance conditions, with a performance period consistent with the Remuneration Policy. Subject to the satisfaction of the performance conditions, and any other conditions that apply, awards will normally vest on the later of the date the Board decides the performance conditions/other conditions have been satisfied and the vesting date specified by the Board at the grant date. Awards will not normally vest until at least three years from grant. Awards may vest in tranches, in which case each tranche may have a different vesting date.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries. LTIP based schemes are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company (creating capital and - lawful - dividends). They are inherently acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

12. Re-elect James Richards - Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

Additionally, there is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.3,

16. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

20. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

TATE & LYLE PLC AGM - 25-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.0,

4. Elect David Hearn - Chair (Non Executive)

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.1,

5. Re-elect Nick Hampton - Chief Executive

Chief Executive.

As there is no director assigned to oversee sustainability issues, the Chief Executive is held accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Currently, the Company's sustainability policies and practices are deemed insufficient to mitigate material risks associated with sustainability, which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.3, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 11.5,

11. Re-elect Lars Frederiksen - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director. There are concerns over the director's potential time commitments, and the director could not prove full attendance of board and committee meetings during the year.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.0,

13. *Re-elect Sybella Stanley - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of Remuneration Committee. Although there are concerns over potential aggregate time commitments, this director has attended all Board and committee meetings during the year under review.

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.0,

15. *Appoint the Auditors*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.00% of audit fees during the year under review and 5.94% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

17. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

20. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 10.4,

21. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

CT UK HIGH INCOME TRUST PLC AGM - 26-07-2024**1. Receive the Annual Report**

The dividend policy was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. The Company does not have a Management Engagement Committee which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

12. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.5, Abstain: 0.9, Oppose/Withhold: 5.5,

FIRSTGROUP PLC AGM - 26-07-2024**3. Approve the Remuneration Report**

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CFO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CFO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.5,

2. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BCC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

12. *Re-elect David Martin - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as he was appointed Interim Executive Chair on the conclusion of the 2021 AGM in September 2021 until 1 June 2022, when the company appointed a new CEO. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.0,

14. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as auditors of the Company*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.13% of audit fees during the year under review and 8.00% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.7, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 4.1,

20. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

DISCOVERIE GROUP PLC AGM - 26-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary

duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

4. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to receive dividend income on share awards starting from the date the awards vest, not from the date of grant. This means dividends should be paid from the vesting date onwards, excluding the performance period before vesting. The LTIP (Long-Term Incentive Plan) currently does not use non-financial metrics to assess performance. This is contrary to best practice, as non-financial factors can focus the remuneration policy on the overall operational performance of the business and the individual contributions of senior executives. Financial parameters, by contrast, are generally beyond an individual director's control. The maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated, with vesting scales designed to reward better performance. However, the total potential awards that can vest under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest-paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a shareholding equivalent to at least 200% of their salary within five years, aligning their interests with those of the shareholders. The Annual Bonus includes deferral and claw-back provisions, adhering to best practices. Specifically, half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. Although the performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is not considered sufficiently long-term, it is welcomed that recipients must hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, and claw-back provisions are in place for long-term incentive plans.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.0,

10. Re-elect Rosalind Kainyah MBE - Non-Executive Director

Independent Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

12. *Re-appoint Deloitte as the Auditors of the Company*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid during the year under review and 2.51% was paid on a three-year aggregate basis.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.3,

17. *Issue Additional Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.0, Abstain: 1.3, Oppose/Withhold: 8.7,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash in Connection with Resolution 15*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.9,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

21. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

22. *Amend discoverIE Group plc 2021 Long Term Incentive Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of a new executive incentive plan. Under the plan, participants will be allotted shares or rights to shares. Performance targets have not been fully quantified at this time, which makes an informed assessment impossible and may lead to (partial) payment against (partial) failure.

LTIP based schemes are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the Company (creating capital and - lawful - dividends). They act as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute Company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

23. *Approve 2024 Deferred Share Bonus Plan*

It is proposed to grant the board authority to part of the annual bonus in shares, instead of cash. There are concerns that the portion of the award that will defer into shares is not sufficient. The company's remuneration policy states that 20% of the bonus will defer to shares for three years. Despite the holding period being sufficiently long, it would be preferred if 50% of the award was deferred into shares for three years. On this basis, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

CRANSWICK PLC AGM - 29-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.6, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration Policy. However, it is clear from Company reporting that sufficient steps have been taken in order to address the concerns raised. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. However, the deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is not considered adequate. Half of the bonus should be deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs.

but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 13.2,

6. *Re-elect Elizabeth Barber - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

10. *Re-elect Yetunde Hofmann - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

11. *Re-elect Tim Smith - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.4, Abstain: 1.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.5,

14. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 9.09% of audit fees during the year under review and 7.18% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time

more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document). The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.2,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.8,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

21. *Cranswick 2024 Long-Term Incentive Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time. LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather

than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.0,

PICTON PROPERTY INCOME LTD AGM - 30-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The functions of Investment Manager and Company Secretary are performed by two different companies, which is welcomed.

In addition, it is also noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. However, a dividend was paid during the year but was not put forward for shareholder's approval, which is contrary to best practice. The legal definition for investment companies permits payments of dividend regardless of capital reserves. It is therefore considered that shareholder consent to dividend is a necessary safeguard and should be sought accordingly.

Total expected costs are instead included in a regulatory document: the Key Information Document (KID). The measure under the term of Ongoing Charges Figure (OCF) is misleading as it does not include all ongoing charges. The OCF excludes - for example - custodian costs, transaction costs of buying and selling shares, some legal costs, and cost of executing buybacks (which for the UK includes broker fees as well as stamp duty). Neglecting disclosure of the above-mentioned costs, coupled with automatic tabling of buyback authorities, carries the risk of buybacks that may actually destroy value if it is performance and cost that are the underlying causes of investment company discounts.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

2. *Re-elect KPMG Channel Islands Limited as Auditor of the Company*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.00% of audit fees during the year under review and 2.78% on a three-year aggregate basis.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to

make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

7. Re-elect Lena Wilson - Chair (Non Executive)

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

It should be expected a fully independent board of an investment company to negotiate, rather than to take instructions from the fund manager. The automatic tabling of buyback resolutions without an analysis of the effect of fund manager (FM) costs and FM performance on the discount brushes several matters under the carpet, which may work in favour of fund manager incumbency, without cost reductions. That carries the risk of buybacks that may actually destroy value if it is performance and cost that are the underlying causes of investment company discounts. Given the absence of an appropriate discussion on cost reductions at the company, it is considered that the re-election of the chair should not be supported.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.2,

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.9,

15. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.3,

VODAFONE GROUP PLC AGM - 30-07-2024

2. Re-elect Jean-Francois Van Boxmeer - Chair (Non Executive)

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

Chair of the Nomination Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

7. Elect Hatem Dowidar - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and member of the Nomination Committee. Not considered independent as Mr. Hatem Dowidar is representative of e& Group a significant shareholder of the Company. There is sufficient independent representation on the Board.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 7.4,

8. Re-elect Delphine Ernotte Cunci - Designated Non-Executive

It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

10. Re-elect Maria Amparo Moraleda Martinez - Non-Executive Director

Independent non-executive director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

12. Re-elect Christine Ramon - Designated Non-Executive

It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

15. Approve the Remuneration Report

Dividend accrual has been separately categorised which is welcome. Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.2, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

16. *Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as the Company's auditor*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.00% of audit fees during the year under review and 2.63% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

21. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.7,

22. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

SEVERFIELD PLC AGM - 30-07-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

4. *Re-elect Alan Dunsmore - Chief Executive*

Chief Executive.

As there is no director assigned to oversee sustainability issues, the Chief Executive is held accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Currently, the Company's sustainability policies and practices are deemed insufficient to mitigate material risks associated with sustainability, which does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

7. *Re-elect Louise Hardy - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.0, Abstain: 7.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

10. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditor of the Company*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

13. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

LINDE PLC AGM - 30-07-2024

1a . *Re-elect Stephen Angel - Chair (Executive)*

Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.5,

1c. *Re-elect Ann-Kristin Achleitner - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Compensation Committee. Not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years. Chair of the Compensation Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.7,

1d. *Re-elect Thomas Enders - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.3,

1f. *Re-elect Joe Kaeser - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Nomination and Governance Committee.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

PIRC issue: At this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the Chair of Nomination and Governance Committee be responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.4, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.2,

1j. *Re-elect Robert L. Wood - Lead Director*

Lead Director and Member of the Nomination and Governance and Compensation Committees. Not considered independent as the director previously served as a director of Praxair, Inc. from 2004 until the business combination of Praxair, Inc. and Linde AG in October, 2018. It is considered that a Lead Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role.

Additionally, this director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

3. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ACB. Based on this rating, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.5, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 7.2,

RECORD PLC AGM - 30-07-2024**1. *Receive the Annual Report***

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.8,

3. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. The vesting scale attached to the LTIP is considered to be overly narrow. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two

years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: ADB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 13.7,

4. Approve the amendments to the Record plc Long Term Incentive Plan

It is proposed to approve the amendments of the Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan. The new limit and additional performance condition are required in order to facilitate the implementation of the Company's new Directors Remuneration Policy. The maximum opportunity is to increase from 150% of the salary to 200% of the salary and on the performance conditions Strategic measures will be count for one third of the award. The amendments proposed do not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.2, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 13.7,

10. Re-elect David Morrison - Chair (Non Executive)

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. As the Company do not have a Board level Sustainability Committee, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. As such, given that the Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered to be adequate in order to minimize material risks linked to sustainability.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

16. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

17. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a

specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

18. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

MCKESSON CORPORATION AGM - 31-07-2024

1f. *Elect Donald R. Knauss - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board, Chair of the Compensation and Talent Committee and Member of the Governance and Sustainability Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines. Additionally, in terms of best practice, it is considered that the Compensation and Talent Committee and Sustainability Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members. Furthermore, it is considered that the Chair of the Compensation and Talent Committee is responsible for the company's executive compensation, and owing to concerns with the company's executive compensation, opposition is recommended.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.2, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 9.4,

1h. *Elect Maria Martinez - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Governance and Sustainability Committee.

Additionally, regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and

they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

This director is the Chair of the Governance and Sustainability Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

The Chair of the Governance and Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

PIRC issue: At this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of nomination committee be responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.5, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 9.3,

1j. *Elect Brian S. Tyler - Chief Executive*

Chief Executive.

During the year under review, the company has received a fine due to anti-competitive practices. On 20 January 2023, U.S. District Judge Charles Breyer gave initial approval to the settlement alleging McKesson of concealing the fact that the pharmaceutical wholesaler profited from a price-fixing conspiracy amongst generic drug manufacturers, calling the settlement 'fair, reasonable and adequate'. According to the settlement, first announced in early November, the company misled investors by saying that it was increasing prices due to supply disruptions. While the full impact of this decision is yet to be ascertained, it is recommended that Camden oppose the re-election of the CEO, who is considered to be accountable for these matters.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

2. *Appoint the Auditors: Deloitte & Touche LLP*

Deloitte proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.51% of audit fees during the year under review and 0.28% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 6.5,

3. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance metrics are replicated under different incentive plans, raising concerns that executives are being rewarded twice for the same performance. Retention awards made up less than one-third of the awards granted to executives, which is considered best practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ADC. Based on this rating, it is recommended that Camden

oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.6, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 9.6,

4. *Amend Articles: Provide for Officer Exculpation*

The Board seeks authority to amend the articles, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding the exculpation of officers. The Company's Certificate of Incorporation (Certificate) currently provides for the Company to limit the monetary liability of directors in certain circumstances pursuant to and consistent with the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The State of Delaware recently amended Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL to allow Delaware corporations to extend similar protections to officers. Specifically, the amendments to the DGCL allow Delaware corporations to exculpate their officers for personal liability for breaches of the duty of care in certain circumstances.

While efforts to align executive and non-executive liabilities and harmonize corporate articles are acknowledged, decisions taken by executives, may cause significant higher losses compared to those taken by directors. While officers remain liable for lack of fiduciary duty due to wrongful actions committed wilfully, they would nevertheless be exculpated against direct actions, such as class actions. Shareholders could still act via derivative lawsuits, which are however more complex and less lucrative legal avenue since shareholders would bring an action in the name of the corporation and not in the name of shareholders. This could potentially dissuading shareholders from pursuing actions and entrench poorly performing officers. On balance, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.1, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 15.5,

VOLEX PLC AGM - 01-08-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Disclosure is adequate, the executives' remuneration includes fixed and variable pay.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

7. *Re-elect Peter Westmacott - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Nomination Committee.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8. Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers as the Auditors of the Company

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

11. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

12. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such a proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

STERIS PLC AGM - 01-08-2024

1b. *Re-elect Richard C. Breeden - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Audit Committee and Member of the Nominating and Governance Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

Chair of the Audit Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.8, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 5.1,

1d. *Re-elect Cynthia L. Feldmann - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Member of the Audit Committee and Chair of the Nomination Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. At this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of nomination committee be responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure. As the Chair of the Nomination Committee is considered to be accountable for the Company's sustainability programme, and there are concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.7,

1f. *Re-elect Jacqueline B. Kosecoff - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Member of the Nomination Committee and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.2,

1i. *Re-elect Mohsen M. Sohi - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.9, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.0,

1j. *Re-elect Richard M. Steeves - Non-Executive Director*

Non-executive Director and Member of the Nomination Committee. Not independent as he served as the CEO of Synergy Health Plc prior to the acquisition of the Company on 02 November 2015.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

2. *Appoint the Auditors*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 5.07% of audit fees during the year under review and 8.02% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.2,

3. *To appoint Ernst & Young Chartered Accountants as the Company's Irish statutory auditor under Irish law to hold office until the conclusion of the Company's next annual general meeting*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 5.07% of audit fees during the year under review and 8.02% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm

that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 10.1,

5. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. The Company uses only one performance metrics to determine the payout of performance awards. Instead of the use of a sole performance metric, it would be preferred that payout be linked to at least two or more performance metrics, with the inclusion of an non-financial performance criteria. Performance metrics are replicated under different incentive plans, raising concerns that executives are being rewarded twice for the same performance. Retention awards made up less than one-third of the awards granted to executives, which is considered best practice. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. The compensation rating is: DDA. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 7.3,

7. *Authorise the Board to Waive Pre-emptive Rights*

It is proposed to exclude pre-emption rights on shares issued over a period of 15 months. The corresponding authority for issuing shares without pre-emptive rights, requested in a previous proposal, does not exceed guidelines (10%). However it is considered that shareholders should be allowed to vote on such resolutions annually. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.5, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.3,

8. *Transact Any Other Business*

Shareholders should receive sufficient notice of proposals brought forward by either management or other shareholders. As such, any other proposition brought forward in the meeting would provide insufficient time for an informed assessment. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

ELECTRONIC ARTS INC AGM - 01-08-2024**1c. *Re-elect Jeffrey T. Huber - Non-Executive Director***

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.7,

1e. *Re-elect Richard A. Simonson - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.0,

1f. *Re-elect Luis A. Ubiñas - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Nominating and Governance Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that a Senior Independent Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role, irrespective of the level of independence of the Board. It is considered that Nomination and Governance committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair. Additionally, at this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of nomination committee be responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure. As the Chair of the Nomination and Governance Committee is considered to be accountable for the Company's sustainability programme, and given the concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 8.0,

1h. *Re-elect Andrew Wilson - Chair & Chief Executive*

Chair and CEO. Combined roles at the head of the Company. There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the Company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the Company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. Combining the two roles in one person represents a concentration of power that is potentially detrimental to board balance, effective debate, and board appraisal.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.4, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 7.2,

2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment.

The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.3, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 12.2,

3. *Appoint the Auditors*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 9.7,

4. *Approve Amended 2019 Equity Incentive Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of the Amended 2019 Equity Incentive Plan. The amendments are as follows: increase the number of shares of common stock, par value \$0.01 per share, available for issuance under the 2019 EIP by 2,100,000 shares; eliminate the fungible share counting ratio for new awards. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.4, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 7.2,

SEQUOIA ECONOMIC INFRASTRUCTURE INCOME FUND AGM - 01-08-2024

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why

the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

REGIONAL REIT LIMITED AGM - 05-08-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

There was no dividend or dividend policy put to vote although the company paid interim dividends during the year, which is considered inappropriate. It is considered that shareholder approval of the dividend, or dividend policy, is a necessary safeguard of shareholders rights and should be sought accordingly.

The functions of Investment Manager and Company Secretary are performed by two different companies, which is welcomed.

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Nevertheless, based on concerns regarding dividends, opposition is recommended.

Dividends have been paid but the final dividend or dividend policy has not been put to a shareholder vote.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

9. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 10% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

12. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.2,

NEWRIVER REIT PLC AGM - 05-08-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

5. Re-elect Colin Rutherford - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee. The Company has no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. The chair of the audit committee is considered accountable for the whistle-blowing reporting structure. It is recommended Camden to Oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.1,

7. Re-elect Alastair Miller - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. In addition Mr. Miller is member of the Nomination Committee. As the Chair of the Nomination committee is newly appointed, the second higher member of the Board is considered accountable for the Nomination Committee's policies and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.7,

14. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.7,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

16. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

SYNCONA LIMITED AGM - 06-08-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is considered appropriate. The functions of Investment Manager and Company Secretary are performed by two different companies, which is welcomed. Regarding the lack of vote on the final dividend or dividend policy, it is seen as a derogation of shareholder's rights. It is appreciated that quarterly dividends may be more favourable to shareholders and be what was agreed in the prospectus, however, shareholders should be provided an opportunity to ratify this approach annually through a vote on the dividend policy. This in turn gives the company a mandate to take that particular approach. Such an annual vote on the policy is not considered as overly burdensome and is a useful way for the company to receive feedback on the chosen approach.

Dividends have been paid but the final dividend or dividend policy has not been put to a shareholder vote.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Re-appoint Deloitte LLP (Guernsey Branch) as the Auditors of the Company*

Deloitte proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.11% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.38% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.8, Abstain: 2.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing

whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

CUSTODIAN PROPERTY INCOME REIT PLC AGM - 08-08-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

It is noted the investment management and company's secretarial functions are performed by the same entity. Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts. The interests of the fund manager are considered to be in conflict with those of shareholders and the company due to the impact of management fees.

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is also noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. However, a dividend was paid during the year but was not put forward for shareholder's approval, which is contrary to best practice. The legal definition for investment companies permits payments of dividend regardless of capital reserves. It is therefore considered that shareholder consent to dividend is a necessary safeguard and should be sought accordingly.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

7. *Re-elect Ian Thomas Mattioli - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Nomination Committee. It is noted that this director has significant links to the investment advisor and therefore cannot be supported on the Board. The interests of the fund manager are considered to be in conflict with those of shareholders and the company due to the impact of management fees.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 81.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 18.3,

9. *Re-appoint Deloitte LLP as the Auditors of the Company*

Deloitte proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

13. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

Authority is sought to issue more than 10% of the issued share capital for cash and expires at the next AGM. The proposed limit is considered excessive. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 10% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

INVESTEC PLC AGM - 08-08-2024

1. *Re-elect Henrietta Baldock - Designated Non-Executive*

It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

11. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a

vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.2,

12. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics to assess individual performance. These metrics enable the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole, as well as the individual roles of each executive in achieving that performance. The performance metrics are not interdependent, meaning that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible when all threshold targets are met. However, the remuneration policy does not include a mitigation statement. The Short Term Incentive is deferred, with claw-back provisions in place. Maximum potential awards for the Short Term Incentive are clearly stated, and half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years, which aligns with best practice. The deferral period attached to the Short Term Incentive is considered appropriate and helps to ensure alignment with long-term performance goals. The Long Term Incentive has a performance period of at least five years, making it sufficiently long-term. Maximum potential awards for the Long Term Incentive are clearly stated, and the total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest-paid Director's base salary. Claw-back provisions are in place for long-term incentive plans. Additionally, recipients of the Long Term Incentive award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is a welcomed requirement. The vesting scales are considered broad and are geared towards better performance. Directors are required to build a shareholding equivalent to at least 200% of their salary within five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executives with those of the shareholders.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BCC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 9.6,

18. *Investec Limited: Re-appoint PwC as Auditors*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid during the year under review and 0.87% was paid on a three-year aggregate basis.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time

more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document). The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

22. Investec Limited: Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 15% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

24. Investec Limited: Approve Financial Assistance to Subsidiaries and Directors

Approval is sought to provide direct or indirect financial assistance by way of loan, guarantee, the provision of security or otherwise to any of the present or future directors or prescribed officers of Investec Limited or any of its present or future subsidiaries and/or any other entity that is or becomes related to Investec Limited. Such arrangements are not supported as they corrupt the relationship between the company and director, raising potential conflicts of interest. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

32. Investec plc: Authorize Market Purchase of Ordinary Shares

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

SAPUTO INC AGM - 09-08-2024**1.1. *Elect Lino A. Saputo, Jr. - Chair (Executive)***

Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.4. *Elect Anthony M. Fata - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Nomination, Remuneration and Sustainability Committee. Not considered independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that a Senior Independent Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role, irrespective of the level of independence of the Board. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination, Remuneration and Sustainability committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.5. *Elect Annalisa King - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that audit committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.6. *Elect Karen Kinsley - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. Although there are concerns over potential aggregate time commitments, this director has attended all Board and committee meetings during the year under review. This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.10. *Elect Annette Verschuren - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

3. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is aligned with companies of a similar market cap. The compensation rating is: BCC.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

NEXTENERGY SOLAR FUND LIMITED AGM - 12-08-2024

9. *Appoint the Auditors*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing

whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

ABRDN PROPERTY INCOME TRUST LIMITED AGM - 13-08-2024

11. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

THE GLOBAL SMALLER COMPANIES TRUST PLC AGM - 13-08-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

5. Re-elect Anja Balfour - Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Chair of the Board, Chair of the Nomination Committee and Member of the Audit and Management Engagement Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. Additionally, in terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee and the Audit and Management

Engagement Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.4, Abstain: 3.4, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.1, Abstain: 1.8, Oppose/Withhold: 4.1,

TELECOM PLUS PLC AGM - 13-08-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.9, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.7, Abstain: 2.4, Oppose/Withhold: 6.9,

4. *Re-elect Charles Wigoder - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years on the Board. Additionally he serves as CEO of the Company from 1998 to 2010 and Executive Chair of the Board from 2010 to 2022. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. In addition, Mr. Wigoder is member of the Nomination Committee. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members. Regardless of the independent representation on the Board as a whole. Furthermore, as the Company do not have a Board level Sustainability Committee, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. As such, given that the Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered to be adequate in order to minimize material risks linked to sustainability. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.6, Abstain: 1.5, Oppose/Withhold: 7.9,

8. *Re-elect Andrew Blowers - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. There are serious concerns regarding the implementation of remuneration at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

11. *Re-appoint KPMG as auditor*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 7.85% of audit fees during the year under review and 8.01% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.5,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.3, Abstain: 0.9, Oppose/Withhold: 2.9,

QORVO INC AGM - 13-08-2024

1c. *Elect John R. Harding - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

1d. *Elect David H.Y. Ho - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Member of the Compensation Committee. Not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years. There are concerns over the director's potential time commitments, and the director could not prove full attendance of board and committee meetings during the year.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

1e. Elect Roderick D. Nelson - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee and the Governance and Nominating Committee. Not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years. It is considered that the Audit Committee and the Governance and Nominating Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members. There are also concerns over the director's potential time commitments, and the director could not prove full attendance of board and committee meetings during the year.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

PIRC issue: In addition, at this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings are not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure. As the chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is not up for election, members of the committee are held accountable for this lack of disclosure. Furthermore, regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders. Moreover, as the Chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is not up for election, the members of the Sustainability Committee are considered to be accountable for the Company's sustainability programme, and given the concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice, among other concerns an oppose vote is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 11.5,

1f. Elect Walden C. Rhines - Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Compensation Committee and member of the Governance and Nominating Committee. Not considered to be independent as he has served on the Board for over nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Compensation Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair. It is also considered that the Chair of the Compensation Committee is responsible for the company's executive compensation, and there are major concerns with the company's executive compensation. There are further concerns over the director's potential time commitments, and the director could not prove full attendance of board and committee meetings during the year.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

PIRC issue: In addition, at this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings are not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure. As the chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is not up for election, members of the committee are held accountable for this lack of disclosure.

Furthermore, regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

Moreover, as the Chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is not up for election, the members of the Sustainability Committee are considered to be

accountable for the Company's sustainability programme, and given the concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 12.2,

1g. *Elect Susan L. Spradley - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Compensation Committee and the Governance and Nominating Committee. There are concerns over the director's potential time commitments, and the director could not prove full attendance of board and committee meetings during the year.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

PIRC issue: In addition, at this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings are not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure. As the chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is not up for election, members of the committee are held accountable for this lack of disclosure.

Furthermore, regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

Moreover, as the Chair of the Governance and Nominating Committee is not up for election, the members of the Sustainability Committee are considered to be accountable for the Company's sustainability programme, and given the concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice, among other concerns an oppose vote is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.7,

2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment.

The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. The annual incentive award made during the year under review is not considered to be overly excessive as it amounts to less than 200% of base salary. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. The minimum performance period prior to vesting is less than three years, which is considered to be short term. Five-year vesting would be preferred. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is not aligned with companies of a similar market cap.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.7,

THE J.M. SMUCKER COMPANY AGM - 14-08-2024**1g. *Elect Alex Shumate - Lead Independent Director***

Lead Independent Director and Member of the Nominating, Governance, and Corporate Responsibility Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that a Lead Independent Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 4.5,

1h. *Elect Mark T. Smucker - Chair & Chief Executive*

Chair and CEO. Combined roles at the head of the Company. There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the Company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the Company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. Combining the two roles in one person represents a concentration of power that is potentially detrimental to board balance, effective debate, and board appraisal.

PIRC issue: Additionally, the articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters. Without a clear justification, we recommend opposing the Chair of the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.7, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 8.6,

2. *Appoint the Auditors: Ernst & Young LLP*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 36.56% of audit fees during the year under review and 37.48% on a three-year aggregate basis.

Non-audit fees exceed 25% of audit fees for the year under review and this level of non-audit fees raises concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.7,

3. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market

standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.8, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 5.7,

CAE INC AGM - 14-08-2024

1.02. *Re-elect Margaret S. (Peg) Billson - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Governance Committee and member of the Human Resources Committee. Not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.08. *Re-elect Alan N. MacGibbon - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

1.09. *Re-elect Mary Lou Maher - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Human Resources Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2. *Appoint the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 5.97% of audit fees during the year under review and 10.13% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns

that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor. It would be recommended that Camden oppose. However, as opposition is not a valid vote option for this resolution, abstention is recommended.

Vote Cast: Abstain

3. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment.

The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is aligned with companies of a similar market cap.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

C&C GROUP PLC AGM - 15-08-2024

3.a. Re-elect Ralph Findlay - Chair & Chief Executive

Chair and CEO. Combined roles at the head of the Company. There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the Company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the Company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. Combining the two roles in one person represents a concentration of power that is potentially detrimental to board balance, effective debate, and board appraisal.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 96.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 3.4,

3.h. Elect Sarah Newbitt - Designated Non-Executive

Independent Non-Executive Director. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

5. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper

quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 40.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 59.4,

6. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BCB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.0, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 5.8,

7. Approve New Long Term Incentive Plan

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

10. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 85.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.2,

11. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

YANDEX NV AGM - 15-08-2024

3. Discharge the Board

Approval is sought to release the members of the Board regarding their activities in the Financial Year under review. The Company does not have an established whistle-blower hotline. It is considered that without a whistle-blower hotline, the company is potentially subject to reputational and financial damage by a lack of supervision of potential malpractice.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

6. Elect Elena Bunina - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as Ms. Bunina previously served as the Head of Academic and Educational Services across the Yandex Group, as well as the General Director and director of Human Resources at Yandex LLC. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

7. Elect Esther Dyson - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

9. To amend the terms of appointment of each of John Boynton, Rogier Rijnja and Charles Ryan to end at the conclusion of the Annual General Meeting to be held in 2025.

Proposal to renew the Board with a bundled election. Although slate elections are not considered to be best practice, they are common in this market. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board after the meeting as resulting from this slate of candidates. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

10. To approve the award of special cash and equity bonuses to each of John Boynton, Rogier Rijnja and Charles Ryan

Non-Executive Directors receive a variable component on top of their fees. It is considered that non-executive directors should receive only fixed fees, as variable compensation may align them with short-term interests and not with long-term supervisory duties. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

12. Approve Amendment to the 2016 Equity Incentive Plan

The Board proposes the amendment of an existing long-term incentive plan by extending it for a further ten-year period and increasing the amount of share available by 30,000,000 Class A Shares. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

14. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's

shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

16. Authorise the Board to Waive Pre-emptive Rights

It is proposed to exclude pre-emption rights on shares issued under the previous resolution at this meeting. The corresponding authority for issuing shares without pre-emptive rights, requested in a previous proposal, exceeds guidelines (10%).

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

ASOS PLC EGM - 20-08-2024

1. Approval of the ASOS Plc Value Creation Plan

The VCP has been designed to incentivise management to deliver exceptional returns for shareholders over a circa five year period ending on 31 August 2029 (the Performance Period), plus a further year over which Awards may be exercised. Any employee (including an Executive Director) of the Company and its subsidiaries will be eligible to participate in the VCP, at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee. Under the VCP, the Committee may grant an eligible employee a right ("Award") to receive a proportion of a pool of value that will be created if certain growth targets are achieved ("Pool"), as explained further below. Awards will be granted in the form of a nil-cost option, where a participant can decide when to exercise their Award and receive ordinary shares in the Company ("Shares") during a limited period of time after it has vested. The proportion of the Pool to which a participant is entitled ("Participant Allocation") will be set at the time the Award is granted. On exercise of the Award, the value of the Participation Allocation will be determined (as explained below) and the participant will receive a number of Shares that are equivalent to the value of the vested Participation Allocation. The Committee may allow Awards to be settled in cash, although in practice, this is only expected to be the case (if at all) in exceptional circumstances. The potential aggregate value of the Pool (to be shared amongst VCP participants) will be equal to 5.5% of the growth in the value of the Company above a reference threshold value of GBP 6.70 per Share ("Threshold Value"), being approximately two times the price of a Share when the Committee initially considered the design for the VCP. An Award will only vest and deliver value to a Participant in respect of any increase in share price above this Threshold Value. For the purpose of assessing the size of the reference Pool in connection with exercises and preventing undue benefit from volatility, the share price will be calculated using the average closing price over the 90 days ending on or shortly prior to the day before the exercise of the Award. The maximum Participant Allocation that a participant may be awarded will be limited to 15% of the Pool. The CEO and CFO will receive Participant Allocations of 15% and 8% respectively. The remaining portion of the Pool will be allocated to eligible employees, with a small portion reserved for future hires and promotions. Awards under the VCP will normally vest as follows: (i) Awards to Executive Directors will vest in two equal tranches (each in respect of 50% of the Participant Allocation) on each of the 4th and 5th anniversary of the date of the General Meeting. (ii) Awards to other participants will vest in three equal tranches (each in respect of one-third of the Participant Allocation) on the 3rd, 4th and 5th anniversaries of the date of the General Meeting. Different normal time vesting profiles may be set in respect later Awards to future hires or in connection with promotions.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries: it is considered that support should not be given to stock or share option plans that do not lay out clear performance criteria, targets and conditions.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.2,

2. Approval of the revised Directors' Remuneration Policy

The Board of Directors is proposing to introduce an ASOS Plc Value Creation Plan ('VCP') to incentivise its Senior Leaders to deliver exceptional value for shareholders through substantial growth in the share price. The VCP will operate instead of the existing ASOS Plc Long Term Incentive Scheme ('ALTIS') for the life of this policy with no Executive Director receiving an award under the VCP receiving further grants under the ALTIS during this period. To facilitate the introduction of the VCP, it is necessary to amend the long-term incentive section of the current directors' remuneration policy to incorporate the operation of the VCP including minor updating of the malus and clawback provisions. No other material changes to the 2023 directors' remuneration policy are proposed. Total variable pay could exceed the proposed limit of 200%. The Annual Bonus performance measures are financial, operational, strategic and individual. Half of the Bonus is paid in cash and half is deferred to shares for three years which is in line with best practice. On the LTIP award performance measures are financial and non-financial. Performance period is three years which is not considered sufficiently long-term, however, a two year holding period applies which is welcomed. Malus and Clawback provisions apply.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.2,

3. Approve the Amendments to the ASOS Plc Long Term Incentive Scheme 2022

In conjunction with the proposals to introduce the VCP (Value Creation Plan), the current dilution limits in the rules of the ASOS plc Long-term Incentive Scheme (ALTIS) will be removed and replaced with a new 10% in 10 year dilution limit counting all awards made under any Group employees' share scheme from the date of the General Meeting which may be satisfied through the issue of new shares or the transfer of shares out of treasury. For the purposes of the new limit in the ALTIS treasury shares will count as new issue shares (unless institutional shareholder guidelines are amended to provide otherwise) but shares subject to awards which have been released or lapsed do not count. The effect of the proposed amendments is to maintain a 10% limit for all ASOS share plans and allow the relevant plans to continue to be offered to a broad population of participants. The amendment proposed does not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

4. Approve the Amendments to the ASOS Plc Deferred Bonus Plan 2022

In conjunction with the proposals to introduce the VCP (Value Creation Plan), the current dilution limits in the rules of the ASOS Plc Deferred Bonus Plan 2022 (the

DBP) will be removed and replaced with a new 10% in 10 year dilution limit counting all awards made under any Group employees' share scheme from the date of the General Meeting which may be satisfied through the issue of new shares or the transfer of shares out of treasury. For the purposes of the new limit in the DBP treasury shares will count as new issue shares (unless institutional shareholder guidelines are amended to provide otherwise) but shares subject to awards which have been released or lapsed do not count. The effect of the proposed amendments is to maintain a 10% limit for all ASOS share plans and allow the relevant plans to continue to be offered to a broad population of participants. In line with PIRC policy on variable pay.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

MICROCHIP TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED AGM - 20-08-2024

1b. Elect Matthew W. Chapman - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that audit committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

PIRC issue: Additionally, at the company, there is no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that such concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the chair of the audit committee, who is considered to be accountable for the concerns with the whistle-blowing reporting structure.

Furthermore, at the company, the Audit Committee does not oversee the whistle-blowing hotline. This may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalated which may mean the issue is concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the chair of the audit committee, who is considered to be accountable for the concerns with the whistle-blowing reporting structure.

Chair of the Audit Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.1,

1f. Elect Karen M. Rapp - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Nominating, Governance, and Sustainability Committee.

PIRC issue: At this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of nomination committee be responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Nominating, Governance, and Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 16.0,

1g. Elect Steve Sanghi - Chair (Executive)

Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.4,

2. Approval of the Amended and Restated 2004 Equity Incentive Plan

The Board proposes the approval Approval of the Amended and Restated 2004 Equity Incentive Plan. The proposed amendment seeks to increase the number of shares of common stock authorised for issuance thereunder by 8,000,000. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.5,

3. Appoint the Auditors: Ernst & Young LLP

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 12.81% of audit fees during the year under review and 17.16% on a three-year aggregate basis.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

4. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.9, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 5.8,

GLOBALDATA PLC EGM - 21-08-2024

1. *Approve Acquisition*

Introduction & Background: The Company announced on 31 July 2024 that its wholly-owned subsidiary GlobalData UK Ltd had conditionally agreed to acquire the entire issued share capital of Business Trade Media, a company which is indirectly wholly owned by the Company's Chief Executive Officer, Mike Danson, reflecting an enterprise value of GBP 10 million subject to adjustment via a customary completion accounts mechanism. Due to Mike Danson's interest in Business Trade Media, he is not considered independent in regard to the Acquisition. Accordingly, the Board has established the Independent Committee, chaired by Murray Legg and solely comprised of Independent Directors, for the purposes of evaluating the merits of the Acquisition and reporting thereon to the Independent Directors. The Acquisition forms an important part of the Company's overall strategy for growth. The Company seeks out strategic acquisition opportunities which extend client reach and product coverage within the Company's markets.

Rationale: The Independent Directors believe that the Acquisition will further advance the Group's transformation into a global data and analytics business with a truly differentiated multi-industry offering, significantly increasing its addressable markets and enhancing the Company's long term growth opportunities. The Acquisition brings together a number of established digital media and industry news brands, which align to our sector coverage enhancing audience and helping to accelerate our GlobalData Curve Strategy. The GlobalData Curve strategy is to increase the Group's interactions with clients and prospects, of which digital media and industry news websites is one channel, to enhance brand awareness and provide an entry point for new clients with a view to longer sustained recurring relationships. The proposed transaction will result in the acquisition of assets mainly in the Consumer, Technology and Industrials sectors. The addition of these assets is expected to generate additional revenues for the Group and the Independent Directors believe the Acquisition will rapidly strengthen and expand the Group's industry coverage for its core corporate clients and enhance the Group's potential to become the world's leading source of data and analytics for corporates.

Recommendation: Such proposals are considered on the basis of whether they are deemed fair, whether they have been adequately explained, and whether there is sufficient independent oversight of the recommended proposal. The Company disclosed sufficient details of the proposal. However, serious corporate governance concerns have been identified: The wholly owner of the Business Trade Media is the CEO of GlobalData plc Mr. Danson. This raises concerns about how shareholders will benefit from a transaction where the proposed expenditure will go to the CEO of the Company. There is no clear justification for how this aligns with the long-term interests of the shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

PROSUS N.V. AGM - 21-08-2024

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

It is proposed to approve the implementation of the remuneration policy. There are concerns regarding excess as the total variable remuneration exceeded 200% of the salary. The Company has disclosed quantified targets against which the achievements and the corresponding variable remuneration has been calculated. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. However, opposition is recommended based on excessive remuneration.

Rating: BD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 83.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.5,

4. *Approve Financial Statements*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

8. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

It is proposed to approve the remuneration policy. Variable remuneration appears to be consistently capped, although the payout may exceed 200% of fixed salary. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. The Company has disclosed quantified targets for performance criteria for the entirety of its variable remuneration component. Nevertheless, opposition is recommended based on excessiveness concerns.

Rating: BDC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 83.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.8,

11.2. *Re-elect Craig Enenstein - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Member of the Nomination Committee and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination and Remuneration Committees should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.3,

11.4. *Re-elect Nolo Letele - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director is considered to be connected with a significant shareholder: Naspers Ltd, as he was Executive Director of the company. Additionally not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

11.5. *Re-elect Roberto Oliveira de Lima - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Member of the Nomination and Remuneration Committees. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a member of the remuneration and nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.4,

13. *Issue Shares for Cash*

Authority to issue shares without pre-emptive rights is proposed for less than 10% of the current share capital. However; the duration of the authority exceeds 12 months. It is considered that shareholders should have the occasion to vote on such resolutions annually.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.6,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares for 18 months. The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.6,

ALIBABA GROUP HOLDING LIMITED AGM - 22-08-2024

3. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

4.1. *Approve New Long Term Incentive Plan: The 2024 Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

4.2. *Approve New Long Term Incentive Plan: The Service Provider Sub-Limit Under the 2024 Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or

all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

5.1. Elect Joseph C. Tsai - Chair (Non Executive)

Non independent non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as he was an Executive Chair until September 2023. He is one of the founders of the Company and significant holder of the outstanding share capital. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

The chair holds another chair position at a listed company, which raises time commitment concerns. It is considered that the chair should be able to wholly dedicate their time to the company in times of company crisis. The COVID pandemic has shown that there are times when multiple unrelated companies will require the Chair's full attention in order to be able to handle times of crisis. It is considered that there is insufficient time to be able to effectively chair two or more companies at the same time.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters. Without a clear justification, we recommend opposing the Chair of the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

5.2. Elect J. Michael Evans - President

President. Not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. It is considered the responsibility of the most senior members of the Supervisory Board to ensure that there is sufficient independent non-executive representation on the board

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

5.4. Elect Irene Yun-Lien Lee - Non-Executive Director

Chair of the Nomination Committee.

The director chairs a committee that is not fully independent, which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented

gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

6. *Appoint the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.33% of audit fees during the year under review and 46.82% on a three-year aggregate basis.

Non-audit fees exceed 25% of audit fees for the year under review and this level of non-audit fees raises concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

ORYX INTERNATIONAL GROWTH FUND LTD AGM - 22-08-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is considered appropriate. The functions of Investment Manager and Company Secretary are performed by two different companies, which is welcomed. Regarding the lack of vote on the final dividend or dividend policy, it is seen as a derogation of shareholder's rights. It is appreciated that quarterly dividends may be more favourable to shareholders and be what was agreed in the prospectus, however, shareholders should be provided an opportunity to ratify this approach annually through a vote on the dividend policy. This in turn gives the company a mandate to take that particular approach. Such an annual vote on the policy is not considered as overly burdensome and is a useful way for the company to receive feedback on the chosen approach. Based on the lack of vote on dividend and dividend policy, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Re-elect Nigel Cayzer - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

3. Re-elect Sydney Cabessa - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and Member of the Nomination Committee.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

4. Re-elect John Grace - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

However, there is insufficient independence on the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

5. Re-elect Christopher Mills - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as he served as Chief Executive Officer of Harwood Capital LLP, the Company's Investment Manager and controlling shareholder. Additionally not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

However, there is insufficient independence on the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

6. Re-elect John Radziwill - Non-Executive Director

Non-executive Director and Member of the Audit and Nomination Committees.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

11. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 10% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

FINSBURY GROWTH & INCOME TRUST PLC EGM - 23-08-2024

1. Authorise Share Repurchase

Introduction & Rationale: The Board implements a buy-back policy, within normal market conditions, whereby it buys-back Ordinary Shares when the Company's share price discount to the NAV per Share approaches 5%. The benefits to Shareholders of the Buy-Back Policy are that: i) the volatility of the Company's share price discount should be reduced, ii) the absolute level of the Company's share price discount should be reduced; and iii) buy-backs are accretive to NAV per Share to the benefit of existing Shareholders. Any buy-back authority, including that sought pursuant to the Proposal, if conferred, is or will be exercised only if to do so would result in an increase in the NAV per Share and if it would be in the best interests of Shareholders generally. Any purchase of Ordinary Shares will be made within guidelines established from time to time by the Board.

Proposal: The Resolution seeks authority for the Company to purchase in the market a maximum of 26,288,741 Ordinary Shares, representing 14.99% of Ordinary Shares in issue as at the Latest Practicable Date.

Recommendation: Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.7,

MARATHON OIL CORPORATION EGM - 29-08-2024

2. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation in Connection with the Merger

The board seeks to approve in an advisory vote on merger related compensation for the Company's named executive officers. The Board proposes that the named executives will receive severance made up of a base salary component and an annual bonus component. The severance is subject to double trigger provisions. It is considered that executive severance should be limited to 12 months salary.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 42.3, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 57.3,

3. Allow Proxy Solicitation

The board requests authority to adjourn the special meeting until a later date or dates, if necessary, in order to permit further solicitation of proxies if there are not sufficient votes at the time of the special meeting to approve the merger. An oppose vote is recommended to any adjournment or postponement of meetings if a sufficient number of votes are present to constitute a quorum. It is considered that where a quorum is present, the vote outcome should be considered representative

of shareholder opinion.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 85.9, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 13.8,

WATCHES OF SWITZERLAND GROUP PLC AGM - 03-09-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they remained under 200% of base salary during the year under review. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee was within the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore considered appropriate. The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.3,

7. Re-elect Rosa Monckton - Designated Non-Executive

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

8. Re-elect Robert Moorhead - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Member of the Remuneration and Nomination Committees.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

10. Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as auditors of the Company

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High

Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 85.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.9,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 15.6,

16. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

JPMORGAN GLOBAL CORE REAL ASSETS LIMITED AGM - 03-09-2024**1. *Receive the Annual Report***

A dividend policy was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 79.2, Abstain: 20.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

7. *Elect Chris Russell - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.0, Abstain: 5.5, Oppose/Withhold: 8.5,

8. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers as the Auditors of the Company*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.1, Abstain: 5.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

10. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing

whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.1, Abstain: 5.4, Oppose/Withhold: 4.5,

12. *Approve the Continuation of the Company*

It is proposed that the Company continue as an investment trust for a period expiring at the conclusion of the Company's upcoming annual general meeting. The average discount over the year was 30.5%, and over three years, 18.73%. The decline in performance and the discount to NAV which has been above 10% for each of the last three years, raises questions about its viability.

The continuation of an investment trust is not supported if the trust's year end share price has been at a discount to NAV of more than 10% for each of the past three fiscal year ends unless the board has provided a clear, cogent and compelling rationale, within the context of its overall investment strategy, in respect of the discount and the actions it is taking to address the situation. Given the Trust's significant discount to NAV over the past three years and the absence of appropriate justification, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 33.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 66.1,

DS SMITH PLC AGM - 03-09-2024

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

4. *Re-elect Mr. Geoff Drabble - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. In addition, on the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Drabble received

significant opposition of 11.96% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 9.2,

5. *Re-elect Mr. Miles Roberts - Chief Executive*

Chief Executive Officer. Member of the Nomination Committee. It is considered best practice that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

The Chief Executive Officer is a member of the Nomination Committee which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.2,

10. *Re-elect Ms. Alina Kessel - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee. There are concerns over a potential conflict of interest between her role as an Executive or Senior Manager in a listed company and membership of the remuneration committee. This does not meet Camden's guidelines and cannot be supported.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

13. *Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as Auditor of the Company*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 4.48% of audit fees during the year under review and 4.19% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

18. Authorise Share Repurchase

It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

TAYLOR MARITIME INVESTMENTS LTD AGM - 04-09-2024

3. Approve the Remuneration Report

Shareholders are being asked to approve the Company's annual report on remuneration. Disclosure of figures and policy is adequate. The aggregate limit set in relation to Directors' remuneration was not exceeded during the year. Directors' remuneration does not comprise any performance-related element, which is welcomed. It is further noted that no additional discretionary payments were made in the year. There was no increase in individual fees during the year under review. Overall, the remuneration practices and the level of fees paid to the Board are considered acceptable. However, at the previous year's AGM, this resolution received significant opposition of 13.61%, which has not been adequately addressed by the Board with the shareholders at this time. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.1, Abstain: 7.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

14. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

AEW UK REIT PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

There was no dividend or dividend policy put to vote although the company paid interim dividends during the year, which is considered inappropriate. It is considered that shareholder approval of the dividend, or dividend policy, is a necessary safeguard of shareholders rights and should be sought accordingly.

The functions of Investment Manager and Company Secretary are performed by two different companies, which is welcomed.

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Nevertheless, based on concerns regarding dividends, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

12. *Issue Additional Shares for Cash*

Authority is sought to issue an additional 10% of the issued share capital for cash. The proposed limit in aggregate with the limit proposed in resolution 11 is considered excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.7,

13. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

BAILLIE GIFFORD UK GROWTH TRUST PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board. Where administrative duties are carried out by the company related to the manager, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 1.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

8. *Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as Independent Auditor of the Company*

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the 'expectations gap' in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is 'useful to users'. That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being 'useful for users', a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state.

PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the 'expectations gap' being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 1.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

12. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 1.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

ODYSSEAN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

9. *Appoint the Auditors*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case

at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

14. *Further issuance of Shares for Cash*

Authority is sought to issue an additional 10% of the share capital, leading to an aggregate of more than 10% of the issued share capital for cash, which expires at the next AGM. The proposed limit is considered excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.7, Abstain: 1.4, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

SDCL ENERGY EFFICIENCY INCOME TRUST PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

7. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Independent Auditor of the Company.*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case

at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

12. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

LINDSELL TRAIN INVESTMENT TRUST PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

6. Re-elect Vivien Gould - Senior Independent Director

Senior Independent Director and Member of the Audit and Nomination Committees. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that a Senior Independent Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role, irrespective of the level of independence of the Board.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee and the audit and nomination committees should be wholly comprised of independent directors.

In addition, it is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

ASHTeAD GROUP PLC AGM - 04-09-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial

performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. The vesting scale attached to the LTIP is considered to be overly narrow. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to 850% of salary for the CEO and 300% of the salary for the CFO, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as one third of the bonus is deferred in shares over a period of three years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 61.9, Abstain: 2.0, Oppose/Withhold: 36.1,

5. *Re-elect Paul Walker - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. In addition, as the Company do not have a Board level Sustainability Committee, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. As the Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise the material risks linked to sustainability.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.1,

9. *Re-elect Lucinda Riches - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. There are serious concerns regarding the implementation of remuneration at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 14.0,

12. Re-elect Renata Ribeiro - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

13. Elect Roy Twite - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

14. Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors of the Company

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. [PwC] proposed as new auditor. Auditor rotation is considered a positive factor. Acceptable proposal.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

16. Amend Existing Long Term Incentive Plan

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the amendments of the Company's Long-Term Incentive Plan. The effect of the proposed amendment is to introduce a revised 'individual limit' into the Plan rules, so that awards will not be granted to a participant under the Plan over ordinary shares in the Company with a market value (as determined by the Company's Remuneration Committee at the time an award is granted) in excess of 850% of salary in respect of any financial year of the Company. The provision of the Plan rules approved by shareholders in 2021 stating that awards may be granted in excess of this 'individual limit' to an eligible employee in connection with their recruitment solely to compensate them for any awards forfeited as a result of leaving their former employer remains unchanged. The amendments proposed do not promote better alignment with shareholder. Moreover, PIRC does not consider that LTIPs are an effective means of incentivising

performance. These schemes are not considered to be properly long term and are subject to manipulation due to their discretionary nature. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 61.2, Abstain: 2.0, Oppose/Withhold: 36.8,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.4,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 8.4,

20. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 14.99% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

JET2 PLC AGM - 05-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

Disclosure is adequate and the Annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting. The financial statements have been audited and unqualified. Although not required to do so under AIM listing regulations, it is considered best practice for the Remuneration report to be submitted to a shareholder vote. As the Company has failed to do this, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

6. *Re-appoint KPMG as the Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence

of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: Oppose

9. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

10. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

11. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

CURRYS PLC AGM - 05-09-2024*2. Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

10. Re-elect Gerry Murphy - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is sufficient independent representation on the Board.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit and remuneration committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.4,

12. Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditor of the Company

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 45.45% of audit fees during the year under review and 23.33% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

Non-audit fees exceed 25% of audit fees for the year under review and this level of non-audit fees raises concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state.

PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB

determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.4,

17. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.4,

XPS PENSIONS GROUP PLC AGM - 05-09-2024

3. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 18.0,

4. Approve the Deferred Share Bonus plan

The Board of Directors proposes the shareholders to approve the XPS Pensions Group Deferred Share Bonus Plan (DSBP). Awards made under the DSBP will be in the form of a deferred right to receive ordinary shares in the Company ('Shares'). The Remuneration Committee may grant an award in one of two forms: (A) nil or nominal cost options and (B) a conditional award. Eligible to participate are any current or former employee (including an Executive Director) of the Company and any of its subsidiaries. The DSBP may operate over new issue Shares, treasury Shares or Shares purchased in the market. In any ten-year period, the Company may not issue (or have the possibility to issue) more than 10% of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company in respect of awards made in that period under the DSBP

and any other employee share plan adopted by the Company. Treasury Shares will count as new issue Shares for the purposes of these limits but they will also cease to count towards these limits if institutional investor bodies decide that they need not count. Awards will normally vest at the end of a two-year deferral period and provided the participant is still an employee in the Company's group (as explained further below). The Committee may allow awards to be settled in cash (in whole or in part) where it is appropriate to do so.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.1,

13. *Re-elect Margaret Snowdon - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. There are serious concerns regarding the implementation of remuneration at the company and it is considered that chair of the remuneration committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.8,

15. *Re-appoint BDO LLP as auditors of the Company*

BDO LLP proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

19. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights*

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits. It is noted that on the 2023 Annual General Meeting the proposed resolution received significant opposition of 13.96% of the votes. the Company did not provide information as to how address the issue with its shareholders. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 83.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 16.9,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 19.9,

21. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 20.0,

22. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.1,

ALIMENTATION COUCHE-TARD INC AGM - 05-09-2024

1. Appoint the Auditors

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.68% of audit fees during the year under review and 17.16% on a three-year aggregate basis.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2.1. Re-elect Alain Bouchard - Chair (Executive)

Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

PIRC issue: The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2.3. Re-elect Jean Bernier - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as Group President, Fuel Americas and Operations North East, and served Group President, Global Fuels and North-East Operations. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2.6. Re-elect Marie-Eve D'Amours - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director has a relationship with the Company, which is considered material. For more than 10 years, Ms. D'Amours attended the Board of Directors of Alimentation CoucheTard, as an observer. Ms. D'Amours is the daughter of Mr. Jacques D'Amours, a co-founder of the Corporation. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.8. Re-elect Eric Fortin - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director has close family ties with the Company. The director is son of Richard Fortin. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.11. Re-elect Mélanie Kau - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Human Resources and Corporate Governance Committees. Not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is the chair of the Corporate Governance committee and the Human Resources Committee. It is important that these committees be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.15. Re-elect Réal Plourde - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as he held executive positions at the Company until his retirement in May 2010 and as he is one of the founders, along with Mr. Bouchard, D'Amours and Fortin, who collectively control a majority of the voting power. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

3. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment.

The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. The annual incentive award made during the year under review is not considered to be overly excessive as it amounts to less than 200% of base salary. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is not aligned with companies of

a similar market cap.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

6. Shareholder Resolution: Disclosure of Languages Mastered by Executives

Proponent's argument: MÉDAC proposes that "the languages mastered by members of management be disclosed in the proxy solicitation circular." The proponent argues the following: "In 2023, we filed a shareholder proposal requesting the disclosure of languages mastered by the directors of around 20 public companies. Following discussions, almost all of these companies - including the big 7 banks - agreed to disclose the information. [...] Several public controversies over language have tarnished the reputation of major open companies with regard to their social responsibility and the interpretation that they fulfill their duties and obligations regarding the diversity inherent in our societies. Language, at the heart of our democratic institutions, is in fact a fundamental attribute of the community. We must prevent such situations, which are harmful from every point of view, from recurring."

Company's response: The board recommended a vote against this proposal. The Company States "Based out of Laval, Québec, we uphold and comply with the Charter of the French Language and adhere to all requirements related to the French language in the course of our business activities and operations in Québec. We also comply with all applicable laws and regulations relating to language in all jurisdictions in which we operate. As a global corporation, we seek in our executive management team a diversity of skills, education, geographical representation, business background, cultural background, global expertise, independence, financial and operational skills and sector and geographic knowledge that meet our strategic needs and priorities. [...] In light of the foregoing, the Board of Directors believes that the Corporation's current approach to addressing diversity, including language diversity, of our officers so they may fulfill their duties and responsibilities in connection with our global activities are appropriate, and there is no need to disclose the languages mastered by executive officers in the Circular."

PIRC analysis: It is welcomed for companies to include local languages in disclosure and at meetings. However, this proposal would decrease disclosure for non-French investors and the company does not clarify whether translation services would be provided or whether the disclosure of filings would be provided also in other than French language. It is considered that diversity should increase and not restrict opportunities for shareholders and stakeholders alike.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

SPEEDY HIRE PLC AGM - 05-09-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Disclosure is adequate. No variable remuneration (either short- or long-term) was paid during the year under review.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. The LTIP does not utilise non-financial metrics as a means of assessing performance. The absence of Non-financial parameters to assess Executives' long-term performance is considered contrary to best practice as such factors allow

the remuneration policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole and the individual roles of each of the senior executives in achieving that performance. Financial parameters are generally beyond an individual director's control. Although it is noted that the Remuneration Committee has the flexibility to utilize non-financial performance targets. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. However, the deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is not considered adequate. Half of the bonus should be deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BEB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 77.9, Abstain: 3.0, Oppose/Withhold: 19.2,

7. Re-elect David Shearer - Chair (Non Executive)

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee. It is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Shearer received significant opposition of 10.27% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders. This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.6,

10. Re-elect Rhian Bartlett - Designated Non-Executive

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

13. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Auditors of the Company*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

18. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.2,

21. *Approve Speedy Hire Plc Performance Share Plan 2024*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

BERKELEY GROUP HOLDINGS PLC AGM - 06-09-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are considered excessive as they exceed 200% of base salary. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report and has failed to disclose sufficient measures taken to address shareholders' concerns. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 7.5,

8. *Re-elect Natasha Adams - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.7,

12. Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditor of the Company

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 7.14% of audit fees during the year under review and 11.43% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.6,

15. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.4,

16. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.9, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 9.9,

17. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

HALFORDS GROUP PLC AGM - 06-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

3. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

It is proposed to approve the remuneration report. No variable remuneration (either short- or long-term) was paid during the year.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

7. *Re-elect Tanvi Gokhale - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director, Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement and Chair of the Sustainability Committee. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

12. *Approve Political Donations*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the authority for Political Donations. The Company states that: This resolution concerns Part 14 of the Companies Act 2006 (the Act), which provides that political donations made by a company to political parties, to other political organisations and to independent election candidates or political expenditure incurred by a company must be authorised in advance by shareholders. It is not the policy of the Company to make political donations and the Directors have no intention of changing that policy. However, as a result of the wide definitions in the Act, normal expenditure (such as expenditure on organisations concerned with matters of public policy, law reform and representation of the business community) and business activities (such as communicating with the Government and political parties at local, national and European level) might be construed as either political expenditure or as a donation to a political party or other political organisation and so fall within the restrictions of the Act. This resolution does not purport to authorise any particular donation or expenditure but is expressed in general terms as required by the Act and is intended to authorise normal donations and expenditure, which would not normally be considered to result in the making of political donations or political expenditure being incurred. If passed, resolution 12 would allow the Company and its subsidiaries to make donations to

political parties, other political organisations and independent election candidates and to incur political expenditure (as defined in the Act) up to an aggregate limit of £150,000 during the period up to twelve months after the passing of resolution 12, in order to avoid inadvertent infringement of the Act. However, the authority will not be used to make political donations within the normal meaning of that expression. Any political donation made or political expenditure incurred which is in excess of £2,000 will be disclosed in the Company's Annual Report for the next year, as required by the Act.

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 150,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.9,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

17. *Approve the rules of the Halfords Performance Share Plan 2024 (the "New PSP")*

It is proposed to the shareholders to approve the new Performance Share Plan of the Company. Under the new plan, all employees of the Halfords Group (including Executive Directors) are eligible to participate in the New PSP and receive PSP Awards at the discretion of the Remuneration Committee. PSP Awards will not ordinarily be capable of vesting until the third anniversary of their grant date, except in exceptional circumstances. The Remuneration Committee may also grant PSP Awards with or without performance conditions attached ('Discretionary Awards'). The Remuneration Committee may set the vesting date for Discretionary Awards at their discretion. Executive Directors are not eligible to be granted Discretionary Awards. PSP Awards may also be granted to an employee (including an Executive Director) for the purpose of facilitating their recruitment as an employee of the Halfords Group. The maximum number of shares that may be awarded to a participant in the form of Performance Awards and Discretionary Awards in respect of any financial year will be limited so that the market value of such shares on the grant date will not exceed 200% of the participant's base salary or any other limit that is specified under the Company's prevailing shareholder-approved Directors' Remuneration Policy in force at the time that the Award is granted. PSP Awards may be satisfied by newly issued shares, shares purchased in the market or by the transfer of treasury shares. No PSP Award may be granted if it would cause the number of new shares issued or issuable pursuant to awards and options granted in the preceding 10 years under any share plan adopted by the Company or a member of the Halfords group (including the New PSP) to exceed 10% of the Company's issued ordinary share capital at the proposed date of grant. Performance Awards will not ordinarily be capable of vesting until the third anniversary of their grant date, except in exceptional circumstances such as corporate events (see paragraph 11 below) or otherwise as determined by the Remuneration Committee'. All Performance Awards will be subject to stretching performance conditions which will determine the extent to which such Performance Awards shall be capable of vesting. Performance conditions will be set by the Remuneration Committee and, in the case of Executive Directors, will be consistent with the Company's prevailing shareholder-approved Directors' Remuneration Policy. Performance conditions will ordinarily be measured over a period of three financial years. Where PSP Awards are granted in the form of options to acquire shares, once vested such options will remain exercisable up until the tenth anniversary of their grant date (or such shorter period that the Remuneration Committee specifies on grant).

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries. LTIP based schemes are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather

than the performance of the company (creating capital and - lawful - dividends). They are inherently acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

TRIFAST PLC AGM - 10-09-2024

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

The Remuneration Committee determined that it was not the right time to perform a detailed review of the Policy and is therefore seeking to extend the current Policy for an additional three years with only a handful of changes.

Any bonus in excess of 50% of salary will defer to shares for a three-year period, this is not considered adequate. It would be preferred if shares were deferred to two years. The LTIP has an absence of non-financial measures, which is against best practice. Performance period is five years, which is considered sufficiently long-term. The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BCC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.1,

13. Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights

The authority is limited to 33% of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. The related proposal received 19.69% opposition at the previous AGM and the opposition has not been addressed by the Company.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.3,

14. Issue Shares for Cash

Authority is limited to 5% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. This proposal was put forward at last years AGM and received 19.46% opposition which has not been addressed by the Company.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.3,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.3,

16. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

18. *Approve Trifast plc Executive Turnaround Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of the Trifast plc Executive Turnaround Plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. The Turnaround Plan is a discretionary share plan of Trifast plc permitting the grant of awards in the form of market priced options over ordinary shares of the Company. Under the Turnaround Plan, the Company's board of directors, the trustee of an employee benefit trust established by a group company or a duly authorised person may grant Options to eligible employees. All employees (including Executive Directors) of the Company's group are eligible for selection to participate in the Turnaround Plan at the discretion of the Grantor. Options may be granted to an eligible employee over such number of Shares as the Board determines at grant. The maximum number of Shares over which Options may be granted to the person(s) holding the role of Chief Executive Officer of the Company from time to time and any other director of the Company from time to time may not exceed 2.2 per cent and 1.3 per cent respectively of the Company's issued ordinary share capital from time to time. The rules of the Turnaround Plan provide that not more than 7.5 per cent of the Company's issued ordinary share capital may be issued or transferred, whether as newly issued Shares, treasury Shares or Shares purchased in the market, under the Turnaround Plan. The Grantor may impose performance conditions on the vesting of Options. Where performance conditions are specified for Options, the Grantor will also specify the applicable performance measurement period. The Grantor may also impose a performance underpin which it would consider in determining the extent to which vested Options become exercisable.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.7,

19. *Approve Trifast plc Equity Incentive Plan*

The Board proposes the approval of the Trifast plc Equity Incentive Plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while

performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 17.4,

MONKS INVESTMENT TRUST PLC AGM - 10-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

A dividend was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

4. *Re-elect Karl Sternberg - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.2, Abstain: 6.9, Oppose/Withhold: 6.9,

11. *Appoint the Auditors: Ernst & Young LLP*

EY proposed. There were no non-audit fees recorded in the year under review. Non-audit fees represented 0.51% of fees on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.9,

GEN DIGITAL INC AGM - 10-09-2024

1a.. *Elect Susan P. Barsamian - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and chair of the Nomination and Sustainability Committee.

Chair of the Nomination Committee. The director chairs a committee that is not fully independent, which does not meet Camden guidelines.

The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

PIRC issue: At this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of nomination committee be responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

1c.. *Elect Eric K. Brandt - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of Audit Committee. The Company does not have an established whistle-blowing hotline. It is considered that without a whistle-blowing hotline, the company is potentially subject to reputational and financial damage by a lack of supervision of potential malpractice. It is considered the

responsibility of the audit committee to review all reports from the whistle-blowing hotline.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

1d. . *Elect Frank E. Dangeard - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.7,

1f.. *Elect Peter A. Feld - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered to be independent as the director is considered to be significant shareholder with 3% shares.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.0,

2. *Appoint the Auditors*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 4.26% of audit fees during the year under review and 4.83% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.8,

3. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance metrics are replicated under different incentive plans, raising concerns that executives are being rewarded twice for the same performance. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is aligned with companies of a similar market cap. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice.

Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. The compensation rating is: ACA.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

NIKE INC. AGM - 10-09-2024

2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. The minimum performance period prior to vesting is less than three years, which is considered to be short term. Five-year vesting would be preferred. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ADA.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.6, Abstain: 0.9, Oppose/Withhold: 16.5,

3. *Appoint the Auditors*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 7.43% of audit fees during the year under review and 5.96% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 5.7,

8. *Shareholder Resolution: Partnerships Congruency Report*

Proponent's argument: National Center for Public Policy Research proposes that the company "owes a duty to shareholders to maximize the value of their investments by focusing on that core purpose and staying away from unrelated concerns, especially if they're partisan, extreme or otherwise fraught with easily avoidable risk." The proponent argues that "Nike has partnerships with and contributes to many organizations that promote highly divisive agendas such as providing minors with secret-from-parents access to puberty blockers and gender transition surgeries, evangelizing radical gender ideology to minors, and lobbying to allow males to destroy girls' and women's chances to excel in their own sports and to violate their privacy and safety in restrooms and locker rooms. [...] This contentious and vast disagreement between radical gender ideologues and the public has nothing to do with Nike making and selling footwear and apparel".

Company's response: The board recommended a vote against this proposal. The company states that their approach to partnering with third-party organizations, along with our existing disclosures, appropriately serves the best interests of our shareholders; and the Proposal would divert Company time and resources to the preparation of a report that would ultimately not provide additional value to the Company's shareholders. [...] The Company believes that sport has the power to move

the world forward, and that the Company has a role to play in creating greater access to sport for all. To that end, one of the Company's strategies is to grow its consumer base by inviting more people."

PIRC analysis: The requested disclosure on the alignment of lobbying expenditure appears to be a spoiler resolution to prevent other shareholders from filing resolutions regarding the company's diversity and focuses on ideological diversity with the clear intent to ensure that conservative views are represented within the company's political activities, as opposed to promoting transparency and accountability around the potential benefits of diversity and requesting transparency over the financial impact from non-traditionally financial issues, avoid any suspicion and any damage that may cause to the company's reputation, or that the company may adopt a conduct different from what it has committed to.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 0.6, Abstain: 0.7, Oppose/Withhold: 98.7,

WAREHOUSE REIT PLC AGM - 11-09-2024

4. *Re-elect Neil Kirton - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee.

The director chairs a committee that is not fully independent, which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.0,

8. *Re-elect Simon Richard Hope - Non-Executive Director*

Non-executive Director and Member of the Nomination Committee. Not considered to be independent as Simon Hope has been Chair of Tilstone Partners Limited (TPL) since its formation in 2010 and was a founding investor, with TPL acting as the Investment Advisor of Warehouse Reit Plc.

It is important that Nomination committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 10% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

NETAPP INC AGM - 11-09-2024**1a. *Elect T. Michael Nevens - Chair (Non Executive)***

Non-Executive Chair of the Board, Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee and member of the Audit Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent as he has a tenure of over nine years on the Board. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. In terms of best practice, it is also considered that the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee and the Audit Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

Furthermore, the articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

PIRC issue: Additionally, at this time, individual attendance records at board and committee meetings are not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company. It is considered that the chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee is responsible for inaction in terms of lack of disclosure.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 93.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.6,

1d. *Elect Gerald Held - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Member of the Compensation Committee. Not considered to be independent as he has a tenure of over nine years on the Board.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.0,

2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ACA.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.7, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

3. *Appoint the Auditors*

Deloitte proposed. Non-audit fees represented 24.29% of audit fees during the year under review and 17.19% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.4,

4. *To Approve an Amendment to Netapp's 2021 Equity Incentive Plan*

The Board proposes the amendment of an existing long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 66.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 33.4,

POLAR CAPITAL TECHNOLOGY TRUST PLC AGM - 11-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

As done in previous years the Directors have decided not to recommend a dividend payment for the financial year under review. As disclosed in the Annual Report, the Company does not pay dividends given its focus on long-term capital growth. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is considered appropriate. It is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board. Where administrative duties are carried out by the company related to the manager.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

8. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditor*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High

Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

INVESCO ASIA TRUST PLC AGM - 12-09-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The dividend policy was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

8. *Appoint Ernst & Young LLP as auditor of the Company*

EY proposed as new auditor. Auditor rotation is considered a positive factor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

12. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

OPEN TEXT CORPORATION AGM - 12-09-2024

1.01. *Re-elect P. Thomas Jenkins - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered independent as he is a former President, CEO and CSO and has been on the board for over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively

participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters. Without a clear justification, we recommend Camden opposing the Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: Oppose

1.03. Re-elect Randy Fowlie - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Audit Committee and Member of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee. Not considered independent due to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee and the audit committee should be wholly comprised of independent directors.

Vote Cast: Oppose

1.04. Re-elect David Fraser - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director. There are concerns over the director's potential time commitments, and the director did not have full attendance of board and committee meetings during the year.

This director attended less than ninety per cent of the board and committee meetings, which they were entitled to attend. There are therefore concerns surrounding this director's aggregate time commitments and support cannot be recommended.

Vote Cast: Oppose

1.07. Re-elect Ann M. Powell - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Talent and Compensation Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: Oppose

1.09. Re-elect Stephen J. Sadler - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

1.10. Re-elect Katharine B. Stevenson - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

1.11. Re-elect Deborah Weinstein - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Corporate Governance and Nominating Committee and Member of the Audit Committee. Not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years.

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2. Appoint the Auditors

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

3. Amend 2004 Employee Stock Purchase Plan

It is proposed to amend 2004 Employee Stock Purchase Plan for employees and corporate officers, to reserve an additional 6 million shares under the plan. The Board would receive the authority to set beneficiaries and other conditions. There seem to be no performance criteria besides employment and tenure.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries: it is considered that support should not be given to stock or share option plans that do not lay out clearly performance criteria and conditions.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

4. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company uses only one performance metrics to determine the payout of performance awards. Instead of the use of a sole performance metric, it would be preferred that payout be linked to at least two or more performance metrics, with the inclusion of a non-financial performance criteria. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. The annual incentive award made during the year under review is not considered to be overly excessive as it amounts to less than 200% of base salary. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Retention awards made up less than one-third of the awards granted to executives, which is considered best practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is not aligned with companies of a similar market cap.

The compensation rating is: ADC.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

TWENTYFOUR INCOME FUND LIMITED AGM - 12-09-2024

2. *Receive the Annual Report*

The functions of Investment Manager and Company Secretary are performed by two different companies, which is welcomed.

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is also noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. However, a dividend was paid during the year but was not put forward for shareholder's approval, which is contrary to best practice. The legal definition for investment companies permits payments of dividend regardless of capital reserves. It is therefore considered that shareholder consent to dividend is a necessary safeguard and should be sought accordingly.

Dividends have been paid but the final dividend or dividend policy has not been put to a shareholder vote.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 6.9,

4. *Appoint KPMG LLP as the Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.00% of audit fees during the year under review and 3.64% on a three-year aggregate basis.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

11. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing

whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.7,

15. *Issue Additional Shares for Cash*

Authority is sought to issue more than 10% of the issued share capital for cash and expires at the next AGM. In combination with Resolution 14, the overall authority would have an upper limit of 20% of the share capital. The proposed limit is considered excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.3,

HAMMERSON PLC EGM - 12-09-2024

4. *Issue Shares with Pre-emption Rights and for Cash*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 8.0,

FORESIGHT ENVIRONMENTAL INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED AGM - 13-09-2024

9. *Re-appoint KPMG as the Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state.

PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm

that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

16. Approve the Discontinuation of the Company

It is proposed that the Company discontinue as an investment trust due to the high level of discount to NAV for the year under review.

The continuation of an investment trust is not supported if the trust's year-end share price has been at a discount to NAV of more than 10% for each of the past three fiscal year ends unless the board has provided a clear, cogent and compelling rationale, within the context of its overall investment strategy, in respect of the discount and the actions it is taking to address the situation. However, as the Company's discount level over the past three years is considered acceptable, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 7.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 92.6,

SCHRODER REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST AGM - 16-09-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The dividend policy was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

8. *Appoint the Auditors: Ernst & Young LLP*

EY proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

12. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.3,

UTILICO EMERGING MARKETS TRUST PLC AGM - 17-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The dividend policy was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the

board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

9. Re-appoint KPMG LLP as the Auditors of the Company

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

13. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

WISE PLC AGM - 18-09-2024**3. Approve Remuneration Policy**

It is proposed to approve the remuneration policy. Variable remuneration appears to be consistently capped, although the payout may exceed 200% of fixed salary. There are claw back clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. The Company has disclosed quantified targets for performance criteria for the entirety of its variable remuneration component.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

4. Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as auditors of the Company

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 17.78% of audit fees during the year under review and 15.93% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: Oppose

7. Re-elect Kristo Käärman - Chief Executive

Chief Executive Officer. Member of the Nomination Committee.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

14. Approve Political Donations

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

16. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

17. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

18. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

GORE STREET ENERGY STORAGE FUND PLC AGM - 18-09-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The dividend policy was put forward for shareholder's approval, which is welcomed. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues

relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board. Where administrative duties are carried out by the company related to the manager, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

9. *Re-appoint EY LLP as the Company's auditor*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 7.27% of audit fees during the year under review and 6.94% on a three-year aggregate basis.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

14. *Issue Further Shares for Cash*

Authority is sought to issue more than 10% on aggregate of the issued share capital for cash and expires at the next AGM. The proposed limit is considered excessive and the authority sought under Resolution 13 above is considered sufficient.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.9, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.0,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

REAL ESTATE CREDIT INVESTMENTS LTD AGM - 18-09-2024

2. *Re-appoint Deloitte LLP as auditor of the Company*

Deloitte proposed. Non-audit fees represented 27.35% of audit fees during the year under review and 29.05% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

3. *Allow the Board to Determine the Auditor's Remuneration*

Standard proposal. It is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the Company received significant opposition on the proposed resolution of 19.33% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

4. *Re-elect Bob Cowdell - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent owing a tenure of nine years in the Board. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. Furthermore Mr. Cowdell is Chair of the Nomination Committee and member of the Audit and Remuneration Committees.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

10. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

IG GROUP HOLDINGS PLC AGM - 18-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.6, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CFO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CFO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.4,

4. *Re-elect Mike McTighe - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. It is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Mike McTighe received significant opposition of 16.09% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.6, Abstain: 0.6, Oppose/Withhold: 3.8,

9. *Re-elect Sally-Ann Hibberd - Designated Non-Executive*

Designated Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.6, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

14. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Auditor of the Company*

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 6.25% of audit fees during the year under review and 8.54% on a three-year aggregate basis.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 5% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.6, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 8.6,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

TAKE-TWO INTERACTIVE SOFTWARE INC. AGM - 18-09-2024

1a. *Re-elect Strauss Zelnick - Chair & Chief Executive*

Chair and CEO. Combined roles at the head of the Company. There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the Company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the Company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. Combining the two roles in one person represents a concentration of power that is potentially detrimental to board balance, effective debate, and board appraisal.

Finally, the articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

Since there is no director up for election who is responsible for sustainability, such as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee or any of its members, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Given the concerns regarding the Company's sustainability policies and practices, a vote to oppose is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.0,

1b. *Re-elect Michael Dornemann - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Member of the Audit, Remuneration and Nomination Committees. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

It is important that remuneration and nomination committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.3,

1c. *Re-elect J Moses - Non-Executive Director*

Non - Executive Director. Chair of the Nomination Committee and Member of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

It is important that remuneration and nomination committees be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines. newline]Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines. PIRC issue: There are concerns surrounding this director's attendance which has not been fully disclosed; without a full attendance record it is not possible to demonstrate that the director attended those board and committee meetings, which they were entitled to attend.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

1d. *Re-elect Michael Sheresky - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Remuneration Committee and Member the the Nomination Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

1f. *Re-elect Susan Tolson - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines. At the company, there is no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that such concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the chair of the audit committee, who is considered to be accountable for the concerns with the whistle-blowing reporting structure.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 9.9,

2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards made up less than one-third of the awards granted to executives, which is considered best practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: BCB.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 86.0, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 13.8,

3. *Re-appoint the Auditors: EY*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 18.94% of audit fees during the year under review and 19.39% on a three-year aggregate basis.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence

of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

FRASERS GROUP PLC AGM - 18-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

The board is seeking shareholder approval for the remuneration policy. The variable remuneration appears to be consistently capped and the CEO's payout is considered to be in line with best practice. In addition, there are malus and clawback clauses in place over the entirety of the variable remuneration, which is welcomed. However, the expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: CDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.1,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

18. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 2% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

21. Authorise Share Repurchase

It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

AO WORLD PLC AGM - 18-09-2024**1. Receive the Annual Report**

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

3. *Re-elect Geoff Cooper - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. However, Mr. Cooper is Chair of the Nomination Committee.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders. Furthermore, as the Company do not have a Board level Sustainability Committee, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. As the Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise the material risks linked to sustainability.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.0, Abstain: 1.6, Oppose/Withhold: 7.3,

6. *Re-elect Chris Hopkinson - Designated Non-Executive*

Non-Executive Director and member of the Nomination Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years and cause is a significant shareholder. However, there is sufficient independent representation on the Board. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 5.4,

10. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 7.78% of audit fees during the year under review and 9.39% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

13. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.4,

15. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

18. *Approve the AO Sharesave Scheme.*

The Scheme is a savings related share option scheme designed to take advantage of the tax beneficial status of savings related share option schemes which comply with Schedule 3 to the Income Tax. Under the Scheme eligible to participate are, UK employees and full-time directors of the Company. To participate in the Scheme, an eligible employee must enter into a Save-As-You-Earn contract ('Savings Contract') with the savings body designated by the Board, agreeing to make monthly contributions of between £5 and £500 for a specified savings period of three or five years (or such other period as may be specified from time to time under Schedule. The number of shares over which options may be granted must as nearly as possible be equal to, but not in excess of, that number of shares which may be purchased out of the repayment proceeds (including, if the Board so determines, any bonus payable) of the relevant savings contract at the option price. Options will only normally be exercisable for a period of six months commencing on the third or fifth anniversary (as the case may be) of the starting date of the related savings contract and, if not exercised by the end of that period, the option will lapse.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries: it is considered that support should not be given to stock or share option plans that do not lay out clear performance criteria, targets and conditions. Furthermore, LTIP based schemes are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company (creating capital and - lawful - dividends). They are inherently acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company

underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

MOONPIG GROUP PLC AGM - 18-09-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.8,

7. *Re-elect Susan Hooper - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

10. *Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as Auditors*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the

benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

12. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

14. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.5,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 11.1,

16. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

DARDEN RESTAURANTS INC. AGM - 18-09-2024**2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation***

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. The annual incentive award made during the year under review is not considered to be overly excessive as it amounts to less than 200% of base salary. The Company uses only one performance metrics to determine the payout of performance awards. Instead of the use of a sole performance metric, it would be preferred that payout be linked to at least two or more performance metrics, with the inclusion of an non-financial performance criteria. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is aligned with companies of a similar market cap. The compensation rating is: ACB.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 95.0, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

3. *Appoint the Auditors*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.15% of audit fees during the year under review and 0.17% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 93.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.1,

4. *Amend Existing Omnibus Plan*

It is proposed to amend the 2015 Omnibus Incentive Plan. The amendment would see an increase of 2.6 million shares issued under the plan and extend the term of plan to the tenth anniversary of the 2024 AGM.

There are concerns with the Plan as the it has various elements bundled together, and although parts of it can benefit the majority of employees, it can still be used as a vehicle for potentially excessive executive payments. As performance conditions may be attached to awards at the Compensation Committee's discretion, there are concerns that the Committee will have considerable flexibility in the payout of discretionary awards and as a result awards may not be subject to robust enough performance targets, and be insufficiently challenging. In addition, maximum award limits are excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 95.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 4.5,

CONAGRA BRANDS INC. AGM - 18-09-2024**1b. Re-elect Thomas K. Brown - Non-Executive Director**

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit and Nominating Committees.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.5,

1h. Re-elect Richard H. Lenny - Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Chair of the Board, Member of the Compensation Committee and Chair of the Nominating Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent due to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

This director is chair of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

This director is a member of the compensation committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters.

PIRC issue: Since there is no director up for election who is responsible for sustainability, such as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee or any of its members, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability program.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.5,

1i. Re-elect Melissa Lora - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee.

At the company, the Audit Committee does not oversee the whistle-blowing hotline. This may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalated which

may mean the issue is concealed. On this basis, and on the potential unforeseeable consequences for the company, opposition is recommended to the re-election of the chair of the audit committee, who is considered to be accountable for the concerns with the whistle-blowing reporting structure. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.8,

1j. Re-elect Ruth Ann Marshall - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director, Chair of the Compensation Committee and Member of the Nominating Committee.

This director is the chair of the compensation committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

This director is a member of the nomination committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 91.0, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 8.8,

2. Amend Articles: Certificate of Incorporation to Provide for Officer Exculpation

It is proposed that the Restated Certificate of Incorporation is amended, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding officer exculpation. The Board seeks authority to amend the articles, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding the exculpation of officers. Article V of the Company's Certificate of Incorporation (Certificate) currently provides for the Company to limit the monetary liability of directors in certain circumstances pursuant to and consistent with the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The State of Delaware recently amended Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL to allow Delaware corporations to extend similar protections to officers. Specifically, the amendments to the DGCL allow Delaware corporations to exculpate their officers for personal liability for breaches of the duty of care in certain circumstances.

While efforts to align executive and non-executive liabilities and harmonize corporate articles are acknowledged, decisions taken by executives, may cause significant higher losses compared to those taken by directors. While officers remain liable for lack of fiduciary duty due to wrongful actions committed wilfully, they would nevertheless be exculpated against direct actions, such as class actions. Shareholders could still act via derivative lawsuits, which are however more complex and less lucrative legal avenue since shareholders would bring an action in the name of the corporation and not in the name of shareholders. This could potentially dissuade shareholders from pursuing actions and entrench poorly performing officers.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 89.2, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.4,

3. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. For the year under review, annual bonus payouts are considered to be excessive as they represent more than 200% of base salary. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance

conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is not aligned with companies of a similar market cap. The compensation rating is: ADA.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 44.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 55.1,

4. *Appoint the Auditors*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 1.22% of audit fees during the year under review and 2.83% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.6,

GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP PLC AGM - 18-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified. The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.4, Abstain: 1.6, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

3. *Re-elect John Brewis - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.5, Abstain: 2.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.5,

8. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as the independent auditors of the Company.*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case

at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

10. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 79.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 20.9,

11. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy fall below the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are not required to retain a sufficient shareholding in the Company. It is considered best practice that directors hold the equivalent to at least 200% of salary, built up over no more than five years. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The

disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BCB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 73.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 26.7,

14. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

LIONTRUST ASSET MANAGEMENT AGM - 19-09-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified. The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 1.9, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Disclosure is adequate. Awards granted to Executive Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are below 200% of the fixed salary for the year under review, and therefore are within guidelines. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent, and major changes are in discussion for the remuneration policy for 2025. The CEO's salary is above the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

However, the expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability,

fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 76.3, Abstain: 7.5, Oppose/Withhold: 16.2,

3. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Disclosure is adequate. Awards granted to Executive Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are below 200% of the fixed salary for the year under review, and therefore are within guidelines. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent, and major changes are in discussion for the remuneration policy for 2025. The CEO's salary is above the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

However, the expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.0, Abstain: 7.5, Oppose/Withhold: 12.5,

6. *Re-elect Mandy Donald - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent designated non-executive director workforce engagement and Chair of the Audit Committee. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

7. *Re-elect Rebecca Shelley - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. Rebecca Shelley is the designated Non-Executive Director for Responsible Capitalism, including responsibility for ESG matters, as such she is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.1, Abstain: 1.8, Oppose/Withhold: 3.2,

9. *Re-appoint KPMG as the Auditors of the Company*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 7.50% of audit fees during the year under review and 2.76% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, *Fraud and Going Concern* and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

13. *Approve the Liontrust Asset Management Plc 2024 Long Term Incentive Plan (the "2024 LTIP")*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 82.9, Abstain: 7.5, Oppose/Withhold: 9.5,

15. *Approve All Employee Share Scheme (Share Incentive Plan or SIP)*

Shareholders are asked to approve the Liontrust Share Incentive Plan (SIP). The Directors would be authorized to take any necessary actions to implement and manage the SIP. The Directors would also have the authority to create similar plans in other countries, adjusting them for local laws. Any shares given through these plans would count towards the same limits as the original SIP. The SIP, established on April 2, 2001, is a tax-advantaged plan open to all UK employees, including executive directors. It allows employees to buy shares in the company up to a certain limit each year and receive free matching shares. The company can also give free shares to all UK employees if desired. Until now, the SIP has used only shares bought from the market. The company now seeks approval to also use newly issued or treasury shares, giving more flexibility. However, as Executives are included within the plan, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.0, Abstain: 1.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.7,

17. *Reissue of Treasury Shares with Pre-emption Rights Disapplied*

The Board requests authority to repurchase and re-issue the shares to participants in the long term incentive plan proposed at the present meeting. Although companies have a legal duty to fund approved plans, this resolution is considered to be a proposal enabling the LTIP proposed. Based on the concerns on the resolution for the approval of the LTIP, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.9, Abstain: 1.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.8,

18. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

BABCOCK INTERNATIONAL GROUP PLC AGM - 19-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 2.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. It is proposed to approve the annual report on remuneration of

Executive and Non-Executive directors with an advisory vote. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed. The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.0, Abstain: 1.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.9,

4. *Re-elect Ruth Cairnie - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 1.9, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

5. *Re-elect Carl-Peter Forster - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Considered independent.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.8, Abstain: 1.1, Oppose/Withhold: 7.1,

6. *Re-elect Lucy Dimes - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director.

The director serves as an executive on the board of a public company while serving as a non-executive on two other company boards, including the company under review. This exceeds recommended limits and does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.7, Abstain: 1.9, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

7. *Re-elect Lord Andrew Parker - Designated Non-Executive*

Designated non-executive director workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

16. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 1.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

18. *Amendments to and Approval of the Babcock Approved Employee Share Ownership*

The Group also operates the Babcock Employee Share Plan which allows employees to contribute up to £150 per month to the fund, which then purchases shares on the open market on the employees' behalf. The Group provides matching shares, purchased on the open market, of one share for every 10 purchased by the employee. During the year the Group bought 116,711 matching shares (2023: 140,340 matching shares) at a cost of £0.4 million (2023: £0.4 million). The Group also operates the Babcock Employee Share Plan International which reflects the structure of the UK Plan. During the year no matching shares were purchased on the open market (2023: no matching shares) and 2,192 matching shares vested (2023: 1,055 matching shares) leaving a balance of 3,726 matching shares (2023: 5,918 matching shares). On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.0, Abstain: 1.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

19. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 7.9,

20. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

FERREXPO PLC EGM - 19-09-2024*1. Re-elect Vitalii Lisovenko - Designated Non-Executive*

Introduction & Background: At the Annual General Meeting of the Company held on 23 May 2024, Mr. Vitali Lisovenko, an Independent Non-executive Director, did not receive the requisite votes required for re-appointment by independent shareholders. As stated in the Company's Annual General Meeting Notice dated 29 April 2024 and under UK Listing Rule 6.2.9R, when a resolution to re-elect an Independent Director has not been passed by both a majority of the independent shareholders (i.e. shareholders of the Company who are entitled to vote on the election of Directors and who are not controlling shareholders) and a majority of all shareholders (including the controlling shareholders), the Company may put the matter to a second vote of all shareholders, to be held between 90 and 120 days after the Annual General Meeting. Pending the second vote, the relevant Director is deemed to have been re-elected to the Board of the Company for the period from the date of the Annual General Meeting until the earlier of: (a) the conclusion of any second vote; (b) the date 120 days after the Annual General Meeting; and (c) the date of any announcement by the Board that it does not intend to hold a second vote. If the Independent Director's re-election is approved by a majority vote of all shareholders voting at the second General Meeting, the Director will then be re-elected until the next Annual General Meeting. The Company has reached out to shareholders, and the Board now intends to hold a second vote for shareholders to vote on the re-election of Mr. Vitali Lisovenko.

Rationale: Mr. Lisovenko contributes to Ferrexpo plc over 25 years' experience in government finance. In 2005, he served as the head of the Trade and Economic Mission at the Ukrainian Embassy in London. He was an Associate Professor of Finance at the Kyiv State Economic University. Mr. Lisovenko brings extensive experience in the field of Ukrainian government finance together with a deep understanding of geopolitical developments in Ukraine which is valuable to the Company. In addition, Mr. Lisovenko was appointed Non-executive Director for workforce engagement on 18 February 2021, given that he is located in Ukraine and speaks Ukrainian the language of the majority of the Company's workforce.

Recommendation: Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It would be preferred that companies appoint directors from the workforce rather than designate a non-executive director (NED). Support will be recommended for the election or re-election of designated NEDs provided that no significant employment relations issues have been identified.

It is noted that although the Company following the UK code put the re-election of Mr. Lisovenko to a separate meeting, it did not disclose information for the reason of the significant opposition Mr. Lisovenko received in the Annual General Meeting and how the Company address the issue arise with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.4, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 15.1,

AUTO TRADER GROUP PLC AGM - 19-09-2024*1. Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 1.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

2. Approve Remuneration Policy

Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date

awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. A mitigation statement has been made which seeks to limit the amount of any payment or benefits provided to a Director upon leaving the Company should alternative employment be secured. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. The Annual Bonus is deferred. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus is in line with best practice as half of the bonus is deferred in shares over at least two years. The performance period for the LTIP is less than five years and is therefore not considered sufficiently long-term. Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. However, recipients of the award are required to hold their vested shares for at least a further two years, which is welcomed.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BCB.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.1,

3. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.3,

5. Re-elect Matthew (Matt) Davies - Chair (Non Executive)

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.4,

7. Re-elect Jeni Mundy - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director.

Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

10. Re-elect Sigga Sigurdardottir - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

11. Re-elect Jasvinder Gakhal - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Remuneration Committee.

Member of the Remuneration Committee. The director also serves as an executive director of another company, which falls short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

14. Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditors of the Company

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state.

PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

17. Adoption of the Auto Trader 2024 Long Term Incentive Plan

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Eligible to participate are any employee (including an Executive Director) of the Company and its subsidiaries. Awards may be in the form of: i) a conditional right to acquire ordinary shares in the Company ('Shares') at no cost to the participant ('Conditional Award'), ii) an option to acquire Shares at nil (or nominal) cost ('Option'); or iii) a right to receive a cash amount which relates to the value of a certain number of notional Shares ('Cash Award'), although it is intended that awards will be granted over Shares rather than in respect of notional Shares unless not practicable. Awards may be subject to the satisfaction of one or more performance conditions which will determine the proportion (if any) of the Award which will vest. The application of performance conditions to Awards granted to the Company's Executive Directors (including the period over which they may be assessed) will be consistent with the Directors' Remuneration Policy as approved by shareholders from time to time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

18. Approve the AutoTrader 2024 Deferred Bonus Plan

The Deferred Bonus Plan (DBP) will be administered by the Board or any duly authorised committee of it. Eligible to participate are any current or former employee (including any current or former Executive Director) of the Company and its subsidiaries. Awards may be in the form of: i) a conditional right to acquire ordinary shares in the Company ('Shares') at no cost to the participant ('Conditional Award'), ii) an option to acquire Shares at nil (or nominal) cost ('Option') and iii) or a right to receive a cash amount which relates to the value of a certain number of notional Shares ('Cash Award'), although it is intended that awards will be granted over Shares rather than in respect of notional Shares wherever practicable. The number of Shares subject to an Award will be such number as have a value equal to the amount of the deferred bonus. The normal vesting date for Awards will be the second anniversary of grant (or such other normal vesting date (or dates in respect of distinct portions) as the Board may specify). The vesting date of Awards granted to the Company's Executive Directors will be consistent with the Directors' Remuneration Policy as approved by shareholders from time to time. The Board may decide that participants will receive a payment (in cash and/or Shares) on or shortly following the vesting of their Awards (or exercise in the case of an Option) calculated by reference to the value of dividends that would have been paid on the vested Shares over such period as the Board determines ending no later than the date on which the Award vests.

Although the proposed award is for all employees, executive are participating in line with the remuneration policy of the Company. In line with PIRC policy on variable pay that includes executives

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.5,

22. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

23. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

AUGMENTUM FINTECH PLC AGM - 19-09-2024

10. *Issue Shares for Cash*

Authority is sought to issue more than 10% of the issued share capital for cash and expires at the next AGM. The proposed limit is considered excessive.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.7,

11. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

ABRDN NEW INDIA INVESTMENT TRUST PLC AGM - 20-09-2024**1. Receive the Annual Report**

The dividend policy was not put forward for shareholder's approval. The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed. Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board. Where administrative duties are carried out by the company related to the manager, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

7. Re-appoint KPMG LLP as Independent Auditor of the Company and to authorise the Directors to determine their remuneration

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

PIRC issue: The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

8. Authorise Share Repurchase

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

PETROFAC LTD AGM - 23-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 8.1,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

There is no maximum cap on retirement allowances nor director benefits but new Executive Directors will have a pension in line with the wider workforce in the relevant geographical location. Annual Bonus has financial and Non-financial performance measures. The Company has a Performance share Plan which is based on: a) TSR relative to a comparator group (50%); and b) Strategic measures (50%). The maximum potential award under all the incentive schemes is 400% of salary normally or 500% in exceptional circumstances, which is excessive. There is a deferral period on the annual bonus with an equal split between cash and deferred shares, which will vest in equal tranches over one, two and three years. Whilst this is welcomed, it is not considered adequate, as it is considered that the deferred shares should all vest after three years and not in tranches over three years. Despite the introduction of non-financial performance measures for the Performance Share Plan (PSP) awards or a two-year holding period, important concerns remains over this plan. The three-year performance period is still not considered properly long-term. The performance targets are not operating interdependently and dividend equivalents can be paid on vested shares, which is not deemed appropriate. However, no dividend equivalents have been applied since October 2019, as no dividends have been paid during that period.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 94.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.6,

5. *Re-elect René Médori - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent as he has a tenure of over nine years on the

Board. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. In terms of best practice, it is also considered that the Nomination Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair. Chair. Independent upon appointment.

Since there is no director up for election who is responsible for sustainability, such as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee or any of its members, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Given the concerns regarding the Company's sustainability policies and practices, a vote to oppose is recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 6.1,

8. *Re-elect Matthias Bichsel - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered independent as he has a tenure of over nine years on the Board. It is considered that a Senior Independent Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role, irrespective of the level of independence of the Board. I

Chair of the Remuneration Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

10. *Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as the Auditors*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.00% of audit fees during the year under review and 9.38% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

12. *Approval of the rules of the Performance Share Plan 2024 (PSP 2024)*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

13. *Approval of the rules of the Petrofac Restricted Share Plan (RSP 2024)*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

14. *Renewal of approval of the rules of the Petrofac Tax-Advantaged Share Incentive Plan (SIP)*

It is proposed to approve a restricted share plan for employees and corporate officers. The Board would receive the authority to set beneficiaries and other conditions. After allotment, shares will be restricted for three years, which is not considered to be sufficiently long term. The Company states that exercise of shares will be based on targets, which at this time remain undisclosed.

Plans to increase employee shareholding are considered to be a positive governance practice, as they can contribute to alignment between employees and shareholders. On the other hand, executives are also among the beneficiaries.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 20% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises. As this is not the case, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

ALPHAWAVE IP GROUP PLC EGM - 23-09-2024

1. *Amend the rules of the Alphawave IP Group Long Term Incentive Plan, the Alphawave IP Group PLC Sharesave Plan and the Alphawave Semi Employee Stock Purchase Plan*

Introduction & Background: The Chair of the Board on the Notice of Meeting states that: "The Company has consistently placed a strong emphasis on meaningful and broad-based employee share ownership. We believe that this is an important way to encourage entrepreneurialism and innovation, to retain and motivate our people and to enable us to compete for talent against our global competitors, the majority of which are based in the United States. It also ensures that there is a direct link between our remuneration and strategy, thereby promoting sustainable long-term value creation in a manner that is consistent with the recommendations of the 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code." The Company currently offer employees opportunities for share ownership through our Long Term Incentive Plan and the Alphawave Semi Employee Stock Purchase Plan. Under the Share Plans, new shares issued or committed to be issued are limited, in any five-year period, to 10% of the issued ordinary share capital of the Company from time to time (the 'Dilution Limit'). For the purposes of the Dilution Limit, options and awards granted prior to our IPO are not taken into account, and sales of treasury shares are treated as newly issued. Since our IPO in May 2021, the Company has committed to grant awards over 70,606,873 shares to more than 907 employees, representing approximately 9.54% of the issued share capital of the Company as at 2 September 2024.

Proposal: To ensure that the Company can maintain a consistent level of growth for the benefit of our shareholders generally and continue to issue awards under the Share Plans in the ordinary course, the Board of Directors is seeking approval from shareholders to reset the Dilution Limit as at the date of the General Meeting, so that all Shares issued or committed to be issued under awards granted before that date will be ignored.

Rationale: As a result of these awards, the Dilution Limit is likely to be reached by 31 December 2024, restricting the Company's ability to attract new staff and remunerate existing staff in line with its objectives. There are the following two primary reasons for the Dilution Limit to have been reached sooner than originally anticipated. Firstly, the Company is growing rapidly, both organically and through M&A activity. Notably, the Company's headcount has grown significantly, from 132 employees (as at 30 June 2021) to 907 today. Secondly, a number of the Company's employees are based in North America. The negative movement of Sterling against the US Dollar and Canadian Dollar, and the Company's current share price, has resulted in a larger number of awards being granted to ensure that it remains competitive in the employment market. The Board of Directors considers that the resolution to be put to the meeting is in the best interests of the Company and its shareholders as a whole and is therefore likely to promote the success of the Company.

Recommendation: Regarding the LTIP award, PIRC believes that LTIP schemes are inherently flawed and not an effective way to incentivize performance. There is a risk that they reward volatility rather than true company performance, acting as a complex and opaque hedge against underperformance and long-term share price declines. They are also a significant contributor to rewards for failure. Although the other two plans do not include executives as participants, the Company has chosen to bundle all three plans into a single resolution. It would be preferable for these proposed amendments to be presented as separate resolutions for shareholder approval. Additionally, the Company is asking shareholders to reset the dilution rights for the proposed plans, which have nearly been exhausted before the end of the

five-year period. This raises concerns about potential shareholder rights dilution. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

FEDEX CORPORATION AGM - 23-09-2024

1a.. Elect Silvia Davila - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of Remuneration Committee.

There are concerns surrounding this director's attendance and it has not been fully disclosed; without the directors full attendance record it is not possible to recommend support.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.8,

1b.. Elect Marvin R. Ellison - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and member of Audit and Finance Committee and Governance, Safety, and Public Policy Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee. As a result, the audit committee is not fully independent, which does not comply with Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

1f.. Elect R. Brad Martin - Vice Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Vice Chair of the Board and the Chair of the Audit Committee. The Vice Chair is not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. The Company does not have an established whistle-blowing hotline. It is considered that without a whistle-blowing hotline, the company is potentially subject to reputational and financial damage by a lack of supervision of potential malpractice. It is considered the responsibility of the audit committee to review all reports from the whistle-blowing hotline.

Chair of the Audit Committee. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.8, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.1,

1h.. Elect Frederick P. Perpall - Non-Executive Director

Independent Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit and Finance Committee and member of the Governance, Safety, and Public Policy Committee.

There are concerns surrounding this director's attendance and it has not been fully disclosed; without the directors full attendance record it is not possible to recommend support.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

1i.. Elect Joshua Cooper Ramo - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and member of the Audit and Finance Committee. Not considered to be independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. This director is a non-independent member of the audit committee and the audit committee should be wholly comprised of independent directors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.3, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

1j.. Elect Susan C. Schwab - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and Member of the Compensation and Human Resources Committee. Not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

1k.. Elect Frederick W. Smith - Chair (Executive)

Executive Chair. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that the Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Holding an executive position is incompatible with this.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters. Without a clear justification, we recommend opposing the Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.4, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

1l.. Elect David P. Steiner - Lead Director

Lead Director and Chair of the Governance, Safety, and Public Policy Committee. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is considered that the Lead Director should be independent, in order to fulfil the responsibilities assigned to that role.

At this time, individual attendance record at board and committee meetings is not disclosed. This prevents shareholders from making an informed assessment on the fulfilment of fiduciary duties and the time that directors commit to the company.

There are concerns surrounding this director's attendance and it has not been fully disclosed.

This director is the Governance, Safety, and Public Policy Committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

1n.. Elect Paul S. Walsh - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director, member of the Compensation and Human Resources Committee. The Director is not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 95.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

2. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ACB. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 90.6, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 9.2,

3. Appoint the Auditors

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 0.21% of audit fees during the year under review and 0.09% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 96.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.7,

4. Amend Articles: Approval of an Amendment to the Third Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation of FedEx Corporation to Limit Liability of Certain Officers as Permitted by Law

It is proposed that the Article thirteen of FedEx's Third Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation (the "FedEx Charter") is amended, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding officer exculpation. The Board seeks authority to amend the articles, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding the exculpation of officers. Article thirteen of the FedEx Charter currently provides for the Company to limit the monetary liability of directors in certain circumstances pursuant to and consistent with the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The State of Delaware recently amended Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL to allow Delaware corporations to extend similar protections to officers. Specifically, the amendments to the DGCL allow Delaware corporations to exculpate their officers for personal liability for breaches of the duty of care in certain circumstances.

While efforts to align executive and non-executive liabilities and harmonize corporate articles are acknowledged, decisions taken by executives, may cause significant higher losses compared to those taken by directors. While officers remain liable for lack of fiduciary duty due to wrongful actions committed wilfully, they would nevertheless be exculpated against direct actions, such as class actions. Shareholders could still act via derivative lawsuits, which are however more complex and less lucrative legal avenue since shareholders would bring an action in the name of the corporation and not in the name of shareholders. This could potentially dissuading shareholders from pursuing actions and entrench poorly performing officers.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 8.1,

5. Approval of an Amendment to the Third Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Federal Express Corporation to Remove the "Pass-Through Voting" Provision

The Board of Directors seeks approval from FedEx's stockholders to amend the Federal Express Charter to remove the Pass-Through Voting Provision. Federal Express became a wholly owned subsidiary of FedEx and in connection with the Holding Company Reorganization, Federal Express's Third Restated Certificate of Incorporation (the "Federal Express Charter") was amended to provide that any act or transaction by or involving Federal Express. Accordingly, the Pass-Through Voting Provision gives FedEx's stockholders direct voting rights with respect to matters affecting Federal Express, FedEx's wholly owned subsidiary, rather than only requiring the approval of FedEx, as sole stockholder. It is considered that the proposed amendments may have an adverse effect on shareholder rights, as the elimination of the Pass-Through Voting Provision would allow FedEx, as Federal Express's sole stockholder, to approve certain corporate actions relating to Federal Express without the additional approval of FedEx's stockholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.2, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

KAINOS GROUP PLC AGM - 24-09-2024

1. Receive the Annual Report

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.2, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.8,

9. *Re-appoint the Auditors: KPMG*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

12. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

13. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 88.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 11.6,

14. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

ZIGUP PLC AGM - 24-09-2024**3. Approve the Remuneration Report**

Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report and has failed to disclose sufficient measures taken to address shareholders' concerns. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.1,

4. Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as auditor of the Company

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

10. *Re-elect John Pattullo - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director and Chair of the Remuneration Committee.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.4,

15. *Approve the ZIGUP plc Long-term Incentive Plan 2024*

The Board proposes the approval of a new long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

16. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. An

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.3, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.5, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 2.2,

18. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

GENERAL MILLS INC AGM - 24-09-2024**1c. . Elect Jeffrey L. Harmening - Chair & Chief Executive**

Chair and CEO. Combined roles at the head of the Company. There should be a clear division of responsibilities at the head of the Company between the running of the board and the executive responsibility for the running of the Company's business. No one individual should have unfettered powers of decision. Combining the two roles in one person represents a concentration of power that is potentially detrimental to board balance, effective debate, and board appraisal.

The articles of association include provisions allowing for the convening of virtual-only meetings. The decision to remove the ability for shareholders to attend meetings in person is significant and could potentially limit shareholder engagement and transparency. Virtual-only meetings may restrict the ability of shareholders to effectively participate, ask questions, and engage with company management and the board. Shareholders should carefully consider the implications of such amendments and advocate for practices that uphold shareholder rights and promote transparency in corporate governance. We welcome the possibility of hybrid meetings as a way to increase participation and transparency, however virtual-only meetings should not be used lightly and should be restricted only to cases where in-person attendance is impossible due to public health crisis or natural disasters. Without a clear justification, we recommend Camden opposing the Chair of the Board.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.2, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 6.1,

1l.. Elect Jorge A. Uribe - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee. The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

2. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. For the year under review, annual bonus payouts are considered to be excessive as they represent more than 200% of base salary. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. Maximum long-term award opportunities are limited to 200% of base salary, which is considered as acceptable practice. The compensation rating is: ADB.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.8, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 6.6,

3. Appoint the Auditors

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 32.42% of audit fees during the year under review and 28.27% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.6, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 7.1,

INTERNATIONAL DISTRIBUTION SERVICES PLC AGM - 25-09-2024

2. Approve the Remuneration Report

All elements of the single figure table are adequately disclosed. Awards granted to Directors under the Company's variable remuneration schemes are considered excessive as they exceeded 200% of base salary during the year under review. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

3. Approve Remuneration Policy

Total potential variable pay is set at 350% of the salary (max. opportunity for Annual Bonus: 150% & max. opportunity for LTIP: 200%) and is deemed excessive since is higher than the recommended limit of 200%. There are no non-financial performance measures attached to the LTIP and so the focus of remuneration policy is not the operational performance of the business as a whole or the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. The vesting period is three years which is not considered sufficient long-term, however a two-year holding period apply for the LTIP awards. The Remuneration Committee maintains the discretion to adjust the performance metrics and also the payout levels of awards, this approach is not in line with best practice.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: CDC.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.2, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.7,

4. *Approve Amendments Long Term Incentive Plan*

The Board proposes to amend the International Distribution Services plc Long Term Incentive Plan. The amendments seek to increase the limit on the value of shares over which awards may be granted to an employee in any financial year to 200% of their salary. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives are awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

6. *Re-elect Keith Williams - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board, Chair of the Nomination Committee and Member of the Remuneration Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent as the director was previously employed by the Company as interim Executive Chair on 15 May 2020 until 1 February 2021. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee and the Remuneration Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members. Furthermore, The chair holds another chair position at a listed company, which raises time commitment concerns. It is considered that the chair should be able to wholly dedicate their time to the company in times of company crisis. The COVID pandemic has shown that there are times when multiple unrelated companies will require the Chair's full attention in order to be able to handle times of crisis.

This director is a member of the remuneration committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.6, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.3,

15. *Re-elect Ingrid Ebner - Designated Non-Executive*

Designated Non-Executive Director. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

16. *Appoint the Auditors: KPMG LLP*

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 3.48% of audit fees during the year under review and 2.75% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns

that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

20. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.7, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 1.2,

21. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 2.0,

22. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

WIZZ AIR HOLDINGS PLC AGM - 25-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 1.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration report. However, it is clear from Company reporting that adequate measures have been taken in order to address shareholder dissent. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.0,

3. *Approve Remuneration Policy*

Claw-back provisions are in place over long-term incentive plans. Directors are entitled to a dividend income which is accrued on share awards from the date of grant, once the awards vest. Dividend should be paid from the date awards vest onwards, and not backdated to the time of grant to include the performance period. A welcome addition to the LTIP scheme is the use of non-financial performance metrics as a means of assessing individual performance. The use of non-financial conditions enables the policy to focus on the operational performance of the business as a whole as well as the individual roles of each of the executives in achieving that performance. Maximum potential awards for both the Annual Bonus and LTIP are clearly stated. The Company received significant opposition at the last AGM to its remuneration Policy. However, it is clear from Company reporting that sufficient steps have been taken in order to address the concerns raised. The performance metrics are not operating interdependently, such that vesting under the incentive plan is only possible where all threshold targets are met. There is no mitigation statement included within the remuneration policy. Vesting scales are considered to be sufficiently broad and geared towards better performance. Total potential awards capable of vesting under the policy exceed the recommended threshold of 200% of the highest paid Director's base salary. Directors are required to build a holding equivalent to at least 200% of salary, over a period of no more than five years. It is considered that a shareholding policy aligns the interests of the Executive to that of the shareholder. There is no deferral period attached to the Annual Bonus. Best practice would see half of the bonus deferred in shares over at least two years. Claw-back provisions are attached to the annual bonus. The performance period for the LTIP is at least five years and therefore considered sufficiently long-term.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit

pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). The 'binding' pay policy vote has not been effective. The disappointment with the policy vote comes across in the levels of dissenting votes on remuneration reports, which disclose outcomes under previously agreed policies. When there are contentious circumstances with executives leaving the instrument that really matters is the service contract. As such, the concept of alignment with shareholders' for pay purposes is a fallacy, because the risk and responsibilities are different. Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BDC

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 63.0, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 36.5,

4. Amend Existing Omnibus Plan

In addition to the changes to the Directors' Remuneration Policy, the Omnibus Plan rules are proposed to be amended to allow for the LTIP awards described to be awarded to Mr Váradi. Mr Váradi holds a one-off award of 837,943 Ordinary Shares granted under the VCP that was approved by Shareholders at the AGM in 2021 and amended by Shareholders AGM in 2023, (the 'VCP Award'). The terms of the VCP Award would be amended so that any vesting under the VCP would be offset against any vesting under the LTIP.

Long-Term Incentives schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure. Therefore, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 73.6, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 26.0,

5. Re-elect William A. Franke - Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee. The Chair is not considered to be independent as he is the managing partner of Indigo, a substantial shareholder of the company. In addition, it is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. Furthermore, in terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

The director chairs a committee that is not fully independent, which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 91.5, Abstain: 0.8, Oppose/Withhold: 7.8,

7. Re-elect Stephen L. Johnson - Vice Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Director and interim Chair of the Remuneration Committee. Not considered independent given his past position with Indigo, a substantial shareholder of the company. There is sufficient independent representation on the Board.

The director chairs a remuneration committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 4.4,

8. *Re-elect Barry Eccleston - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. It is noted that on the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Eccleston received significant opposition of 13.37% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

A director on the Board has received more than 10% of the vote in opposition to their election at the previous AGM, and this has not been adequately addressed by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 77.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 22.3,

9. *Re-elect Barry Eccleston (Independent Shareholder Vote)*

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent. It is noted that on the 2023 Annual General Meeting the re-election of Mr. Eccleston received significant opposition of 13.37% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

A director on the Board has received more than 10% of the vote in opposition to their election at the previous AGM, and this has not been adequately addressed by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 55.4, Abstain: 22.3, Oppose/Withhold: 22.3,

13. *Re-elect Charlotte Andsager - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee.

The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

14. *Re-elect Charlotte Andsager (Independent Shareholder Vote)*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Sustainability Committee.

The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 75.1, Abstain: 22.3, Oppose/Withhold: 2.6,

17. *Re-elect Dr Anthony Radev - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 87.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 12.9,

18. Re-elect Dr Anthony Radev (Independent Shareholder Vote)

Independent Non-Executive Director and Designated non-executive director for workforce engagement. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 64.8, Abstain: 22.3, Oppose/Withhold: 12.9,

23. Re-appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP as the Company's auditors

PwC proposed. Non-audit fees represented 6.67% of audit fees during the year under review and 8.11% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor.

The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

26. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 81.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 18.9,

27. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 74.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 25.2,

DE LA RUE PLC AGM - 25-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.9, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are not considered excessive as they do not exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is below the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. The total combined variable reward paid during the year falls below the 200% recommended threshold and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee falls below the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered to be overly excessive.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: BD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.0, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 2.8,

9. *Re-elect Clive Whiley - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board and Chair of the Nomination Committee.

On the 2023 Annual General Meeting the election of Mr. Whiley received significant opposition of 10.8% of the votes and the Company did not disclose information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

Additionally, as the Company do not have a Board level Sustainability Committee, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme. As the Company's sustainability policies and practice are not considered adequate to minimise the material risks linked to sustainability. Overall, opposition

is recommended.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 96.0, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 3.8,

10. Re-appoint Ernst & Young LLP as Auditor of the Company.

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 28.57% of audit fees during the year under review and 8.66% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

12. Approve Political Donations

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. The Company did not make any political donations or incur any political expenditure and has no intention either now or in the future of doing so.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

14. Issue Shares for Cash

Authority is limited to 5% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. Within acceptable limits. It is noted that in the 2023 Annual General Meeting the proposed resolution received significant opposition of 10.39% of the votes and the Company did not disclosed information as to how address the issue with its shareholders.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.6, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

15. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

16. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.2,

DIAGEO PLC AGM - 26-09-2024

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

Awards made under all schemes during the year are considered excessive as they exceed 200% of base salary. The CEO's salary is in the upper quartile of a peer comparator group. This raises concerns over potential excessiveness of the variable incentive schemes currently in operation, as the base salary determines the overall quantum of the remuneration structure. Total combined variable reward paid during the year is considered excessive, exceeding the 200% recommended threshold. The ratio of CEO pay compared to that of the average employee exceeds the recommended limit of 20:1 and is therefore not considered appropriate.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AE.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.0, Abstain: 1.1, Oppose/Withhold: 3.9,

7. *Re-elect Karen Blackett - Designated Non-Executive*

Independent Non-Executive Director. It is considered that a worker's representative should be chosen by the employees of the company, rather than being appointed by a Non-Executive Director for workforce engagement. In instances where there is no stated intention to implement an Employee Director nominated by peers, standing

for election at the AGM, support for the Designated Director for Workforce Engagement will not be given. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.1,

10. *Re-elect Javier Ferrán - Chair (Non Executive)*

Chair. Independent upon appointment.

The Chair is also chairing another company within the FTSE 350 index. It is considered that a chair cannot effectively represent two corporate cultures. The possibility of having to commit additional time to the role in times of crisis is ever present. Given this, a Chair should focus his attention onto the only one FTSE 350 Company. Additionally, since there is no director up for election who is responsible for sustainability, such as the Chair of the Sustainability Committee or any of its members, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability program. Given the concerns regarding the Company's sustainability policies and practices, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.0, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

11. *Re-elect Susan Kilsby - Senior Independent Director*

Senior Independent Director. Considered independent.

There are serious concerns regarding the remuneration policy at the company, and it is considered that the chair of the Remuneration Committee should be held accountable for it when considering re-election.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

14. *Re-appoint PwC as the Auditors*

PwC proposed. No non-audit fees were paid to the auditors in the past three years. This approach is commended. The current auditor has been in place for more than five years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.5, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

16. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority is subject to an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000.

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 50,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.5, Oppose/Withhold: 1.9,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.4, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 0.5,

AVANGRID, INC. AGM - 26-09-2024

2.1. *Elect Ignacio Sánchez Galán - Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as the director has a relationship with the Company, which is considered material. He serves as Chair and CEO of Iberdrola, S.A, which owns 81.6% of the Company's common stock. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. There are concerns over the director's potential aggregate time commitments.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2.2. *Elect John E. Baldacci - Vice Chair (Non Executive)*

Non-Executive Vice Chair. The Vice Chair is not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Vice Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Vice Chair is considered to be incompatible with this.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

2.3. *Elect Daniel Alcain Lopez - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director has a relationship with the Company, which is considered material. He serves as Director of Group Administration and Control of Iberdrola, S.A, which owns 81.6% of the Company's common stock. In addition, the director was formerly

employed by Avangrid as Senior Vice President - Controller from 2015 to 2018. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.5. Elect María Fátima Báñez García - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Governance and Sustainability Committee. Not considered independent as it is noted that the director previously served as a board member for Iberdrola México until June 2022. Iberdrola México is a member of the Iberdrola group, which owns 81.6% of the Company's share capital. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.6. Elect Agustín Delgado Martín - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent as the director is considered to be connected with a significant shareholder Iberdrola S.A. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.10. Elect John L. Lahey - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and the Chair of the Compensation and Nominating Committee. Not considered to be independent as owing to an aggregate tenure of over nine years as he served on the board of UIL from 1994 until its acquisition by the Company in 2015. The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Compensation and Nominating Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.11. Elect Santiago Martínez Garrido - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director. Not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years. There is insufficient independent representation on the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.12. Elect José Sainz Armada - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director, member of the Compensation and Nominating Committee, and Governance and Sustainability Committee. The Director is not considered independent as he served as Chief Financial, Control and Resources Officer at Iberdrola, S.A, which owns 81.6% of the Company's common stock and not considered independent owing to a tenure of over nine years.

This director is a member of the compensation and nominating committee. It is important that this committee be exclusively comprised of independent directors in order to ensure an equitable and unprejudiced appointment process. Does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

2.13. Elect Alan D. Solomont - Non-Executive Director

Non-Executive Director and the Chair of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent as owing to tenure of over nine years.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: Oppose

4. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company included non-financial metrics into the annual bonus structure, which is considered best practice. The annual incentive award made during the year under review is not considered to be overly excessive as it amounts to less than 200% of base salary. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Maximum long-term award opportunities are not limited to 200% of base salary, which raises concerns over the potential excessiveness of the remuneration structure. Retention awards make up a significant portion of the long-term incentives and therefore the scheme does not link pay to performance. Five-year vesting would be preferred. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. In addition, executive compensation is aligned with companies of a similar market cap. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. The compensation rating is: ADC.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

5. Adjournment Proposal

The board requests authority to adjourn the special meeting until a later date or dates, if necessary, in order to permit further solicitation of proxies if there are not sufficient votes at the time of the special meeting to approve the merger. An oppose vote is recommended to any adjournment or postponement of meetings if a sufficient number of votes are present to constitute a quorum. It is considered that where a quorum is present, the vote outcome should be considered representative of shareholder opinion.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

JUMBO SA EGM - 26-09-2024

1. *Approval of the establishment of a Share Buyback Program in accordance with article 49 of law 4548/2018*

It is proposed to the shareholders of the Company to approve the adoption of a buyback program, in order to reduce the Company's share capital and cancel its own shares, in accordance with the provisions of the article 49 of Law 4548/2018, under the following conditions: The sole purpose of the Company for acquiring its own shares through a purchase from the Greek stock market is the reduction of its own share capital, which will be carried out by the cancellation of the shares and the equivalent reduction of the share capital. The buyback program will be implemented under the following terms: The maximum number of shares to be acquired will not exceed the percentage of ten percent (10%) of the fully paid-up share capital of the Company, ie a total of 13,605,975 (136,059,759 x 10%) shares. Their minimum purchase price will be one (EUR 1) euro per share and their maximum purchase price will be EUR 27.20 per share. The program's period of implementation is twenty-four (24) months. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares for the next 24 months. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders. As no clear justification was provided by the Board, it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

LAMB WESTON HOLDINGS INC AGM - 26-09-2024

1b. *Elect Charles A. Blixt - Non-Executive Director*

Non Executive Director and Chair of the Governance Committee. Not considered to be independent as owing to a tenure of over nine years.

The director chairs a committee that is not fully independent, which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Regardless of local practice or recommendations, or average percentage of diversity on the boards of local listed companies, it is considered that gender diversity should be explicitly taken into account when appointing directors. Namely, it is considered that at least one-third of the board should be reserved for the less represented gender. There is an increasing amount of research that suggests that more diverse companies actually perform better than less diverse companies, and they lead to higher returns. By seemingly not including diversity in the composition of the board, and not having an adequate target to do so, it is considered that the company is not taking into account the materiality of non-financial factors, which could be detrimental for shareholders. As the Chair of the Governance Committee is not up for election, opposition is recommended to the members of the Committee.

This director is the Chair of the Nomination Committee, and with less than 33% of the Board being women, the composition does not meet Camden's guidelines.

The Chair of the Sustainability Committee is accountable for the Company's sustainability programme and there are serious concerns over the Company's sustainability policies and practice. The Company's sustainability policies, practice and disclosure fall short of Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.2, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 3.4,

1e. *Elect Andre J. Hawaux - Non-Executive Director*

Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee. Not considered independent as he held executive positions at Conagra Brands, from which the Company was spin-off in November 2016.

The director chairs a committee which is not fully independent which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 98.8, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 1.0,

2. Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance metrics are replicated under different incentive plans, raising concerns that executives are being rewarded twice for the same performance. Retention awards made up less than one-third of the awards granted to executives, which is considered best practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ACB.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 93.3, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 6.3,

3. Appoint the Auditors

KPMG proposed. Non-audit fees represented 7.70% of audit fees during the year under review and 12.77% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.3, Abstain: 0.2, Oppose/Withhold: 0.6,

4. Amend Articles: Approval of an Amendment to the Company's Amended and Restated Certificate of Incorporation to Allow for Exculpation of Officers as Permitted by Delaware Law

It is proposed that the Restated Certificate of Incorporation of Juniper, is amended, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding officer exculpation. The Board seeks authority to amend the articles, to reflect new Delaware law provisions regarding the exculpation of officers. Article VII of the Company's Certificate of Incorporation (Certificate) currently provides for the Company to limit the monetary liability of directors in certain circumstances pursuant to and consistent with the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL). The State of Delaware recently amended Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL to allow Delaware corporations to extend similar protections to officers. Specifically, the amendments to the DGCL allow Delaware corporations to exculpate their officers for personal liability for breaches of the duty of care in certain circumstances.

While efforts to align executive and non-executive liabilities and harmonize corporate articles are acknowledged, decisions taken by executives, may cause significant higher losses compared to those taken by directors. While officers remain liable for lack of fiduciary duty due to wrongful actions committed wilfully, they would nevertheless be exculpated against direct actions, such as class actions. Shareholders could still act via derivative lawsuits, which are however more complex and less lucrative legal avenue since shareholders would bring an action in the name of the corporation and not in the name of shareholders. This could potentially dissuade shareholders from pursuing actions and entrench poorly performing officers.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 89.2, Abstain: 0.4, Oppose/Withhold: 10.5,

BAILLIE GIFFORD US GROWTH TRUST PLC AGM - 27-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

It is noted that no dividend was recommended for the year under review.

The company have disclosed a voting policy indicating how they vote on issues relating to investment and investee companies. In addition, it is also noted ESG matters are taken into account in investment decisions which is welcomed.

Administration and company secretarial duties are undertaken by the Investment Manager of the company. Independence from the management company is considered a key governance issue affecting investment trusts and to ensure that the management company is not used as a conduit for shareholder communication with the board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

12. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

Authority is sought to repurchase up to 14.99% of the issued share capital. The authority would expire at the next AGM. Before considering approval of buybacks (and this should come from the board, not the manager, nor a company secretary in the employ of the fund manager), we would like to see a public statement: - addressing whether any part of the discount can be explained by capitalisation of the costs (the total costs as in the Key Investor information Document - 'KID'), - setting out why the board believes that the performance of the incumbent management is not a contributory factor to the discount, and - setting out how the current fee structure might be contributing to the discount, for example some investment companies cap management fees, or reduce the manager fee the larger the fund gets, - setting out the effect of prior year buybacks to help determine the effectiveness of prior buybacks.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 100.0, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

BALTIC CLASSIFIEDS GROUP PLC AGM - 27-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

The annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting and has been audited and certified.

There are concerns regarding the company's sustainability policies and practices. The annual report and financial statements may not accurately reflect the material and financial impact of non-traditional financial risks, including the lack of board-level accountability for sustainability issues. These concerns should have been addressed in the annual report submitted to shareholders; however, the report fails to do so adequately. Camden is recommended to oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 0.0,

2. *Approve the Remuneration Report*

It is proposed to approve the remuneration report.

The expectations for pay schemes for approval for general meetings are: a going rate true market salary, director service contracts approved by vote, a single profit pool to be distributed company wide, exceptional bonuses only and no long-term incentive plans (LTIPs). Executives who are directors have unlimited liability, fiduciary duties and Companies Act s172 and contractual duties. The delivery of objectives covered by these duties should not be additionally rewarded with bonuses or LTIPs

but considered part of the job. It is believed that the fallacy of 'alignment' with shareholders needs to be retired. Not only do schemes not align, but executives are employees of the company with duties to it. The duties including the new s172 duties should already set the alignment. It is incongruous to use pay schemes as a vehicle for alternative means of 'alignment' which can actually create a competing set of director 'duties'.

Rating: AD.

Based on this rating it is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 96.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 3.3,

4. *Re-elect Trevor Mather - Chair (Non Executive)*

Independent Non-Executive Chair of the Board. As there is no Chair of the Sustainability Committee, the Chair of the Board is considered accountable for the Company's sustainability programme.

There is no board level responsibility for ESG issues which does not meet Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.9, Abstain: 0.3, Oppose/Withhold: 6.8,

10. *Re-elect Kristel Volver - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director and Chair of the Audit Committee. The Company has no external whistle-blowing hotline. This suggests that concerns that should be raised by a whistle-blower are dealt with internally, which may increase the risk of such issues not being followed up or escalating to a level where the higher was the level of the misconduct, the more likely is the issue to be concealed. The chair of the audit committee is considered accountable for the whistle-blowing reporting structure. It is recommended Camden to Oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

11. *Re-elect Jurgita Kirvaitiene - Non-Executive Director*

Independent Non-Executive Director.

This director attended less than ninety per cent of the board and committee meetings, which they were entitled to attend. There are therefore concerns surrounding this director's aggregate time commitments and support cannot be recommended.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.1, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.9,

13. *Re-appoint KPMG LLP as auditor of the Company*

KPMG proposed. No non-audit fees were paid during the year under review and 36.89% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees raises some concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor..

In late 2020 International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB) produced a consultation entitled, Fraud and Going Concern and refers to the "expectations gap" in the sense that the public expect more of auditors than is expected of them. By reference to conclusions of the BEIS Select Committee of Parliament and High Court decisions, there isn't an expectations gap so far as the UK at least is concerned. Indeed auditor duties in respect of fraud are onerous and in the Barings case at the High Court the issue of negligence didn't merely involve the signing of the public accounts by the audit partner with misstated amounts in, but earlier at the time more junior members of staff missed the fraud when it was smaller reviewing a bank reconciliation (a private and not public document).

The IAASB model of auditing is based on auditors certifying information that is "useful to users". That construct side-steps the crucial duties auditors have for the benefit of the company itself as the Barings case demonstrated. In PIRC's view that model fuels an unwarranted expectations gap and, if audits are limited by the

standards misdirect the focus of audits to being "useful for users", a delivery gap because the legal standard and duty is broader than the standards themselves state. PIRC has therefore asked the IAASB to reissue its consultation and has also written to the largest accounting firms to repudiate the IAASB consultation and confirm that the concept of an 'expectations gap' does not limit the scope of their work. In parallel PIRC has reviewed responses from the largest accounting firms to the IAASB determine whether they were encouraging or refuting the concept of an expectations gap. Both Deloitte and BDO correctly referred to the "expectations gap" being dependent on local laws. Both firms also referred to problems with international auditing standards and international accounting standards. BDO went so far as to make other recommendations as well. Mazars did similar in giving evidence to the BEIS Select Committee. In the absence of similar statements from PwC, KPMG, EY or Grant Thornton, Camden is unable to support re-election or re-appointment of those firms as auditors. PIRC issue: the current auditor has been in place for more than five years and there are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

15. *Approve Political Donations*

The proposed authority exceeds an overall aggregate limit on political donations and expenditure of GBP 100,000. Political donations in excess of this amount are considered as an inappropriate use of shareholder funds according to Camden guidelines.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 97.6, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 2.4,

17. *Issue Shares for Cash*

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 90.8, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 9.2,

18. *Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment*

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported as it is considered that the 5% limit sought under the general authority above is sufficient. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 84.4, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 15.6,

19. *Authorise Share Repurchase*

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 99.7, Abstain: 0.0, Oppose/Withhold: 0.3,

TRIMBLE INC. AGM - 30-09-2024

3. *Appoint the Auditors*

EY proposed. Non-audit fees represented 24.56% of audit fees during the year under review and 16.84% on a three-year aggregate basis. This level of non-audit fees does not raise serious concerns about the independence of the statutory auditor. The current auditor has been in place for more than ten years. There are concerns that failure to regularly rotate the audit firm can compromise the independence of the auditor.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 80.1, Abstain: 3.6, Oppose/Withhold: 16.2,

4. *Approval of Amendments to the 2002 Stock Plan*

The Board proposes the amendment of a current long-term incentive plan. Under the plan, the CEO and other executives will be awarded rights to shares, a portion (or all) of which will vest depending on the achievement of some performance criteria. Vesting period is three years and as such is considered to be short-term, while performance targets have not been fully disclosed in a quantified manner at this time.

LTIP schemes are not considered an effective means of incentivising performance and are inherently flawed. There is the risk that they are rewarding volatility rather than the performance of the company. They are acting as a complex and opaque hedge against absolute company underperformance and long-term share price falls. They are also a significant factor in reward for failure.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 95.0, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 5.0,

2. *Advisory Vote on Executive Compensation*

The Company has submitted a proposal for shareholder ratification of its executive compensation policy and practices. The voting outcome for this resolution reflects the balance of opinion on the adequacy of disclosure, the balance of performance and reward and the terms of executive employment. The Company uses adjusted performance metrics for most elements of compensation. The use of non-GAAP metrics prevents shareholders from being able to assess fully whether the performance targets are sufficiently challenging. The Company does not consider non-financial metrics in its assessment of performance. Awards under the annual-incentive plans are tied to multiple performance conditions, which is considered best practice. Performance measures attached to long-term incentives do not duplicate those attached to other awards, which is considered acceptable practice. Retention awards made up less than one-third of the awards granted to executives, which is considered best practice. Performance shares have a three-year performance period, which is a market standard. However, a five-year performance period is considered best practice. Executive compensation is not aligned with peer group averages. The compensation rating is: ACA.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

Results: For: 92.9, Abstain: 0.1, Oppose/Withhold: 7.1,

MARLOWE PLC AGM - 30-09-2024

1. *Receive the Annual Report*

Disclosure is adequate and the Annual report was made available sufficiently before the meeting. The financial statements have been audited and unqualified. Although

not required to do so under AIM listing regulations, it is considered best practice for the Remuneration report to be submitted to a shareholder vote. It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

4. Re-elect Lord Ashcroft - Chair (Non Executive)

Non-Executive Chair of the Board. The Chair is not considered to be independent as Lord Ashcroft holds 12.27% of the Company's share capital. It is a generally accepted norm of good practice that a Chair of the Board should act with a proper degree of independence from the Company's management team when exercising his or her oversight of the functioning of the Board. Being a non-independent Chair is considered to be incompatible with this. Furthermore Lord Ashcroft is Chair of the Nomination Committee. In terms of best practice, it is considered that the Nomination Committee should be comprised exclusively of independent members, including the chair.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

7. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

8. Authorise Share Repurchase

The authority is limited to 10% of the Company's issued share capital and will expire at the next AGM. It is proposed to authorise the Board to purchase Company's shares until next AGM. This resolution will not be supported unless the Board has set forth a clear, cogent and compelling case demonstrating how the authority would benefit long-term shareholders and no clear justification was provided by the Board.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

GREATLAND GOLD PLC EGM - 30-09-2024

3. Issue Shares for Cash

The authority sought exceeds the recommended 5% maximum of the Company's issued share capital and expires at the next AGM.

It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: *Oppose*

4. Issue Shares for Cash for the Purpose of Financing an Acquisition or Other Capital Investment

The Board is seeking approval to issue up to an additional 10% of the Company's issued share capital for cash for use only in connection with an acquisition or a

specified capital investment. Such proposal is not supported. Best practice would be to seek a specific authority from shareholders in relation to a specific transaction if such situation arises and this is not the case.
It is recommended that Camden oppose.

Vote Cast: Oppose

4 Appendix

The regions are categorised as follows:

| | |
|------------------|---|
| ASIA | China; Hong Kong; Indonesia; India; South Korea; Laos; Macao; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; Taiwan; Papua New Guinea; Vietnam |
| SANZA | Australia; New Zealand; South Africa |
| EUROPE/GLOBAL EU | Albania; Austria; Belgium; Bosnia; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Denmark; Estonia; France; Finland; Germany; Greece; Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Liechtenstein; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Moldova; Monaco; Montenegro; Netherlands; Norway; Poland; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland |
| JAPAN | Japan |
| USA/CANADA | USA; Canada; Bermuda |
| UK/BRIT OVERSEAS | UK; Cayman Islands; Gibraltar; Guernsey; Jersey |
| SOUTH AMERICA | Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Cuba; Ecuador; El Salvador; Guatemala; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Panama; Paraguay; Peru; Uruguay; Venezuela |
| REST OF WORLD | Any Country not listed above |

The following is a list of commonly used acronyms and definitions.

| Acronym | Description |
|---------|---|
| AGM | Annual General Meeting |
| CEO | Chief Executive Officer |
| EBITDA | Earnings Before Interest Tax Depreciation and Amortisation |
| EGM | Extraordinary General Meeting |
| EPS | Earnings Per Share |
| FY | Financial Year |
| KPI | Key Performance Indicators - financial or other measures of a company's performance |
| LTIP | Long Term Incentive Plan - Equity based remuneration scheme which provides stock awards to recipients |
| NED | Non-Executive Director |
| NEO | Named Executive Officer - Used in the US to refer to the five highest paid executives |
| PLC | Publicly Listed Company |
| PSP | Performance Share Plan |
| ROCE | Return on Capital Employed |
| SID | Senior Independent Director |
| SOP | Stock Option Plan - Scheme which grants stock options to recipients |
| TSR | Total Shareholder Return - Stock price appreciation plus dividends |



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